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ABSTRACT
PATH DEPENDENCE IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS: RESOURCES, REGIMES,
AND INTERVENTIONS
Ivan Medynskyi
Old Dominion University, 2015
Director: Dr. David C. Earnest

This dissertation investigates the patterns of path dependence in intrastate
conflicts. It is motivated by three research questions: What factors determine a particular
outcome of a civil war? How strong is their impact? What are the causal mechanisms in
play? To examine these questions, this study introduces a theory of path dependence to
the study of intrastate conflicts that bridges the gap between analyses of the phases of
contention.
First, it examines the broad understanding of path dependence that highlights the
impact of initial conditions on civil war outcomes. Then, this dissertation explores the
narrower notion which focuses on the role of timing and sequence of internal factors and
intervening events in shaping different resolutions to intrastate conflicts. Using
multinomial logistic regression and event history models to analyze initial conditions,
intrinsic features, and intervening factors in influencing the probability of particular civil
war outcomes, this study identifies relevant agencies that can be utilized to shape
solutions for current and future instances of armed civil conflicts. Finally, three case
studies test the applicability of the path dependence theory through outlining the
narratives, incorporating quantitative findings, and identifying causal mechanisms.
The empirical findings of the initial conditions models emphasize the relevance of
conflict spillover, non-lootable resources, and structure of bipolarity. An investigation

into the factors that ‘lock in’ a particular civil war outcome highlights the role of UN and
regional intergovernmental organizations in accelerating a compromise outcome;
explains the variation in dynamics behind democratic and autocratic regimes; but
surprisingly finds no support for the relationship between the size of the armed forces and
conflict outcome. Although case study analysis supports the validity of the empirical
results, it also points at the potential limitations of the quantitative design. Since this
study follows a mixed methods approach, it effectively compensates for the drawbacks of
different types of analysis.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“Everything that has a beginning has an end.”
The Oracle, The Matrix Revolutions

War appears to be endemic to human history, yet it is a finite process. Every
armed conflict that was started out of greed, grievance, misperception or overconfidence
eventually loses its momentum and culminates in a cessation of violence. While we
always strive to understand the underlying causes of war to potentially prevent it, once
the armed conflict has started we leave it to its own devices as if it is impossible to
understand the underlying causes of its termination. Closer examination of the millennialong scholarship on war indicates the disproportionate emphasis on how conflicts start,
rather on why they end or the way they end. Contemporary inquiries into the nature of
conflict focus on the causal contributions of motives and opportunities on the onset of
hostilities, while overlooking the causality behind their termination. This study introduces
the idea of path dependence to the study of civil wars by synthesizing the existing
approaches to study of intrastate conflicts with discourses on process evolution in order
to demonstrate how the initial conditions of war and tipping points shape the outcomes of
conflict.
The increasing interest in the phenomenon of civil wars is not surprising given
the tectonic trends in the global conflict dynamics. The technological, political, and
economic progress of our civilization is closely related to the sophistication of the ways
we kill each other. The nature of war, however, has changed in the past seventy years as
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the number of wars between states has diminished, while conflicts within national
borders have become more frequent (Figure 1). The advance of weapons of mass
destruction and global confrontation between the victors of the Second World War
shifted the dynamics of conflict to the intrastate level. The academic and policy worlds
soon followed with the development of a new scholarly field that focused on the causes
and consequences of civil wars.
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Figure 1. Trends in Various Types of Armed Conflicts, 1945-2007.1

The primary contribution of the intrastate conflict research agenda was an inquiry
into the factors that influence the probability of war onset. Recent scholarship moved
beyond the causes of civil wars and investigated the dynamics of conflict, chances of its
recurrence, and the impact of third party interventions. The main drawback of the current

1

The graph is constructed by author using the data from the Correlates of War project.
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state of affairs in the field of civil wars lies in the reductive approach that treats the
conflict as the sum of different stages rather than a continuous process. Application of
path dependence theory, however, allows for analysis of an intrastate conflict in its
entirety. The main assumption about path dependence is rather intuitive and postulates
that previous stages in the process make causal contributions to the subsequent stages –
or in other words history matters. Originally applied to explain economic processes and
technological transformations, path dependence theory was recently introduced by Paul
Pierson into the study of political processes.2 He argued that the phenomenon of path
dependence can be analyzed through a broader concept that focuses on the “causal
relevance of preceding stages in a temporal sequence” and a narrow concept that
investigates “social processes that exhibit increasing returns.”3 In this dissertation, I
extrapolate path dependence theory to the study of intrastate conflicts and evaluate the
explanatory power of both the broad and narrow definitions. While the existing
scholarship examines either separate phases of civil war or factors that affect its
dynamics, the theory of path dependence bridges the gap between the onset of war,
period of confrontation, and its outcome by examining the causal links between different
periods.
My analysis of seven decades of the intrastate armed conflict reveals similar
patterns of war development that have not been limited to a particular geographic region
or a time period. Across the instances of civil wars, certain initial conditions such as the
presence of oil or hostilities in the neighboring countries have shaped the outcome of
conflict, while other crucial factors such as ethnic diversity or abundance of easily
2

Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political
Science Review Vol. 94, no. 2 (June, 2000): 251-267.
3
Ibid, 252.
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extractable resources such as diamonds have no effect. Just as the initiation of war
appears to be contingent on a set of greed and grievance factors, so do its outcomes
largely depend upon the presence or absence of relevant onset features as well as tipping
points. The idea of the internal capacity of the state and external interventions to have the
power to shift the course of conflict and maximize the probability of government’s
success, rebels’ victory, or a compromise lies at the core of the tipping point hypothesis.
Here I argue that the state capacity represented by the size of government’s armed forces
and regime type as well as the third party interventions by international, regional, and
state actors can significantly alter the path of conflict and “tip” the scales of war. Indeed,
the models of path dependence through the prism of tipping points reveal the importance
of fluctuations in state capacity and the timing for interventions.
Although path dependence theory effectively synthesizes fragmented scholarly
approaches to the phenomenon of civil war, the true test of my findings lies in
understanding the direction of current intrastate conflicts and predicting their outcomes.
This study closely examines civil wars in Russian autonomous republic of Chechnya; the
Democratic Republic of Congo; and Sri Lanka. Throughout these three cases of conflict
between the central government and insurgents, common patterns in initial conditions and
intervening factors have shaped the outcomes of conflict. Given the insights that theory
of path dependence reveals about the dynamics of civil wars, it is valid to theorize about
the potential developments of internal conflict in the war-torn eastern regions of Ukraine,
where pro-Russian separatists are battling the central government.
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From a Peaceful Revolution to an Armed Conflict: War in Ukraine

To illustrate the significance of tipping points, one can consider the current war in
Ukraine. The course of an intrastate conflict has been shaped by foreign military
intervention as well as the tragic events surrounding the destruction of the Malaysian
Airlines Flight 17. Along with unique initial conditions that were present at initiation of
hostilities, these events have the capacity to determine the outcome of war.
Since the demise of the Soviet Union and collapse of the bipolar system of
international relations, the power distribution has shifted dramatically across the globe.
The frozen conflicts that were kept intact by the rigid Cold War realities have been
unraveled, which in turn produced the loci of instabilities and violence. An outbreak of
the violent conflict in Ukraine; the breach of its sovereign borders; impending energy
resources warfare; and ongoing exchange of sanctions between Western states and Russia
bring the current state of affairs in Europe to a new threat level. Unlike unrest in
Caucasus, Transnistria, and Central Asia, an intrastate conflict in Ukraine can be hardly
classified as “frozen” considering the absence of hostilities in the past. Even after the
Russian-Georgian war of 2008, the possibility of the Russian-backed insurgency or a
direct Russian invasion has been considered probable, but highly unlikely.
In the past ten years, Ukraine has gone through two fundamental socio-political
processes: the Orange Revolution of 2004 and Euromaidan of 2013/2014. While the
reasons behind the onset of the revolutions are somewhat similar since both were caused
by the dissatisfaction with the political regime and its decisions, the way they progressed
and the outcomes that they brought are astonishingly distinct. The Orange Revolution
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brought millions of people on the streets in 2004 in a sign of protest against an election
fraud of the aspiring presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych. The peaceful character
of the demonstrations and absence of hostilities from the police and other armed
structures has made the Orange Revolution an example of non-violent resistance.
Widespread corruption, rising authoritarian grip, and finally a last-minute
decision to halt the signing of the Association Agreement with European Union in
exchange for lavish credit from the Russian Federation have led thousands of people on
the streets of Kyiv in the fall of 2013 to express their dissatisfaction and demand the
signing of the agreement with EU. What started as a peaceful process quickly escalated
into a brutal beating of the demonstrators who were primarily students. The next couple
months have consolidated the citizens in the face of growing aggression of the
presidential administration such as bloody clashes with special units of police,
humiliation of protesters, their disappearance and, tragically, deaths. The apogee of
conflict – deadliest clashes between Euromaidan demonstrators and armed units
including snipers and heavily armed units between February 18th and 24th – resulted in
hundred people killed and thousands injured. Against all odds, demonstrators were able
to hold their ground and push back the police. In the face of imminent repercussions,
Yanukovych and his administration have fled the country and the provisional government
has been established by the leaders of Euromaidan.
The success of the protestors, however, has sent signals not only to other regions
of Ukraine that have supported the escapee president, but also to the neighbors, including
the Russian Federation which openly supported Yanukovych and his struggle against
Euromaidan. On March 16th, 2014, the Crimean autonomous republic held the fictitious
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referendum that was backed by “green people,” Russian forces that however did not have
any insignia. In a landslide approval voting, Crimea declared independence that was not
recognized by Ukraine or the international community, but has been widely deemed as a
fair and just by Russia. Shortly after, Crimea joined the Russian Federation as a new
administrative unit. Separatist tendencies have spread further in the southern and eastern
parts of Ukraine. Scenarios similar to those in Crimea were executed in several oblasts,
but only in Luhansk and Donetsk, were separatists able to find the support – and not in a
small part due to the incoming financial and military assistance from the eastern
neighbor. The ensuing Anti-Terrorist Operation carried out by the Ukrainian army and
the National Guard is aimed at curbing the foreign military assistance to separatists and
reestablishing constitutional order in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.
A year-long intrastate conflict in Eastern Ukraine took the lives of thousands of
soldiers and civilians. Although several definitions were given to this armed conflict
including anti-terrorist operation, civil war, or Russian invasion of Ukraine, the term
“hybrid war” has been widely used to capture the peculiarities of the foreign intervention
conducted through the use of special forces, mercenaries, cyber attacks, and
informational warfare in addition to providing military equipment and training for the
insurgents. This type of tactics along with its permanent seat on the UN Security Council
allowed the Russian Federation to claim its non-involvement into the intrastate conflict in
Ukraine. Given this new trend in conflict dynamics that put the Baltic countries as well as
Kazakhstan to alert, it is critical to trace both the onset factors that led to the outbreak of
violence as well as intervening conditions that can ultimately change the course of war.
These illustrate the importance of path dependence in civil wars.

8
Tipping the Scales of Conflict

Current approaches to the study of intrastate conflicts are not equipped to delve
into the peculiarities of a specific war in all its totality and tend to analyze factors that
shape a particular stage of hostilities. Moreover, they rarely focus on the ongoing
conflicts and the ways to solve them. The theoretical approach that I develop in this
dissertation synthesizes path dependence and civil war scholarship to provide avenues to
hypothesize about the possible courses that the conflicts can take in the observable future.
From the path dependence standpoint, intrastate conflicts are shaped by the initial
conditions during the start of the war as well as internal factors and external interventions
that “tip” the scales of conflict. The war in Eastern Ukraine is no exception.
In Ukraine, several onset factors that are traditionally associated in the civil war
literature with the outbreak of conflict have provided causal contribution to the initiation
of hostilities in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. From the greed and grievances
perspective, this region has both the motivation factor of the ethnic Russians that
comprise approximately 35 percent of the population as well as opportunity factor of
non-lootable resources (coal and shale gas).4 As subsequent chapters show, my
quantitative analysis of the conflict dynamics for the past seventy years finds little
evidence for connection between ethnicity and the outcomes of a civil war. At the same
time, non-lootable resources such as oil appear to be connected with the minimization of
the rebels’ chances to succeed. Since both coal and oil are non-lootable resources, it is
valid to assume that separatists cannot easily finance their activities though coal mining.

4

“All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001,” State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, accessed May 31, 2015,
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/

9
The primary factor that contributed to the onset of intrastate conflict in Eastern Ukraine
and could potentially shape its outcome is war contagion or spillover of hostilities. After
the annexation of Crimea, the Russian Federation contributed to the outbreak of conflict
by providing financial, military and technical support for pro-Russian insurgents. My
analysis indicates that wars shaped by contagion are less likely to result in a
government’s victory and more likely in a compromise.
The caveat here is that war spillover is oftentimes associated with third party
intervention. Indeed, Russian military intervention in the summer of 2014 has shaped the
course of the war. Towards the end of July, separatists’ forces were in full retreat and
Ukrainian forces were close to capturing their last strongholds. The incursions of regular
Russian troops, which were constantly denied by Moscow, have shifted the tides of war.
They led to heavy casualties on both sides and signing of provisional ceasefire agreement
in Minsk in September, 2014. It is possible that the direct Russian involvement could
have occurred earlier. Yet, the destruction of the Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 over
Donetsk region on July 2014 has attracted international attention to the war in Ukraine
and intervened into the strategic calculations. Both the Malaysian Airlines tragedy and
Russian August invasion can be considered “tipping” points as they shifted the course of
the conflict. This dissertation evaluates the impact of such tipping points on the outcomes
of civil wars. Through a series of statistical inquiries and case studies, it identifies the
patterns of path dependence in intrastate conflicts. In essence, I devise a study that
answers the following questions: What factors determine a particular outcome of a civil
war? How strong is their impact? What are the causal mechanisms in play?
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Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation consists of seven chapters, bibliography and an appendix. The
introductory chapter outlines the contemporary scholarship on intrastate conflicts;
introduces the theory of path dependence as the framework for analyzing civil wars as a
continuous process; and, discusses the central research question and methodological
foundation of the dissertation.
The second chapter of the dissertation introduces theoretical approaches to the
study of war and security in general and intrastate conflict in particular. Here, I trace the
development of the literature on the causes and consequences of war from the time of
antiquity to the modern era. Next, I propose a classification of the intrastate conflict
literature according to the phases of war that it addresses. Thus, my evaluation is focused
on works that (a) analyze factors behinds the onset of civil wars; (b) elements that shape
conflict dynamics; (c) the impact of third party interventions; and (d) debates around the
ways civil wars are resolved. I provide an overview of sociological inquiries into
contentious politics, state capacity, and causal mechanisms in civil wars. Furthermore, I
evaluate the existing approaches to the path dependence and elaborate on the ways they
can be applied to the study of intrastate conflicts. I extrapolate the broad and narrow
notions of path dependence to evaluate the dynamics of civil wars. Evaluation of the
impact of initial conditions on the outcome of a war builds up on the former concept,
while the analysis of endogenous and exogenous tipping points investigates the latter
definition of path dependence. Here, I also speculate about the causal mechanisms of
tipping points such as the type of regime of the state in which war occurs, the
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peacekeeping missions by the United Nations, or regional intergovernmental
organizations.
Chapter three outlines a detailed analysis of the research design, methodology,
and explanatory variables. Here, I provide an overview of the existing approaches to
defining a civil war and discuss the reasons behind my choice to utilize the Correlates of
War Project’s definition of an intrastate conflict. By following the logic of mixed
methods research, I devise three analytical frameworks to examine hypotheses pertaining
to initial conditions and tipping points in shaping path dependence in civil wars as well as
to examine the causal mechanisms behind them through case studies analysis. Finally, I
discuss the design of the OTIC and the TPIC datasets that I develop and use to test the
hypotheses of the first two analytical frameworks.
The fourth chapter investigates whether the factors that lead to the start of the
armed conflict may affect how civil wars are resolved. In this section, I briefly describe
the logic behind the power of initial conditions, and follow with the output of the
multinomial logistic regression analysis of the onset-termination hypotheses. I provide
both the results with three civil war base outcomes and marginal effects to account for
directionality and magnitude of the explanatory variables. I discuss the findings of the
quantitative tests in the context of path dependence dynamics as well as in their
relationship to the existing literature on intrastate conflicts. The examination of the
opportunity and motivational factors, spillover effects, and control for the Cold War
period produces a comprehensive picture for the broad concept of path dependence in
intrastate conflicts.
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Chapter five of the dissertation addresses the narrow concept of path dependence
in civil wars by evaluating the impact of endogenous and exogenous tipping factors on
the outcome and duration of a civil war. Specifically, I focus on the timing and sequence
characteristics of path dependence. The TPIC dataset reflects these features through
structuring each new exogenous tipping point as a separate period during which the civil
war may come to an end. Here, I apply a multinomial logistic regression analysis and
three event history (survival) models to test the hypotheses derived from the narrow
concept of path dependence. While the earlier inquiries into the analysis of civil war
outcomes utilized parametric survival models and the most recent studies applied the Cox
proportional hazards model, I argue that these approaches do not satisfy the main
assumption about the dependence of competing risks in the outcomes of civil wars.
Instead, I apply a semiparametric proportional hazards model developed by Fine and
Gray that controls for the fact that three possible outcomes of intrastate conflicts are
interdependent. Finally, I provide a comparative analysis of all three survival models to
check the consistency of the findings across the specifications.
The sixth chapter of the dissertation offers a detailed examination of three cases
of an intrastate conflict through the lens of initial conditions, tipping factors, and causal
mechanisms of path dependence. The selection criteria of the cases reflect a variation in
the civil war outcome, the presence of exogenous or endogenous tipping factors as well
as in- and out-of-sample cases of civil wars. The three civil wars analyzed in this study
are the First Chechen War that ended in the victory of rebels; Africa’s World War where
warring sides reached a compromise; and, Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War that
concluded with the success of the government. The first two intrastate conflicts were

13
included in the OTIC dataset, while conflict in Sri Lanka is a recent case that I have
utilized to the test the predictive and explanatory power of the path dependence theory.
The concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the empirical models
and discusses their applicability for the analysis of the individual cases of intrastate
conflicts. Next, I outline theoretical and methodological implications of the path
dependence theory in civil wars. I discuss here policy relevance and limitations of the
study as well as recommendations for future research.

Conclusion

Uncovering the intrinsic dynamics that shape the direction and outcomes of
intrastate conflicts can improve our understanding of the most pervasive type of conflict
in modern history. Undoubtedly, the frequency of civil wars will increase given the
negative effects of globalization; the thawing of frozen conflicts; global nuclear
stalemate; and the state of affairs in the contemporary security framework that has
evolved to prevent interstate rather than intrastate warfare. This study offers an initial
step toward identifying causal mechanisms that lead to unique civil war outcomes. Policy
implications of this study can be used to shift the chances of the government’s or rebels’
success in conflict. Yet, caution should be exercised when interpreting the findings of the
quantitative approach since the case studies analysis reveals the complexity of civil war
dynamics.
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CHAPTER 2
INTRASTATE CONFLICTS AND PATH DEPENDENCE

Introduction

The Cold War nuclear stalemate diminished the probability of full-scale interstate
war, but instead indirectly encouraged conflicts of smaller scale. The increasing number
of intrastate conflicts during last fifty years produced a new way of thinking about
conflict in international relations. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
emergence of asymmetric threats, scholars diverted their attention to the study of how
conflict originates within the state; what influences its dynamics; and how it is possible to
end the confrontation. This chapter examines the state of the field regarding intrastate
wars, identifies the civil war sub-debates, and analyzes political science, sociology and
formal modeling perspectives on internal conflicts. It elaborates on the definitions of civil
wars; onset and termination; path dependence; tipping points; and other related notions.
Furthermore, this section focuses on the development of path dependence scholarship in
economics and political science literature and extrapolates its main findings to the sphere
of intrastate conflicts. Finally, I provide a research design that captures the dynamics of
civil war as a path dependent process that goes beyond juxtaposition of onset and
termination cases. By introducing the concept of tipping points in civil wars and
analyzing how these factors shape the path of a particular type of intrastate warfare, I
substantiate not only the existence of the path dependence, but also uncover general
trends behind civil war dynamics.
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Debates in the Study of Intrastate Conflicts

After the end of the Second World War, intrastate wars became the dominant type
of a military conflict. In the wake of reassessing the post-Cold War distribution of power,
identification of modern threats and challenges as well as determination of the
contemporary meaning and role of security, scholars of international relations diverted
their attention to the study of conflict within states. In the following section, I propose the
analysis of the intrastate conflict scholarship through the prism of the evolution and
current state of affairs in the civil war debate; discussion of the semantic and
methodological approaches to the study of civil war; and outlining the limitations and
areas for future improvement and development. First, I limit the scope of academic
investigation to the mainstream international security scholarship that specifically
addresses the notion of intrastate conflict. The sociological and game theoretical
viewpoints are analyzed later in this chapter.
The last century was an era of a tremendous breakthrough in all spheres of
development – space exploration, information revolution, global markets, the list can go
on forever. At the same time, progress brought not only a better quality of life, but also a
more efficient way of combating rivals at the domestic and international levels. Two
devastating world wars revealed the horrific potential of humankind to exterminate its
own kin at an unthinkable scope and rate. Only after the invention of the most deadly
weapon, the nuclear bomb, did states realize the unbearable cost of war at the global
scale. The common knowledge entered the realm of military and political thinking that
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was best summarized by Albert Einstein: “I don’t know [what weapons will be used in
the Third World War]. But I can tell you what they’ll use in the Fourth — rocks!”1
The ensuing stalemate characterized the conflict dynamics of the Cold War
period. Two superpowers separated the world into to spheres of influence and only at the
peripheral regions using proxy states engaged in de facto military confrontation.
Strategists on both sides developed new doctrines that adapted to the bipolar distribution
of power. The bourgeoning neorealist school of thought has viewed bipolarity as the most
stable form of international system. Indeed, the number of interstate wars has
significantly decreased following the Second World War after the ensued SovietAmerican demarcation of the world. However, as the wars between states have become
less frequent, confrontations within the national borders started to characterize global
conflict dynamics. This tendency continued beyond the Cold War era, where intrastate
wars were waged at the periphery of superpower rivalry or in the Third World.
Academic interest in analyzing the phenomenon of civil war has largely resulted
from the reassessment of security field after the end of the Cold War. Despite the
growing frequency of intrastate conflicts and simultaneous decrease of wars between
states since the Second World War, academic interest was largely focused on the latter
type. The peak of intrastate conflicts in the early 1990s sent a signal about the changing
security environment and attracted attention of policy-makers and scholars alike. While
seminal inquiries into the nature of conflict within the states have originated before the
peak of intrastate violence, the advance of quantitative research methods and
accumulation of the recorded history of intrastate conflicts by Correlates of War project
1
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and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) catalyzed the academic discipline.
Currently with no strict agenda on the table, the civil war debate incorporates a variety of
research topics that are oftentimes interconnected between each other as well as with
external scholarly discourses.
Within the overarching intrastate conflict discipline, it is possible to identify
several central sub-debates. The most diverse and prolific research topic addresses the
reasons behind the onset of civil wars. This sub-debate attempts to capture the conditions
and factors that stimulate or inhibit opponents in the internal conflict to engage in the
armed hostilities. The second scholarly sub-debate focuses on the elements that
characterize the dynamics of civil war. The third and arguably the most related to the
discipline of international relations sub-debate revolves around the notion of third party
interventions: when they occur, under what conditions, and whom do they support?
Finally, scholars debate about the solutions to civil wars. While some view institutions or
third party interventions as the answer, others consider partition of the state as the most
viable solution. These sub-debates are, of course, not exhaustive determinants for the
study of civil war and there exists a wider pool of so-called “gray areas” that in some way
are related to the phenomenon of internal conflict. These are repression, genocide,
secession, political violence, revolution, failed states, terrorism, and ethnic conflicts to
name a few. However, since the primary focus of this study is the analysis of the
intrastate conflict, the following overview of scholarship emphasizes four
abovementioned sub-debates: onset, dynamics, third party intervention, and termination
of the intrastate wars.
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As I argued earlier, the academic and policy awareness about the fact that civil
war represents the bulk of conflict incidence across the world appeared only after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Globalization trends revealed the existence of the conflict
zones that previously were outside of the bipolar competition. Moreover, frozen conflicts
that were contained by the military might of Soviet empire started to unravel in the early
nineties. Civil wars in Yugoslavia, Caucasus, Transnistria, and other ethnically diverse
regions have commenced following the vacuum of power. Aside from the collapse of
empires and the advent of globalization, the United Nations, which was no longer a
hostage of ideological rivalry, started to exercise its legitimate role of a peacekeeper and
peace mediator and gave greater voice to the problem of internal conflicts.
Academic response to these structural transformations started to unfold in the
early 1990s. During this period, several seminal works arguably “set the tone” for the
subsequent understanding of the nature of civil wars. In 1994, David Singer and Melvin
Small offered a new revised dataset on international and civil wars.2 The following year,
James D. Fearon published the seminal work “Rationalist Explanations for War” in
which he suggested the reasons why bargaining fails and states occasionally go to war,
which can also be extended to analyze intrastate conflicts. Four years later, Paul Collier
and Anke Hoeffler in “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” offered an examination of
conditions that force actors to engage in intrastate rivalry by focusing on the grievances
and opportunities for seizure of export commodities. In 2002, Gleditsch and other
scholars from Uppsala Conflict Data Program in collaboration with Peace Research
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Institute Oslo developed an Armed Conflict Dataset that provides conflict data from the
period of 1946 to the present.
While it is possible to arbitrarily distinguish scholarship on intrastate conflicts
through the prism of schools of thought (institutional liberalism, structural realism,
constructivism, etc.), it is more appropriate to classify the research contributions in terms
of variable preferences and methodological approaches. Most of the articles under review
have utilized statistical evaluation of intrastate conflicts; formal modeling; or a
combination of both. It is also worthy of notice that the overwhelming majority of
scholarship is the product of American and European academic environments; this fact
can arguably limit the scope of ideas as well as the audience. Finally, it is worth noting
that the United Nations and particularly the World Bank have expressed interest in the
subject of civil wars and on multiple occasions have funded related projects. Thus, the
World Bank in the 1990s sponsored a comprehensive project on the economics of
conflict that involved the efforts of leading academicians (including Collier and
Hoeffler).3
The civil war debate does not revolve around one particular issue. Instead, it
serves as an umbrella for several sub-debates, which touch upon various aspects of
internal conflict. Here, I focus on various topics that reflect the complexity of the
phenomenon of civil war and draw inferences about particular stages of internal conflict,
characterize the intrinsic processes, and speculate about the external variables.
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Onset of Intrastate Conflicts

The first and probably most crucial question that the discipline attempts to answer
is why civil wars occur in the first place. That is to say, scholars go beyond the traditional
understanding of origins of war in faulty human nature or universal greed. Instead, they
aim to apply robust methodological techniques and test models that are peculiar to civil
war. The main points of contestation in this sub-debate are the conditions inside the state
that lead to civil wars; underlying and immediate factors; economic and political
preconditions; resources that could be used to instigate the internal conflict; and, the
unique aims of potential rebel groups.
A quite simple and straightforward yet very influential explanation of the
outbreak of civil war was given by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler in “Greed and
Grievance in Civil War.”4 Their main argument is based on the supposition that the onset
of civil war is dependent upon the motivation of rebel groups and opportunities to fulfill
those motivations. Collier and Hoeffler argue that dissatisfactions of various social
groups within the state, which in turn shape the motivations of rebels, are ubiquitous and,
to a certain degree, always present. Previous literature on the civil war outbreak
constantly emphasized various motivational factors, but failed to explain the relative low
incidence of the actual internal military conflicts. Collier and Hoeffler hypothesized that
rare occurrence of civil war is related to the lack of opportunities on the behalf of the
rebel groups to enforce their grievances. Using econometric methods to test previous
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models and their own ideas about the onset of civil war, the authors have analyzed
seventy-nine intrastate wars in the time span from 1960 to 1999.5
Aside from a wide variety of motive-based approaches to civil wars, Collier and
Hoeffler highlight two seminal works that enhance our understanding of the internal
conflict. The first alternative view on the motive-opportunity relations was offered by
Herschel Grossman, who hypothesized about the importance of lootable resources, which
provide sufficient incentives for rebel groups to engage in the hostilities.6 Another crucial
refinement to the onset literature was made by Jack Hirshleifer through adding a new
determinant of perception that effectively altered the dyad of motive and opportunity.
The possibility of misperceiving grievances could significantly alter the quality of
internal military conflict.7
After testing several greed and grievance models of civil war, Collier and
Hoeffler concluded that opportunity rather than motivation is responsible for the outbreak
of conflict. Among the opportunity variables, the authors identify the availability of
finances (primary commodity exports), the cost of rebellion, and military advantage as
the most significant factors.8 On the other hand, intuitively crucial motivational factors
such as inequality, political rights, ethnic polarization, and religious fractionalization
proved to be of a little significance (ethnic conflict, however, proved to be adversely
related to the outbreak of conflict). Finally, the authors suggested that the significance of
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opportunities and motivations can be substantially increased by the size of the
population.9
The scholarship on the economic determinants of intrastate conflict onset has
burgeoned following the introduction of the greed and grievance paradigm. In The
Political Economy of Armed Conflict, Karen Ballentine, Jake Sherman and their
colleagues emphasize the significance of the war economy in contemporary civil
conflicts.10 Using as a starting pointed the theory developed by Collier and Hoeffler that
diminishes the factors of ethnic heterogeneity; level of political rights; economic
mismanagement; and regime type on the emergence of civil conflicts, Ballentine and
Sherman evaluate the role of various natural resources as the “greed” factor. Furthermore,
they offer a series of case studies, including Colombia, Nepal, Bougainville, Kosovo, Sri
Lanka, and Burma, with the goal of moving beyond the dichotomous profit-seeking
versus justice-seeking dichotomy of greed and grievance theory.
The focus on six pivotal conflicts in different parts of the world offered a more
robust understanding of specific preconditions for an intrastate war; mechanisms that
trigger the conflict; and the solutions for peaceful settlement. The main advantages of
such an approach are the assessment of cases at the regional and global scale; tracing
comparisons between similar preconditions and outcomes of geographically distant
conflicts; and evaluation of the effectiveness of tools that seek to reconcile the dispute.11
While the large-n quantitative analysis of the intrastate conflict conducted by Collier and
Hoeffler suggested that the majority of civil wars are triggered by the opportunity factor,
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the more in-depth case study perspective suggests that the reality is far more complex and
involves both economic and non-economic determinants.12
One of the applications of the motive-opportunity dyad to analyze the
peculiarities of civil wars in the African continents was proposed by Charles Cater.13 In
the elaboration of the post-Cold War conflict dynamics in Africa, Cater tests four
dominant theories of causes of war: economic predation; kleptocratic states; horizontal
inequalities; and, weak states theories.14 Cater grounds the economic predation variable
in Collier’s assumption about the salience of the rational striving for financial profit that
explains predatory motives of intrastate groups.15 The correlation between the corruption
of “shadow” state leaders and the rise of the warlords, observed by William Reno,
associates the cause of civil war with the redistribution of wealth within this dyadic pair,
thus explaining the phenomenon of kleptocratic states.16 Frances Stewart’s interpretation
of “horizontal inequality” points to the regional, ethnic, class, and religious group
identities that can be dissatisfied with its political participation, economic assets,
employment and income inequalities, as well as its social access and situation.17 Finally,
to explain the idea of the weak state, Cater refers to Ayoob’s findings on causes of civil
war in developing countries. He emphasizes the weakness of these states that results from
the excessive use of power to address internal problems due to the lack of political
institutions and the dominance of military elements in dealing with domestic issues.18
Through the prism of these four theories, Cater concludes that in the cases of Angola,
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Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo, economic determinants could not
explain the incidence of civil war. In reality, he observes, the intrastate conflicts in Africa
are driven by “cyclical patterns of state failure and mobilization of resources for
insurgency – each having interrelated economic and political dimensions.”19
Different economic and political preconditions for civil wars still require a trigger
or catalyst to transform financial, political or other motives into the practical action. To
distinguish between the general preconditions and immediate triggers, Michael E. Brown
offers a new framework that identifies underlying causes and then includes the proximate
or permissive causes of internal conflict.20 In comparison with Collier and Cater, Brown
does not consider political and economic factors to be sole explanations for the onset of
intrastate conflict, but also adds structural and cultural variables. The weakness of states;
intra-state security concerns; and ethnic geography contribute to the structural causes,
while discriminatory political institutions; exclusionary national ideologies; inter-group
politics; and elite politics fall into political factors group.21 The idea of economic
problems; discriminatory economic systems; and the economic development and
modernization issues are grouped under the social/economic causes of civil war. Finally,
cultural/perceptual factors include problematic group histories and patterns of cultural
discrimination.22
According to Brown these four underlying causes of internal conflict can be
catalyzed under several conditions. The aggravation of the certain factor can be analyzed
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within the framework of elite-level or mass-level catalysts and internal or external
developments.23 Thus, the four combinations of triggering factors (elite/mass triggered
versus internally/externally driven) or the sole impact of one of them can change the
dormant character of the underlying cause and lead to the emergence of civil war.24
Another influential theory for understanding the outbreak of civil war was
developed around the earlier discussed idea of the primary export commodity or lootable
resources. After Collier and Hoeffler identified primary commodity exports as the most
influential factor in the onset of civil wars, several academic articles attempted to verify
and improve their findings. The most prominent critique of the Collier and Hoeffler’s
analysis was made by James Fearon in “Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War.”25
Fearon challenges the argument that primary commodity resources are the main factor for
funding insurgencies by referring to a similar study by Fearon and Laitin published in
2003 that produced an opposite result where primary resources did not have an
independent effect on the onset of internal conflict.26 Fearon explains these discrepancies
by criticizing Collier and Hoeffler’s methodology and data manipulations. He argues that
five-year cycles used in Collier and Hoeffler’s analysis fail to adequately capture the
conflict onset since the problem of missing data causes the pool of observations to
become extremely limited. Instead, through focusing on a country-year format and
additional statistical techniques, Fearon was able to more systematically and consistently
encompass the variables and observations, which revealed the weakness of the primary
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commodity exports’ argument.27 Nevertheless, the author does not dismiss the role of
primary commodities as a primary source of rebel funding, but stresses their diversity
ranging from diamonds to drugs to oil exports. Fearon’s refined models revealed that it
“seems unlikely that oil exports (or cash crops) predict higher civil war risk because oil
provides better financing opportunities for would-be rebels,” but in fact fuel resources
might “indicate a weaker state given the level of per capita income and possibly a greater
‘prize’ for state or secessionist capture, both of which might favor civil war.”28
While James Fearon primarily focused on fuel resources as indicators of civil war
outbreak, Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Elisabeth Gilmore in “A Diamond
Curse? Civil War and a Lootable Resource” using novel data on diamond production to
speculate about the impact of this export commodity on the onset of internal conflict.29
The authors accept the general framework of understanding the civil war through
motivation and opportunity factors, but also add the third dimension of identity, which
manifests itself through group formation.30 These three determinants are crucial in
analyzing the influence of natural resources, particularly of the lootable type. The ability
of rebel group to loot resources may serve as a motivation for insurgency and opportunity
for financing their activity as well as for building a group identity around a particular
commodity. The discussion of lootable resources evolved primarily along the lines of
geographical location, concentration of resources, and their type. Lujala, Gleditsch, and
Gilmore focus on diamonds as a unique type of lootable resources. They elaborate further
by distinguishing two groups of diamonds: primary diamonds located in the kimberlite
27
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pipes (geological structures where diamonds are usually found) and controlled by
government and secondary diamonds that are more easily excavated and extorted.31 This
major distinction offered a novel insight into the onset dynamics of civil war. According
to Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore, diamonds do not generally affect the risk of internal
conflict outbreak, but they do impact civil wars. Thus, the type of diamonds plays a
critical role in the outbreak of civil war: secondary diamonds (lootable resource) can be
easily exploited by rebel group, while primary mine-type diamonds minimize the risk of
conflict onset.32 To sum up, diamonds have an influence on the civil outbreak under
certain circumstances and further studies on lootable resources might benefit from this
distinction.
The role of ethnic rivalries and, consequently, causes of ethnic conflict has been
an important dimension for the study of civil wars. The collapse of the Soviet Union and
the spread of democracy coincided with the resurgence of nationalism and a spike of
intrastate warfare. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner see this trend not as an accident,
but rather as a complex phenomenon that encompasses the history of nation- and statebuilding; the evolution of ethnic conflict; inconsistency between ethnic fragmentation and
democratic polities; and, of international involvement in solving protracted ethnic
violence.33 The collection of theoretical approaches to the study of ethnic conflict and a
series of case studies that test these theories in the volume National and Ethnic Conflict
edited by Michael E Brown, Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller,
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highlight the complex nature of the ethnic conflict.34 The overarching theme in this
volume is the diversity of ideas rather than the sole consolidated approach about the
causes of civil war. The authors generally agree on the intricacy of civil conflict and often
advise unique multifaceted solutions for each particular case. They refer to the
nationalism and ethnicity not only as inherent causes, but also as triggers of other internal
and international factors of internal rivalry.
An alternative view on the role of ethnic factors in the onset of internal conflict
was developed by James Fearon and David Laitin in “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil
War.” They posit that the spike of civil wars during the early 1990s was the result of the
fifty-years-long protracted conflicts that had been revived after the end of the Cold War.
Fearon and Laitin’s study of insurgency conditions suggests that “state weakness marked
by poverty, a large population, and instability – are better predictors of which countries
are at risk for civil war than are indicators of ethnic and religious diversity or measures of
grievances such as economic inequality, lack of democracy or civil liberties, or state
discrimination against minority religions or languages.”35
Another crucial research area of the onset of internal conflict focuses on the aims
of rebel groups through the introduction of the literature on motivational factors. David
Sobek and Caroline L. Payne in the article “A Tale of Two Types: Rebel Goals and the
Onset of Civil Wars” propose to classify civil wars in terms of legitimacy (in which
rebels aim at changing the relationship between state and society) and replacement (in
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which rebels aim at changing the government).36 The authors made an underlying
assumption that the dynamics of conflict would be fundamentally different based on the
goals that the rebels pursue. Thus, using Tilly’s “polity” model that explains the
relationship between government, members of the society, and challengers that do not
have low-cost access to resources, Sobek and Payne construed that in civil wars of
replacement rebels are primarily concerned with the benefits of winning in order to get
access to lootable resources.37 On the other hand, civil wars of legitimacy are more
complex and presuppose longer duration and increased viability of rebellion by the
possibility of lootable resources’ extraction.38 Their analysis reveals that the wars of
replacement should be associated with short duration, where the longevity of rebels’
viability is not significant, but access to lootable resources is a primary concern. At the
same time, Sobek and Payne observed for wars of legitimacy, motivated by the factor of
viability/greed instead of grievance, “a fairly strong relationship between the viability
measures and the risk of civil war of legitimacy onset, which only became stronger when
the expected duration of the conflict increased.”39

The Dynamics of an Intrastate Conflict

The motivation, opportunity, identity triad is widely accepted as an overarching
analytical framework for understanding the causes of civil wars. At the same time,
previous studies utilized primarily multivariate models that require quantifiable variables
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to test the core hypotheses of the study. Yet the pursuit for statistically significant results
sometimes simplifies reality and fails to capture the intrinsic dynamics of civil war.
Oftentimes, qualitative inquiries into the nature of intrastate conflict could uncover and
describe the mechanisms and trends that are overlooked or discarded during the large-n
analysis.
A series of case studies of ethnic conflicts by John Mueller points out the
heterogeneity of the social composition of the battling ethnic groups. By focusing on civil
wars in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Mueller advances the argument that the
notion of ethnic wars as we know it is misguided. He suggests that “ethnic warfare more
closely resembles nonethnic warfare, because it is waged by small groups of combatants,
groups that purport to fight and kill in the name of some larger entity,” which is, by and
large, passive and controlled by these combatant groups.40 Moreover, for the
abovementioned cases, perennial hatred was not a primary factor for the perpetuation of
the internal crisis. Instead, “bands of opportunistic marauders recruited by political
leaders and operating under their general guidance” engaged in the looting and carnage
that was later associated with the whole ethnic group.41 In Yugoslavia, Mueller argues,
politicians might have been at the inception of the confrontation and sparking hatred, but
the atrocities and looting were conducted by common criminals, thugs, prison inmates, or
even soccer hooligans.42
Civil war in this region was characterized by a unique dynamic structure. In the
first “takeover” stage, well-armed thugs recruited by political leaders emerged in the
areas without central authority and police forces. Mueller points out that at this stage the
40
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general population felt confused rather than exhibiting hatred. In the ensuing “carnival”
stage, these groups of thugs engaged in pillaging and looting that were occasionally
joined by opportunistic marauders and other criminals. During the “occupation and
desertion” phase, these criminal groups did not limit the hostilities to a single ethnicity,
but terrorized the entire population in the region.43 In conclusion, Mueller remarks that
ethnic war does not simply resemble Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes, but
ethnicity appears to function as merely an ordering device, not a motivational factor. In
cases where ethnic groups did engage in the uncontrolled war against everyone,
organized criminal groups were behind the larger population. As the solution to such
types of crises, Mueller suggests the provision of third party interventions and
international policing. Finally, he makes a provocative inference about the possibility of
ethnic war sparking anywhere if the conditions were similar to the discussed case since
the thugs and criminal elements exist in every state.
In a response to John Mueller, Anna Simons acknowledges the critical role of
armed thugs in internal conflicts yet criticizes his emphasis on hatred as a primary
motivation for ethnic conflict. She offers an alternative factor of fear, explaining that fear
fueled by propaganda can unite citizens to take actions under the conditions of the state’s
failure to provide the security. 44 Armed thugs and criminals spread fear through
atrocities, which reawaken the previous experience of violence. Despite Mueller’s
argument about the absence of hatred between ethnic groups, fear based on the previous
history of violence stimulates the general population to restore violent behavior.45
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Third Party Interventions in Intrastate Conflicts

The phenomenon of external intervention in civil war is one of the most
developed and contested subtopics in the literature on civil wars. One explanation for the
popularity of this issue lies in the policy-related implications of third party interventions.
Ironically, scholars who analyze this topic represent a predominantly American and
European academic discourse, which might to an extent offer foreign policy suggestions
for great power decision-making. The fact that the United States and lately the United
Nations have engaged in a multitude of interventions ranging from humanitarian to
security concerns stimulated scholarly endeavors to capture the conditions, motivations,
and effectiveness of third party interventions.
A crucial aspect of third party interventions is the ability to sustain peace in the
aftermath of civil war. Virginia Page Fortna in the article “Does Peacekeeping Keep
Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War” examines
the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations in the post-conflict areas, specifically
focusing on the intrastate cases. Previous multivariate models have offered mixed results:
some studies suggest that comprehensive, multilateral efforts under the UN auspices do
in fact allow for a longer-term more stable environment, while other more sophisticated
approaches do not find the connection between third party intervention and lasting
peace.46 Fortna argues for the refined approach in the analysis of the peacekeeping
interventions by differentiating between the pre- and post-Cold War periods as well as
between UN peacekeeping missions and operations by other organizations. Moreover,
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she critically examines the way data is treated in previous research and points to some
major drawbacks. Thus, previous data treated conflicts that resumed after twenty years
and conflicts that resumed after two months similarly, which skewed perceptions about
the effectiveness of the peacekeeping interventions. Moreover, Fortna emphasizes the
peculiarities of each case, arguing that peacekeepers are usually sent to the areas where
peace is rather fragile due to variety of factors, but not to areas where peace exists per
se.47 Finally, the major caveat of the previous approach lies in the equal treatment of all
peacekeeping missions without distinguishing between post-conflict operations and
interventions during the ongoing civil war.
After the revision of the previous data, Fortna came to the conclusion that
peacekeeping interventions do prolong peace, but they have become more effective after
the end of the Cold War.48 Among all types of peacekeeping missions, traditional and
observer types had the strongest effect in reducing the risk of war outbreak, while
multidimensional missions had a fifty percent chance of success.49 In sum, peacekeeping
operations proved to be efficient and even though the “presence of international
personnel is not a silver bullet, of course, it does not guarantee lasting peace in every
case, but it does tend to make peace more likely to last, and to last longer.”50
Civil wars tend to be contagious and neighboring states have an incentive to
intervene in the conflict to prevent the outbreak of internal conflict within their own
borders. While the possibility of the civil war spillover is a potential threat, it is important
to identify under what conditions states are likely to intervene. Jacob Kathman in “Civil
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War Contagion and Neighboring Interventions” devised a criterion to measure the civil
war contagion likelihood and explains the historical precedence of such interventions.
Using the traditional motivation-opportunity framework for understanding civil war,
Kathman acknowledges that since war is very costly, state utilities in terms of
opportunism or threat response should be sufficiently high. Yet previous research has not
accommodated the proximity as a potential difference between interveners, which led
Kathman to hypothesize that contiguous states are facing qualitatively different threats.51
Consequently, the reasons behind state decision to intervene are based on “the attributes
of the conflict state, the characteristics of the third party, and the affective dyadic links
between the intervener and the war participants.”52 Kathman also prioritizes the research
on the diffusion of interstate war to explain how geographic ties between neighbors that
manifested in “ethnic affinities, security ties, and political relationships” can motivate a
proximate state to engage in civil wars.53 The tests of intervention onset in terms of
infection risk as a primary independent variable supports the hypothesis about the
qualitatively different threats for neighboring states.
A critical role of a third party intervention is to stop the atrocities and bloodshed
associated with the civil war. While such an intuitive assumption seems to be the only
one possible, empirical analysis is required to verify this relationship. Dylan BalchLindsay and Andrew J. Enterline in “Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War
Duration, 1820-1992” examine whether third party interventions prolong or shorten the
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duration of intrastate conflict.54 They combine the viewpoint of Patrick Regan who
suggested that a third party intervenes to end the conflict quickly and cite Karl Deutsch as
well as Rodolfo Stavenhagen who considered that “third parties intervene for less
benevolent reasons, including lengthening the duration of a civil war in order to distract,
or drain the resources of, rival states, or simply to plunder the resources of the civil war
state itself.”55
Balch-Lindsay and Enterline make an important observation by arguing that the
decision to intervene is not only costly but also requires the understanding of the systemic
dimensions in terms of domestic participants and other external actors. The originality of
Balch-Lindsay and Enterline’s empirical testing of third party intervention relies on the
assumption that civil war is embedded in the international system, which affects the cost
and benefit analysis of the third parties.56 The results reveal that the duration of civil war
is contingent upon the coherence of motivations of the third parties: “an equitable
distribution of third party interventions corresponds to a greater likelihood that a
stalemate will emerge and the civil war will endure for a significantly longer period of
time.”57 This conclusion confirms the intuitive logic that the longevity of war is related to
the effectiveness of goals and actions coordination between third parties.
Previous studies about the impact on conflict duration of third party interventions
on behalf of government or rebels have offered mixed results. In the article “Going in
When it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil Conflicts,” Stephen Gent
suggests that instead of conflict duration, one should consider the outcome as the primary
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concern of third parties. He argues that military third party interventions are costly and
therefore will commence only if the marginal effect from them will be at the highest
point.58 The empirical analysis of this refined perspective on third party interventions
revealed that the “relative capability of the rebels has a statistically and substantively
significant impact on the likelihood that a conflict will experience a military intervention
on behalf of the government and the rebels.”59 This finding supports previous claims
about the utility maximizing strategy of the third parties.

Solutions to Intrastate Conflicts

The most challenging question in the civil war debate is finding solutions to
internal conflict. Articles discussed in this section provide empirical evidence for the
partition based on ethnic or geographic principle as well as allowing for a victory of
either side in conflict as possible opportunities to end civil war.
The existing literature on civil war suggests two different approaches for ending
intrastate wars. The dominant majority of scholars agree that ending conflict through
negotiated settlement as soon as possible is the top priority to halt human suffering as
well as economic and political collapse. On the other hand, some scholars (Edward N.
Luttwak and Robert Wagner) suggested that civil war should last until only one side
emerges victorious, which is encapsulated in a catchphrase “give war a chance.”60 In
order to test the validity of both arguments, Monika Duffy Toft in the article “Ending
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Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?” conducts analytical and empirical tests and
suggests that termination of modern civil wars requires both cooperation and avoidance
of downplaying the punishment for both sides.61 The regression models that focused on
the type of civil war termination revealed three major trends:
First, civil wars ending in negotiated settlements are much more likely to recur.
Second, negotiated settlements are no more likely to lead to democracy than other
types of settlements. Rather, rebel victories are more likely to produce this result.
Third, economic growth trends do not seem to be correlated with the type of civil
war termination.62
These conclusions undermine the academic and policy-makers’ assumptions
about the benefits of negotiated solutions. Extending the time horizon is imperative to
judge the effectiveness of peace longevity and level of democracy. It appears that in a
long run, such settlements lead to the recurrence of civil war and more bloodshed. On the
other hand, rebel victory in the longer run establishes stronger peace conditions and
provides gradual democratization. Toft argues that for negotiated settlements to be more
effective than rebel victory, they should incorporate provisions of long-term benefits as
well as punishment mechanisms enforced by third parties in case one side decides to
defect from a negotiated settlement.
Territorial partition is often considered a solution to an intrastate conflict.
Nicholas Sambanis and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl in the article “What’s in a Line? Is
Partition a Solution to Civil War?” evaluate the costs and benefits of territorial partition
and demonstrate the weakness of this argument through a series of empirical tests.63 They
closely examine the ethnic security dilemma as an explanation for conflict reduction after
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territorial partition by focusing on two crucial claims: “the claim that ethnic power
sharing is particularly unstable and the related claim that ethnic identity is easily
identifiable, making targeting of individuals for violence easier after ethnic war.”64 While
this theoretical assumption makes a case for the effectiveness of territorial partition,
Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl’s empirical models that focused on the recurrence of war
following such peace transitions have shown no significant connections.
In the response to the earlier studies by Nicholas Sambanis that refuted the
effectiveness of partition, Carter Johnson in “Partitioning to Peace Sovereignty,
Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars” points at methodological and theoretical limitations
of the previous research and makes a claim for the effectiveness of ethnic partition.
Johnson views the main flaw of Sambanis’ analysis in using new borders instead of
demographic separation of ethnic groups as the indicator for partition. 65 According to
Johnson, introduction of the new Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index (PEHI) to
capture the effectiveness of partition revealed that “in all cases where the PEHI showed a
complete separation of warring minorities, there were no war recurrences and no
occurrences of low-level violence for at least five years after the end of the ethnic civil
war.”66
Another direction of inquiry into the termination of intrastate conflicts touched
upon the factors that can explain a particular civil war outcome. By examining the impact
of third party interventions on the civil process, Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew K.
Enterline, and Kyle A. Joyce have observed the effect of foreign support on the duration
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of various civil war outcomes.67 In this rare study that looks at interactions among the
stages of conflict, the authors applied a Cox competing risks model to analyze the time to
different intrastate conflict outcomes while controlling for elements of separatists wars,
factor of democracy, and economic development among others. Their findings indicate
that foreign support increases the likelihood of the military success of the side that
received assistance, while in the situation when third parties extend help to both sides of
conflict, negotiated settlements does not appear to be a viable solution.68
An alternative approach to explaining outcomes of internal conflicts was proposed
by James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin in the paper “Civil War Termination.” Using a
“random narratives” method to examine the causal mechanisms behind a civil war
settlement, the authors have found that “civil wars will tend to end when there is a
significant shock to the relative power or cost tolerance of one side or the other, such as
the beginning or end of major foreign support to government or rebels.”69 Furthermore,
the authors criticize the existing assumption about the clear distinction between military
victory and negotiated outcome solutions on the basis that any civil war outcome already
incorporates a degree of negotiation between warring sides. Instead, they propose to
focus on center- and autonomy-seeking wars as a more applicable theoretical framework
for the study of civil war termination.70 Finally, while focusing on examining case studies
and not large-n statistical tests, Fearon and Laitin contended that foreign support and

67

Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew J. Enterline and Kyle A. Joyce, “Third-Party Intervention and the Civil
War Process,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 45, no. 3 (May, 2008): 345-363
68
Ibid, 360-361.
69
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Civil War Termination” (paper presented at the 2007 Annual
Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, August 30 – September 2,
2007), 2.
70
Ibid, 41

40
changes in the government or rebel leadership are possible causal mechanisms in ending
civil wars.71

Limitations of the Quantitative Approaches in the Study of Intrastate Conflicts

Ted Robert Gurr’s “Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal
Mobilization and Conflict since 1945” and Michael D. Ward, Brian D. Greenhill and
Kristin M. Bakke’s “The Perils of Policy by P-Value: Predicting Civil Conflicts” address
the intricacies of intrastate conflict using quantitative methods. The scope and questions
that the authors ask vary greatly. On one hand, Ted Gurr’s article is a clear example of a
traditional approach for the analysis of internal conflict using statistical tools. On the
other hand, Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke focus on broader issues of predictability and
critique the pitfalls of using the very same statistical methods for determining the onset of
conflict.
Emphasizing the state-centric focus of the previous research on conflicts, Gurr
offers a new approach that focuses on the communal groups and asserts the main purpose
of the research in testing “elements of a general model of the conditions under which
communal groups mobilize for political action to assert and protect group interests.”72
Gurr determines a dependent variable as an extent of a protest or rebellion that communal
groups perpetrate against their governments in the 1980’s, and then opens a broader
discussion about defining and categorizing communal groups. The author provides a
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lengthy overview of peculiarities of ethnoclasses, ethnonationalitites, communal
contenders, military sects and indigenous peoples, but also recognizes the theoretical
complexity of cross-national study of such diverse actors that are broadly associated with
the term communal groups. Through breaking down previous academic findings about
motives behind protests and rebellions, Gurr determines the key aspects of the general
model such as political action, grievances, and mobilization.73 For each of these core
variables, the author develops a categorical codification. Furthermore, he creates
additional indicators by adding economic, political, and demographic attributes as well as
chronological periodization to the core variables. Not surprisingly, Gurr builds his central
hypotheses on the effects of democracy and democratization on the severity of protest
that a communal group will exercise:
1. Institutionalized democracy facilitates non-violent communal protest.
2. In democratizing autocracies, democratization is predicted to facilitate
mobilization for violent communal protest and rebellion.
Gurr does not go into detail while explaining methodological instruments he used
for analyzing the behavior of the communal groups. The author confines himself to
determining correlations between communal protest and rebellion indicators as well as
providing exploratory regression analysis. However, since the author developed
categorical dependent variables for his model, binomial regressions were utilized to
determine the relationship between the indicators. What he lacked in methodology, the
author compensated for in extensive analysis of findings. After providing a detailed
overview of five group models and highlighting correlation nuances, Gurr created two
complete models of Communal Protest and Communal Rebellion in the 1980s. Statistical
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analysis of these models supports Gurr’s argument that mobilization and one of two types
of grievances have a significant explanatory power in both Communal Protest and
Rebellion.
Outlining methodological shortcomings in the works of Ted Gurr, a renowned
pundit in the sphere of conflict studies, is rather challenging. While many gray areas such
as preoccupation with large-n comparisons, complications of codification, and
peculiarities of groups were pointed out by the author, one can argue that greater
attention could be given to clarifying the methodological basis of research. Since the
study covers the period from 1945 to 1989, it might benefit from time-series analysis.
Moreover, Gurr only briefly mentions the effects of the lag variable which are clearly
important since such a large chronological period was examined.
While Gurr denies the pursuit of maximizing the variance, his results depend
entirely on identifying statistical significant relationships. In “The Perils of Policy by Pvalue: Predicting Civil Conflicts” Michael D. Ward, Brian D. Greenhill and Kristin M.
Bakke argue against an indivisible focus on statistical significance, and instead offer a set
of tests to analyze the predictive efficiency of the often-cited models of civil wars. For
their analysis, the authors utilize results from Fearon and Laitin’s article “Ethnicity,
Insurgency, and Civil War” as well as Collier and Hoeffler’s “Greed and Grievance in
Civil War.”74 Models of civil war occurrence developed by above-mentioned authors
were used for building policy actions by the United States and the World Bank. Policy
application of their findings speaks to concerns regarding the precision and dangers of
self-fulfilling predictions. Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke argue that current models have to
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be diligently scrutinized with a particular focus on the statistically significant variables.
The authors subject Fearon and Laitin as well as Collier and Hoeffler’s models to the test
of predictability based on the dichotomous indicator (war or no war) and amount of
generated false positives.
To illustrate the dependency of false and true positives in each model, the authors
generated Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) plots for both models. The ROC plot
describes the relationship between the conflicts that were predicted correctly to the
number of false positives. Both models performed poorly as they produced almost the
same amount of false negatives as positives when the threshold of statistical significance
becomes lower. In the next test, the authors analyzed the predictive power of models by
gradually removing the most significant variables. After excluding these indicators (GDP
and Population), the authors observed that the new model with minimal predicting power
outperformed previous models and inferred that “the inclusion of statistically significant
variables can actually reduce our ability to make correct predictions.”75 While that
analysis was performed using an existing dataset, Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke went
further and introduced a cross-validation out-of-sample analysis. Using four smaller
subsets of country-year observations, the authors tested each model and calculated the
area under the curve (AUC) to determine predictive power. Although both models
reached reasonable level of predictions, the authors notice that they didn’t suffer from
overfitting.76 Yet again, new models that were less parsimonious but without statistically
significant variables showed better results, rather than those where statistically significant
indicator being the only covariate.
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While Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke’s study provides a substantial critique of the
traditional approaches to conflict occurrence (including Gurr’s work), there are still a few
drawbacks to point out. It is certainly true that the caution should be exercised when one
claims that statistical significance is associated with the predictive power. At the same
time, the authors do not propose a remedy for this conundrum aside from in-sample and
out-of-sample validity methods. The overview of these two articles speaks to the
limitations of the current empirical analysis in the sphere of intrastate conflicts. The
research design of this study, which relies on the quantitative methods, addresses the
issue of reliance on statistically significant variables by investigating their explanatory
power through a series of case studies.

Prospective Directions for the Debate

The civil war debate has been developing at a steady rate since the end of the
Cold War through accumulation of knowledge and contestation of ideas. With some level
of confidence, it is possible to characterize this debate as mature with defined topics,
methodology, and exchange of ideas. However, the maturity of the debate does not mean
that it has exhausted its analytical and factual potential, but instead suggests that the
theoretical boundaries as well as seminal works have being largely outlined. The
availability of prior large-n studies such as Correlates of War project and UCDP/PRIO
datasets, chronological and cross-country extent of internal conflicts as well as the
possibility of comparative analysis add up to the prevalence of empirical methods. While
such studies give policymakers concrete results, which aim at general applicability, they
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sometimes fall short due to problems of data availability and methodological
manipulations.
The possible solution to the overwhelming reliance on statistical significance lies
in applying statistical inferences to real-life scenarios, which will reveal the nuances not
captured by the “wide-angle” lens. The second possible direction of further research
might be based on incorporating new unique internal conflicts in which access to global
social networks, application of modern warfare, and changing mindset of third parties had
a tremendous impact. For example, this area of analysis can be applied toward
understanding the phenomenon of the Arab Spring and its larger impact in the Middle
East. Third, potentially productive avenue for future inquiries into the nature of intrastate
warfare lies in exploring cultural and religious factors, globalization and mass media.
These factors start to characterize heavily the dynamics of the contemporary civil wars
such as crises in Syria and Iraq, while ignoring them arguably means failing to capture
the future of intrastate conflict.
Overall, the civil war debate is characterized by the fragmentation of the central
phenomenon of civil war into several sub-debates that analyze particular stages of
internal conflict: onset, dynamics, third party intervention, and solutions. The dynamics
of the intellectual exchange of ideas was heavily influenced by critical phases:
compilation of the comprehensive intrastate conflict datasets; introduction of the
motivation-opportunity-(identity) framework; elaboration of the resource extraction
approach; and, empirical testing of civil war solutions. The civil war field, by and large,
grew by borrowing the ideas from related disciplines (sociology, economics, psychology,
etc.), elaboration of the statistical techniques, and accumulation of empirical evidence.
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Finally, time really matters in this debate because a couple of decades from now it will be
possible to clearly distinguish between the civil wars of the Cold War period, post-Cold
War, and modern (2010+) types of internal conflicts.

Sociological Approach to Civil Wars

Following the quantitative revolution in social sciences, a growing locus of
scholarship on causes and consequences of civil war shifted toward an empirical
examination of conflict. The formidable quantitative inquiries into creating the typology
of wars that consequently could be utilized to establish temporal and cross-sectional
trends has fundamentally altered the debate about the existence of armed violence. Even
this study of the onset and termination of civil wars falls under largely a similar paradigm
of applying statistical methods for observing underlying links behind the armed conflict.
While statistical models become more complex, empirical tests more robust, and p-values
get smaller, the focus is shifting from viewing wars in their totality towards
disaggregating the armed conflict into stages and examining each in as a separate
phenomenon.
Instead of making an argument against an empirical method, I advocate for the
symbiotic approach between scholarship that uses large-sample-size quantitative models
and sociological inquiries into contentious politics pioneered by Sidney Tarrow, Charles
Tilly and Doug McAdam. The first body of literature, which I examined earlier, offers a
methodological and typological background regarding the internal wars. The second
paradigm that focuses on contentious politics bridges the gap between different stages of
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conflict through offering an overarching framework of processes and mechanisms of
contention.
Several seminal works including Dynamics of Contention by McAdam, Tarrow,
and Tilly and Contentious Politics by Tilly and Tarrow offer voluminous theoretical
insights into the similarities between various forms of contention such as strikes,
nationalism, democratization, social movements, revolutions and civil wars.77 In contrast
to previous studies, the contentious politics paradigm generates an understanding of
conflict in its totality by emphasizing the persistence of contention among agents within
the society. Thus, instead of fitting the complex phenomena of social movements and
civil wars within robust “artificial” limits that are quantifiable, Tarrow, McAdam, and
Tilly offer the view of contention as a continuum that can fluctuate from the “contained”
to “transgressive” phase.78 Such a theoretical framework is better equipped to highlight
the importance of dynamic nature of the conflict.
According the Tarrow, McAdam and Tilly, contentious politics is an “episodic,
public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least
one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the
claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.”79
Furthermore, the degree of contentious politics can vary from the contained form where
“all parties to the conflict were previously established as constituted political actors” to a
transgressive form where “at least some parties to the conflict are newly self-identified
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political actors” and/or “at least some parties employ innovative collective action.”80 In
other words, politics is inherently contentious but the form of claim-making that is
exercised varies from well-established “peaceful” mechanisms to innovative tactics that
are “unprecedented or forbidden within the regime in question.”81 The majority cases of
contentious politics such as social movements, civil wars or nationalism are transgressive
in nature, meaning that they involve actions that exist outside the established rules of the
game and that also means using violence to achieve the claims.
In the Dynamics of Contention, the authors outline how environmental, cognitive,
and relational mechanisms and processes explain the sudden shifts in the “sustained
contentious episode: a regime collapses, a guerrilla group comes to power, a set of
activists shift from terror to collaboration.”82 In terms of the current study, the
mechanisms outlined by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly correspond to the onset factors of
civil war, while the sudden shifts in contentious politics fall neatly as the termination of
the intrastate conflict. While the authors identify a wide variety of mechanisms such as
the depletion of resources, individual commitments to collective action, brokerage,
certification or coalition formation, all of them, in principle, serve as triggers to
contentious shifts that are coterminous with the termination factors proposed in this
study.
The goal of the Dynamics of Contention is to explain how various forms of
contentious politics, be it a social movement, democratization or even wars, have similar
patterns of development. At the same time, Tilly and Tarrow in Contentious Politics
suggest that in comparison to other form of contention, lethal conflicts including civil
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wars have unique characteristics.83 The authors posit that “the high stakes of claim
making and the problem of sustaining armed force” are factors that distinguish largescale lethal conflicts from other forms of transgressive contentious politics. Furthermore,
they contend that despite these peculiar features, lethal conflicts do in fact follow similar
mechanism.84 Here, Tilly and Tarrow warn against two common misperceptions about
armed conflict: reasons behind large-scale wars lie not in the mind of perpetrators, but are
complex and multifaceted; and not all large scale wars are unique, but rather follow
certain general principles that con be discerned and compared.85
In Contentious Politics, Tilly and Tarrow make a crucial observation about the
possibility of the occurrence of lethal conflict. The primary determinant of the state’s
ability to prevent the outbreak of violence rests in the character of the political regime
that is reflected through the “capacity of its central government and its degree of
democracy.”86 Tilly and Tarrow define capacity as “the extent to which governmental
action affects the character and distribution of population, activity, and resources within
the government’s territory.”87 Furthermore, they define democracy through the political
rights, level of influence that citizens have over their government, and how well they can
be protected against governmental agents. According to the authors, fluctuations in
capacity can lead to either regime split or transfer of power: “high-capacity states reduce
the threat by making it difficult for anyone to create rival concentrations of coercive
means with their territories,” while the “low-capacity states more often face precisely the
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threat that some rival actor will build up a major concentration of coercive means and use
it to topple the existing rulers.”88
Specifically, in regards to civil wars, Tilly and Tarrow identified two broader
groups depending on the regime type: “relatively high-capacity regimes, however
democratic or undemocratic, containing significant zones that escape central control” and
“low-capacity undemocratic regimes.”89 Both the theory of transgressive contentious
politics as well as linkage between contentious mechanisms and sudden shifts outlined in
Dynamics of Contention and their application toward the armed lethal conflicts in
Contentious Politics offer a theoretical and methodological ground for an investigation of
the inherent relationship between the form of the intrastate conflict onset and its
termination. The goal of this research is to establish the trends within this framework and
explain them from both macro level approach and by looking at individual cases.
The study of the state capacity as an element of contentious politics and by
extension of intrastate conflict has its roots in the literature that investigates the impact of
governance on the economic performance. In the seminal article “State Capacity and
Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal,” Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold
have analyzed state capacity not through the prism of the ability of the government to
intervene in the economic affairs of the state, but also through the efficiency of such
intervention.90 Recent scholarship views state capacity as a necessary precondition for
economic growth as it draws attention to “the authority of the state within its territory —
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the capacity to maintain order and enforce the laws — and the administrative capacity to
develop, fund, and carry out its policies.”91
In the interdisciplinary literature on conflict and development, weak state capacity
has been widely associated with the fragile state and consequently with the higher risk of
civil war or international conflict.92 Thus, Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson analyzed
state capacity in terms of the fiscal capacity to collect taxes and legal capacity to support
markets.93 Through modeling internal conflict dynamics, the authors have suggested that
“high resource dependence may jointly trigger a high propensity toward conflict, low
income, and low investments in legal and fiscal capacity.”94 Cameron G. Thies in the
article “Of Rulers, Rebels, and Revenue: State Capacity, Civil War Onset, and Primary
Commodities” using the predatory theory indirectly tests the assumptions put forth by
Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow regarding the role of state capacity in the civil war
onset.95 By assuming state capacity to be a function of its fiscal size and strength, Thies
found no relationship between state capacity and the onset of civil war.96 At the same
time, his inquiry into the role that various resources play in conflict suggested that many
primary commodities, including oil, in fact enhance state capacity defined through fiscal
dimensions.97 While administrative, bureaucratic or fiscal elements of a state capacity are
obviously valid determinant of the government’s ability to intervene into economic or
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social life of the society during periods of peace, factors of military capacity and quality
of political institutions can shed additional light during the period of civil conflict.98

Application of the Path Dependence Theory To the Study of Intrastate Conflicts

Civil wars are complex and multifaceted phenomena. The starting point for the
analysis of intrastate conflict dynamics lies in a choice that the researcher makes
regarding the nature of this type of war. The choice is simple: civil wars are unique
events and should be analyzed on case-by-case basis, or civil wars are inherently similar
and the goal of the researcher is to uncover those commonalities. I adhere to the second
approach and suggest that not only do intrastate conflicts follow common patterns in
regards to their onset and termination, but also that the fluctuations in the initial onset
conditions of conflict are responsible for differences of civil war resolution. In this study,
I apply the concept of path dependence in intrastate conflicts as both the theoretical
construction to explain the overarching dynamics of war and the analytic tool for testing
hypotheses about the onset-termination dynamics.
In addition to the initial research design that compares the instances of civil war
onset and termination, an analysis of the civil war through the lens of path dependence
requires establishing the common theoretical framework; application of the path
dependence paradigm to the study of intrastate conflicts; and elaboration of the methods
that are used to capture civil war dynamics. Although the idea of path dependence was
thoroughly examined in the social science literature in the past decades, the wide variety
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of notions that was generated in the recent scholarship offers competing rather than
complementary definitions of the path dependence.
.
Characteristics of the Path Dependence

While the idea of path dependence seems rather intuitive, it is critical to examine
theoretical approaches to this multifaceted concept. The most common definition of the
path dependence describes it as a process in which the outcomes are dependent on the
choices that were made in the earlier stages.99 Yet, this simplistic understanding has been
gradually revised to accommodate and explain a great number of phenomena in
technological, economic, and political dimensions. Path dependence as a concept found
its earlier description and application in the field of economics. The seminal work by
Paul A. David, which focused on the famous success story behind the QWERTY
keyboard, offered a platform for the subsequent debate about the nature of path
dependence.100 David defined this phenomena as “one of which important influences
upon the eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally remote events, including
happenings dominated by chance elements rather than systematic forces.”101
The essential quality of path dependence that he emphasized was its nonergodicity as “stochastic processes like that do not converge automatically to a fixedpoint distribution of outcomes.”102 Although the notion of ergodicity has a wide
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application in the fields of mathematics, physics, and probability theory, in this study I
adhere to the economic application of this concept. In simple terms, an ergodic system is
one not susceptible to frequent changes meaning that the same theories can be applied
repeatedly overtime to explain it.103 The idea of non-ergodicity was further developed by
Paul A. David in the paper “Path Dependence, Its Critics and the Quest for ‘Historical
Economics’.”104 Through the elaboration of path-independent processes whose dynamics
“guarantee convergence to a unique, globally stable equilibrium configuration” and
through defining ergodic stochastic systems as those where “there exists an invariant
(stationary) asymptotic probability distribution that is continuous over the entire feasible
space of outcomes – that is, a limiting distribution that is continuous over all the states
that are compatible with the energy of the system,” David concludes that the non-ergodic
processes are characterized by the inability to “shake free of their history, are said to
yield path dependent outcomes.”105 Thus, his particular interest with dominance of
QWERTY over other more efficient types of keyboards emerged from the hypothesis
about the degree to which “history matters” in the economic analytical framework.
One of the earliest applications of the idea of path dependence in the sphere of
political science revolved around the processes of development. According to Kevin
Morgan, the seminal works of Albert Otto Hirschman The Strategy of Economic
Development and Karl Gunnar Myrdal Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions
ignited the interest in the notion of path dependence and “cumulative causation as the key
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self-reinforcement mechanism.”106 While also not directly using the term of path
dependence, Timur Kuran elaborates on the reasons behind the spontaneous onset of the
revolutions in Eastern Europe in the late eighties and alludes to the power of the initial
conditions.107 He builds up on the structuralist approaches to revolutions proposed by
Theda Skocpol by emphasizing the distribution of thresholds and shifts in the public and
private preferences of citizens.108 Kuran’s theory that focuses on revolutionary
bandwagoning emphasizes the duality of an individual that is “powerless because a
revolution requires the mobilization of large number” and, at the same time, “very
powerful because under the right circumstances he may set off a chain reaction that
generates the necessary mobilization.”109 Despite the fact that the idea of historical
causality has been used by the students of politics for millennia and the elaboration of
exactly how and why history matters occupied the minds of the prominent thinkers of old
and new, it was still an economic approach to path dependence that shed new light on the
power of cause and effect.

Two Notions of Path Dependence

The majority of recent scholarship on path dependence refers to Paul Pierson’s
article “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics” as the bridge
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from economic foundations to political applications of this phenomenon. While noting
that earlier works in sociology did mention the importance of temporal factors, sequence
or small-scale events, Pierson contends the overwhelming assumption in the field was
that macro outcomes result from macro reasons.110 To investigate the application of path
dependence in the social science, he elaborated on its main premise of increasing returns.
According to Pierson, the idea of increasing returns can be applied in two ways:
First, they pinpoint how the costs of switching from one alternative to another
will, in certain social contexts, increase markedly over time. Second, and related,
they draw attention to issues of timing and sequence, distinguishing formative
moments or conjunctures from the periods that reinforce divergent paths. In an
increasing returns process, it is not only a question of what happens but also of
when it happens.111
Pierson sees a wide applicability of path dependence in politics in terms of study
of power asymmetries, collective action, and institutions. Yet, the traditional definition of
path dependence as the impact of prior events on later outcomes seems to be limited in
explaining the abovementioned instances. He argues that it is important not only to
outline the path, but also to understand why things occurred in a particular manner.
Building up on Margaret Levi’s elaboration of path dependence as a process in which the
reversal from a particular course is costly (the notion of switching costs), Pierson
suggests that the notion of increasing returns can also be analyzed as “self-reinforcing or
positive feedback processes.”112 Reflecting on existing approaches to path dependence,
he outlines a broader definition that highlights “causal relevance of preceding stages in a
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temporal sequence” and a narrow definition emphasizing “social processes that exhibit
increasing returns.”113
In his seminal article, alongside providing a definitional foundation, Pierson
outlined conditions that are specifically relevant for path dependence processes in
politics. Thus, under the narrower definition that stresses the factor of increasing returns,
path dependence is characterized by multiple equilibria of the outcomes; contingency or
the impact of small events that occur at the right moment; the critical role of timing and
sequence; and inertia or resistance to deviate from the path.114 Adopting the analytical
framework of path dependence implies the need for reassessment of the established
approaches to understanding the political processes, be it institutional development or
inquiries into asymmetries of power.
In regards to the problem statement outlined in this study, it is imperative to
analyze the applicability of the path dependence paradigm in analyzing the onsettermination dynamics of intrastate conflict. According to Pierson, the key implication of
path dependence for political science is the “need to focus on branching points and on
specific factors that reinforce the paths established in these points.”115 Hereafter, I
propose a theoretical framework that extends Pierson’s argument into the study of the
intrastate conflicts. Table 1 below provides an overview of the path dependence
framework developed in this study.
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Table 1. Comprehensive Research Design Framework.
Focus

Approach

Research Design A

Initial conditions

Quantitative large-n

Research Design B

Tipping points

Quantitative large-n

Research Design C

Case studies

Comparative qualitative

The central point of inquiry in this study is the analysis of the relationship
between the onset and termination of intrastate conflicts. Specifically, I hypothesize that
the outcome of civil war, be it a victory of the government, compromise or success of the
rebels, is intrinsically related to the factors which are commonly understood to have
caused a particular intrastate conflict. Although it is possible to test empirically the
correlation between the onset and termination variables (what I will label Research
Design A), this approach, while satisfying the requirements for the broad definition of
path dependence, tells very little about the dynamics of the process and the mechanisms
involved.
To investigate and explain fluctuations in civil war outcomes through the lens of
civil war onset factors, it is imperative to treat an intrastate conflict as a path dependent
process. Here, I borrow the narrow definition that was elaborated by Paul Pierson where
increasing returns serve as a key determinant of the path dependence. Furthermore, I
investigate the effect of branching points or tipping factors that are responsible for
preventing the deviation from a particular course of action or in our case, civil war
outcome (what I call Research Design B). This approach is also consistent with the

59
theoretical framework of contentious politics that I use to justify the importance of the
comprehensive approach toward analyzing intrastate conflicts. Both Pierson in article
“Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics” and Doug McAdam,
Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow in Dynamics of Contention have highlighted the
importance of tipping factors or sudden shifts in understanding the dynamics of political
processes.116

Path Dependence and Intrastate Conflicts

Both approaches to understanding path dependent processes that are outlined in
this chapter are self-sufficient in their own right. The initial research design that offers a
large-n study of intrastate conflicts following the end of the World War II stresses the
possibility of inherent correlation between onset and termination factors. It also treats the
null hypothesis regarding the absence of such interrelation with equal attention, since the
finding of no relationship between causes of civil wars and the ways they are solved can
contribute to the critical debate about modern peacemaking efforts. An absence of path
dependence will not only provide a better understanding about the nature of intrastate
wars but also devise viable approaches toward mitigating the most prolific type of violent
conflict. If the analysis finds no reasonable signs of path dependence in intrastate
conflict, it would be valid to assume the uniqueness of each particular civil war and the
need for an in-depth country-specific inquiry into nature of internal conflict. On the other
hand, if the large-n analysis provides sufficient data to validate the claim of path
116
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dependence in intrastate conflict, this alone will be enough to investigate further the
possibility of the correlation/causation conundrum through proceeding to what I will
label Research Design C that focuses on case studies.
In a sense, the comparison of the onset and termination of intrastate conflicts that
I propose in Research Design A follows the logic of the broad definition of path
dependence that Paul Pierson summarized as “causal relevance of preceding stages in a
temporal sequence.”117 The observation of correlation or lack of thereof between the
starting conditions and outcomes in internal warfare would satisfy the requirement for the
broad definition of path dependence. Detecting path dependence in intrastate conflicts for
the selected period of time would be substantial in itself not only because of the novelty
of the methodological approach, but equally because of the research and policy
implications. While contemporary scholarship has entertained the idea of path
dependence in intrastate conflicts, it largely avoids the analysis of the broader definition
of path dependence, instead attempting to evaluate the bargaining mechanisms rather than
testing the overarching assumption.118
The broad definition of path dependence also allows for testing the presence of
path dependence in intrastate conflict only through juxtaposing the onset and termination
elements without justification for the possible intervening variables that could impact the
course of the civil war. While it is possible that exogenous or endogenous forces can
affect the outcome of the intrastate conflict, the requirement for observing path
117
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dependence in the broad context is satisfied with the presence of at least two stages of the
process. Since this will be the first attempt at testing path dependence in intrastate
conflicts, it is not required to extend the process stages beyond the onset and outcome
conditions. Upon the initial testing purported in the Research Design A, I proceed with
elaborating the factors that could trigger changes in the outcome following the start of
civil war.
In Research Design B, the broad definition of path dependence is narrowed down
to explain the dynamics behind the process through the introduction of factors that could
account for the phenomena of increasing returns and switching costs. Both in the
contentious politics and economics scholarship, these factors were suggested to be the
tipping points or branching points respectively.119 The observation of path dependence in
civil wars in a broader sense postulating “that what has happened at an earlier point in
time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in
time” is crucial on its own.120 Yet, actually tracing mechanisms that could account for
heightening the switching costs and increasing returns by testing the hypothesis of the
tipping points will provide more fruitful research agenda and policy implications.
While attempts have been made to transfer and adapt the logic of path dependent
processes from the economic sphere to the political realm by outlining not only the
mechanisms, but also characteristics of such processes, little attention was given to the
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areas outside of power asymmetries, collective action, and institutions.121 Hereafter, I
theorize about the applicability of W. Brian Arthur’s features of increasing returns and
Paul Pierson’s review of path dependence characteristics of political process to the study
of war in general and intrastate conflict in particular.
In the seminal work Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy,
which Paul Pierson utilized to extrapolate the logic of path dependence into political
sphere, renowned economist W. Brian Arthur outlined four features that describe the selfreinforcing mechanisms.122 These are multiple equilibria or unpredictability of the
outcomes; possible inefficiency of the outcome; lock-in or inflexibility of the outcomes
once the increasing returns are in play; and, path dependence or non-ergodic dynamics.
While such self-enforcing or autocatalytic systems are observed in physics, chemistry,
and biology, Arthur’s primary purpose was to search for such processes in the field of
economics. Many scholars including Arthur turned to the dominance of certain
technologies such as QWERTY or VHS as the most evident systems that exhibit
increasing returns. Can intrastate wars exhibit the path dependence dynamics? While this
question will be elaborated in subsequent chapters through a series of statistical tests, it is
equally important to analyze internal warfare through the four features that Arthur
suggested in the abovementioned work.
As I have mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the nature internal conflict
is still debated. The primary concern is whether we should treat each case of civil war as
a unique phenomenon or suggest that there are similar patterns in civil war dynamics that
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can be observed across temporal and spatial dimensions. I adhere to the second postulate
and argue that we can uncover similarities throughout various instances of internal
warfare. Whereas the recent scholarship on intrastate conflicts has been largely successful
at “discovering” inherent tendencies in the civil wars’ onset, dynamics, and termination,
the claims regarding the possibility of predicting the outcome of war have not entered in
the mainstream literature.
The second aspect of self-enforcing systems, the inefficiency of the outcome,
stems from the assumption that war in itself is the suboptimal result that is more costly
than peace. Following James Fearon’s seminal hypothesis about war as a failure of the
bargaining process, it is valid to assume that in intrastate conflicts the outcome is
oftentimes inefficient.123 The third feature, lock-in or inflexibility of switching to
alternative outcomes, can also characterize intrastate conflicts. Later in the chapter, I
elaborate the lock-in feature through outlining exogenous or endogenous tipping points in
the course of civil war. Finally, by juxtaposing the onset factors with the various
outcome of intrastate conflict as I do in Research Design A, it is valid to assume that civil
wars are non-ergodic systems where the differences in the earlier conditions influence the
later stages. All four features that Arthur outlined for self-reinforcing systems (path
dependent processes) in the field of economics can be applied to study of intrastate
conflicts.
If we agree with Carl von Clausewitz that war is simply a continuation of politics
by other means, than perhaps we can also elaborate on the applicability of Paul Pierson’s
characterization of path dependence processes in politics to the study of intrastate
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conflicts. According to Pierson, path dependence in the narrower definition that stresses
increasing returns in social processes is characterized by the multiple equilibria;
contingency; a critical role for timing and sequencing; and inertia.124 Both Pierson and
Arthur consider multiple equilibria or unpredictability of the outcome as the inherent
feature of the path dependence. Indeed, in economic, political, and war dimensions it is
increasingly complicated to predict correctly the outcome of the process. Pierson’s
second characteristic, contingency or “relatively small events, if they occur at the right
moment, can have large and enduring consequences,” can, although selectively, be
applied to the study of intrastate conflicts.125 The power of small events – like the selfimmolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in 2010 that arguably sparked revolution in Tunisia or
use of social media by activists to initiate revolution in Egypt the same year – has given
rise to assumptions that small scale events could cause large-scale consequences. Yet, the
countless incidences of similar actions like for example self-immolation by Tibetan
protestors against Chinese rule did not led to the outbreak of civil war. These contrasting
results highlight the third aspect of path dependence in political sphere, the critical role of
timing and sequencing. Finally, Pierson’s feature of inertia that is consistent with
Arthur’s lock-in characteristic can be found across the variety of intrastate wars. I argue
that internal and external forces create a positive feedback and establish conditions under
which switching to alternative outcomes is unlikely. I elaborate this assumption reflected
in the Research Design B in the subsequent parts of this dissertation.
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Tipping Points in Intrastate Conflicts

Four sub-debates in the field of intrastate conflicts that I outlined earlier in this
chapter share the reductive approach. They generated valuable insights into the nature of
war, yet rarely communicated between each other. Introduction of the path dependence
theory offers a dialogue that connects different stages of conflict. Although theoretically
there can be a multitude of factors that could and do intervene in the course of civil war,
modern scholarship on intrastate conflict stresses the significance of certain internal and
external determinants. Below, I outline several of these factors or tipping points that alter
the flow of intrastate conflict. These factors can be grouped into two large categories. The
first group is characterized by the presence of exogenous forces in the conflict such as the
involvement of the United Nations as a global collective security institution; military
peacemaking intervention by the regional intergovernmental organization; and, state-led
third party intervention on the behalf of either rebels or the government.

Table 2. Exogenous Tipping Points and Civil War Outcomes.
Exogenous Tipping Point
UN intervention
Regional IGO intervention
State intervention for government
State intervention for rebels

Civil War outcome
Compromise
Compromise
Government wins
Rebels win

In the table 2, I summarize my expectations about the correlation between
different exogenous tipping points and civil war outcomes. I argue that the presence of
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United Nations forces in an intrastate conflict would be more conducive to a compromise
outcome since the primary task of the peacekeeping missions is to prevent hostilities
from warring sides and encouragement of a compromise rather than siding with either
government or rebel counterpart. While UN peacekeeping activities are aimed at
mediation and provision of avenues for peace dialogue, it is important to outline several
caveats that could explain this peculiar outcome of internal conflict.
The idea of peacekeeping was not originally integrated in the Charter of the
United Nations, but rather appeared as a response to the changing dynamics of conflict on
a global scale. Although civil wars and domestic unrest occasionally erupted, they were
disproportionately less numerous than conflicts between nation-states. The pivotal change
in the global conflict environment occurred in the second half of the twentieth century
following the devastation of the Second World War, as the number of intrastate conflicts
superseded the incidence of wars between the states.126
Despite the global ideological confrontation and de jure absence of provisions
regarding peacekeeping, the United Nations were able to initiate lightly armed observer
missions in the late 1940s with the aim of monitoring ceasefires and providing buffer
zones between combatants. These were the United Nations Truce Supervision
Organization and the Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, which still maintain
their presence in the Middle East and Jammu and Kashmir areas respectively.127 After
mediating the Suez Crisis, peacekeepers started to be distinguished by the blue berets and
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helmets symbolizing neutrality.128 Gradually, the idea of preventive diplomacy was
incorporated in peacekeeping rhetoric. But it was not until the end of the Cold War that
peacekeeping was able to unleash its true potential.
From 1989 onward, the number of peacekeeping operations and personnel
significantly increased and the thinking behind these missions’ tactical and strategic
purpose evolved. The traditional functions of peacekeeping such as monitoring ceasefires
have been expanded “from helping to build sustainable institutions of governance, to
human rights monitoring, to security sector reform, to the disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration of former combatants.”129 The shift toward more humanitarian
dimensions also required new types of actors such as police and civilian personnel, in
addition to the military forces that still remain essential for security purposes.
In 2000, the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council conducted a
series of high-level discussions on the future of peacekeeping called the Panel on United
Nations Peace Operations. The final document prepared by a group chaired by Lakhdar
Brahimi outlined the current state of peacekeeping’s major drawbacks and avenues for
improvement. The Brahimi Report pointed out three strategic activities of the UN in the
sphere of peace operations: conflict prevention and peacemaking; peacekeeping; and,
peacebuilding.130 The first step, conflict prevention and peacemaking, aims at addressing
the structural sources of conflict and, if the conflict has erupted, providing mediation and
diplomatic solutions. The second step, peacekeeping, has evolved from the traditional
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role of being a barrier between warring sides into a complex operation with the
participation of civilian counterparts. Finally, it describes peacebuilding as a process of
creating space for peace to thrive, which consists of “reintegrating former combatants
into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law … ; improving respect for human
rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses;
providing technical assistance for democratic development … ; and promoting conflict
resolution and reconciliation techniques.”131
The transformation of UN peacekeepers from being merely buffer zones between
two warring states to engaging actively in the internal conflict on behalf of one of the
parties is a substantial factor for the objective analysis of the UN interventions as a
tipping factor and is duly acknowledged in the present inquiry. While the role of UN
forces as a tipping factor in intrastate conflicts tends to favor compromise-oriented
solutions, the involvement of the regional intergovernmental organizations and its impact
on the war outcome appears to be less straightforward. Regional inter-governmental
organizations that intervene in intrastate conflicts vary significantly in terms of political,
economic and military capacity to fulfill the mission; internal cohesion; and legitimacy in
the country of involvement. Moreover, the majority of organizations that are actively
intervening in intrastate conflicts were either formed following the end of the Cold War
or relieved of the bipolar global gridlock that prevented them from an active engagement.
Despite these differences, intergovernmental organizations such as the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the
European Union, the African Union or the League of Arab States tend to intervene
following the resolution from the United Nations and, therefore, abide to the same
131
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principles of halting the hostilities and securing peaceful solutions. Thus, it is possible to
make a tentative hypothesis that the involvement of regional intergovernmental
organizations is also conducive to a compromise solution. At the same time, the results of
the tests could suggest the discrepancies of the outcomes due to the factors that have been
discussed earlier.
The role of third party interventions in the course of an intrastate conflict has been
extensively examined in the scholarship on civil wars.132 The central focus in this
subfield was generally on the duration of civil war or duration of peace after the civil war
in case of third party interventions. Other areas of interest included the role of contagion
in the decision of states or international organizations to intervene or decision-making of
a third party based on the expectations of civil war outcome.
A particularly interesting work for the current analysis of path dependence was
Clayton L. Thyne’s study How International Relations Affect Civil Conflict: Cheap
Signals, Costly Consequences in which he focused on the role of signals that states sent to
the parties of intrastate conflict in terms of onset, duration and outcome. His
comprehensive analysis suggested that the outcome of the civil war is “closely linked to
expectations developed prior to the onset of rebellion.”133 Although Thyne bases his
analysis on the bargaining theory of war to substantiate the role of signals that a third
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party sends and claims that all stages on internal conflict are interrelated, his analysis
does not make a direct claim about the existence of path dependence through increasing
returns and switching costs in civil wars. Thyne’s findings suggest that external actors’
supportive or hostile actions toward the government do, in fact, influence the outcome of
the conflict. Therefore, despite certain difference in the research design, Thyne’s
conclusion could be contrasted with results of the present inquiry about the role of the
exogenous tipping points in the civil war outcomes.

Table 3. Endogenous Tipping Points and Civil War Outcomes.
Endogenous Tipping Point
High military capacity
Low military capacity
Democratic regime
Autocratic regime

Civil War outcome
Government wins
Rebels win
Compromise
Government wins

The second group of tipping factors that is introduced into the models of intrastate
conflict to test path dependence dynamics delves into the structural characteristics of civil
wars (Table 3). The fluctuations in the parameters of these endogenous features could
alter the course of the internal conflict through creating the environment in which
switching toward the alternative outcome will be too costly. In a sense, endogenous
factors are aimed at capturing the internal dynamics of civil war that exist outside of
direct influence by either government or rebel forces. The two types of endogenous
tipping points introduced in the present inquiry are the size of the government’s military
forces and fluctuations in the regime type.
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Both endogenous tipping factors were identified by Charles Tilly and Sidney
Tarrow as determinants of the government’s ability to prevent the outbreak of conflict.134
According to the authors, government capacity and the level of democracy shape the
effectiveness of regimes in the contentious politics. Their definition of state capacity as
the “extent to which governmental action affects the character and distribution of
population, activity, and resources with the government’s territory” effectively captures
all aspects of regime’s control during the non-war period.135 While focusing on tax
extractive and bureaucratic features of a regime might be useful in analyzing the onset
conditions for civil wars, understanding the dynamics of the armed conflict period
requires focusing the attention on the military capabilities of a state.
The capacity of the political regimes to crack down on rebels is an abstract notion
that could encompass several determinants. The first indicator of a government’s strength
is the availability of offensive military capabilities that can be construed in terms of
armed forces size, its resolve, and training. Here, I focus on the military capacity defined
through the number of military personnel available to the government to topple the
rebellion. The logic of correlation between the size of the army and the onset, duration
and termination of an intrastate conflict has been extensively examined in the scholarly
literature.136 While not necessarily an effective predictor of the onset of civil war as are
other military proxies such as the GDP per capita or military expenditures, military
personnel per capita can provide better insights into the termination dynamics of
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intrastate conflicts.137
Another indicator of regime effectiveness in contentious periods is the level of
democracy, which could be captured through the POLITY IV indicators. Tilly and
Tarrow define democracy as the “extent to which people subject to a given government’s
authority have broad, equal political rights, exert significant influence (e.g., through
competitive elections and referenda) over government personnel and policy, as well as
receive protection from arbitrary action by governmental agents such as police, judges,
and public.”138 In a sense, the form of government whether it is more democratic or
authoritarian could inform the outcome of the internal conflict by pointing at the options
that the government has in combating the rebels. The ability of an authoritarian
government to exercise military force on rebels without repercussions to its own political
survivability would allow them to avoid pressures from their own population and
therefore would have the ability to rally more resources to topple the rebellion. At the
same time, the government that is neither authoritarian nor democratic does not have an
advantage of rallying resources and is more likely to fail in combating rebel forces. It is
harder to hypothesize about possible outcomes of civil war in democratic regimes since
by definition the inclusive politics and influence over government’s actions should
prevent the civil wars from occurring in the first place. Nevertheless, if intrastate conflict
does occur and the regime maintains enough political features to be considered
democratic, it is valid to assume that the existing mechanisms and institutions would
enable rebels and the government to address the grievances peacefully and deliver a
compromise outcome.

137
138

Ibid, 283.
Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 55.

73
Conclusion

The existing scholarship on civil wars dates back to the accounts of conflict
within states in the ancient world. The development of perspectives on the causes and
consequences of intrastate conflicts is associated with the historic milestones such as the
end of the Second World War, nuclear stalemate, and the fall of the Soviet Union.
Current debates in the sphere of internal armed violence revolve around four distinct
areas: onset of war, conflict dynamics, third party interventions, and conflict outcomes.
Furthermore, the study of intrastate conflicts has burgeoned in the recent years through
focusing on interdisciplinary approaches that involved sociology and formal modeling.
While certain methodological limitations imply the use of caution when devising policy
implications for predicting the dynamics of civil wars, the burgeoning of the discipline
not only highlights the relevance of understanding the nature of the most abundant form
of armed violence, but also indicates the potential for innovative approaches to the study
of intrastate conflicts.
The justification proposed in this chapter regarding the intervening factors that
influence the course of the civil war and fixate certain outcomes are not exhaustive, but
primarily serve as a logical exercise to propose testable hypotheses. Thus, I theorize that
these tipping points when introduced by the external actor into the intrastate conflict
(exogenous group) or are triggered by the internal factors (endogenous group) lead to
unique civil war outcomes by increasing returns for a particular path and consequently
elevating costs of switching to an alternative course of action. In chapter 6, I proceed
with devising and testing models of path dependence in intrastate conflicts based on these
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exogenous and endogenous factors. Thus, I transform theoretical justifications regarding
the impact of tipping factors proposed above into quantifiable parameters.
Rather than filling a missing niche in the existing literature on intrastate conflicts,
this study generates a novel argument about whether or not history matters in civil wars
through juxtaposing the onset and termination elements. Furthermore, the current
approach encompasses the sociological perspectives of Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam about
the turning points in contentious politics and the theory of path dependence that was
primarily elaborated through the inquiries in the field of economics.
The following chapter elaborates on three research frameworks introduced here
and describes methodological tools that are used for each section. Furthermore, I provide
information about two datasets that I have created to test the hypotheses of the Research
Design A and B. Finally, I outline independent, dependent, and control variables and
explain techniques I used to address the problem of missing values.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES

Identifying Intrastate Conflicts

The notion of war has entered the lexicon as violence became a norm in solving
disputes between tribes, cities, and nations at the dawn of our civilization. It is certainly
true that we have some general understanding of the term, but for the purpose of this
dissertation I outline the definition of war and then highlight the difference between
intrastate conflicts and other types of warfare. While trivial and pervasive, the notion of
war can be boiled down to the intrinsic elements that define it. Yet, it is the details that
allow us to distinguish war from other forms of violence. According to Merriam-Webster
Online Dictionary, war can be defined as:
a.

A state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or
nations;

b.

A period of such armed conflict.1

This explanation, despite being rather vague, points to the traditional
misconception that the right to wage wars primarily belongs to states and nations.
Possibly a tribute to our past when interstate war was indeed one of the ways to solve
disputes between nations, war nevertheless has evolved beyond the domain of states and
nations. In fact, after the World War II the number of wars between countries has slowly
decreased, while the incidence of armed conflict within states has been on a steady rise.

1
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Following the quantitative revolution in the social sciences the primary approach in
academia toward understanding the phenomenon of war lies in outlining a definition that
will distinguish it from other types of conflicts. The fathers of quantitative revolution and
founders of an influential Correlates of War project, Melvin Singer and David Small,
have suggested defining war through the prism of violence. Thus, they contended that
“not only is war impossible without violence (except of course in the metaphorical
sense), but we consider the taking of human life the primary and dominant characteristic
of war.”2 Indeed, the focus on violence and specifically on the numerical component that
Singer and Small encapsulated in the number of battle-related deaths gives us an abstract
distinction between various types of violence.
If the primary focus in understanding war is violence captured in terms of war
casualties, then what are the distinctions that make civil wars different from other forms
of conflict? In order to operationalize the civil war, one must reflect on the intrinsic
dynamics of this particular type of conflict. A wide variety of projects and academic
inquiries have emerged in the last fifty years attempting to define civil war in terms of
quantifiable variables. While it was obvious that for intrastate wars the central
confrontation would occur between the actors within the national border, a boundary
between the numbers of casualties that would distinguish civil war from civil conflict
became a central point of a disagreement.
Three seminal projects have advanced our understanding about the character and
mechanisms of the civil war: the Correlates of War project; “Greed and Grievance in
Civil War” by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler; and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
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(UCDP) Armed Conflict Dataset. The war typology that the Correlates of War project
offers has been constantly evolving to reflect the difference in the character of diverse
forms of violent conflict. Thus, the initial distinction of international wars and civil wars
that was proposed by Melvin Small and David Singer has been since updated to
differentiate interstate, extra-systemic, colonial, intercommunal and other types of wars.3
Meredith Reid Sarkees in the guide to the fourth version of the Correlates of War project
dataset “The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars (Version 4 of the
Data)” has suggested the following definition of civil wars:
The classification of civil war was built on three dimensions: internality, types of
participants, and the degree of effective resistance. In general, a civil war was
defined as any armed conflict that involved; (1) military action internal to the
metropole of the state system member; (2) the active participation of the national
government; (3) effective resistance by both sides; and (4) a total of at least 1,000
battle-deaths during each year of the war.4
An important revision to the Correlates of War definition was made by Paul
Collier and Anke Hoeffler who accepted the 1,000 deaths threshold for an internal
conflict, but also suggested that “in order to distinguish wars from massacres, both
government forces and an identifiable rebel organization must suffer at least 5% of these
casualties.”5 The critics of the Correlates of War project arbitrary benchmark of 1,000
deaths argued that it does not adequately reflect the dynamics of the modern internal
conflict. Consequently, researchers at Uppsala Conflict Data Program suggested that the
civil war must be defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government or
territory or both, where the use of force between two parties results in at least 25 battle3

Meredith Reid Sarkees, “The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars (Version 4 of the
Data),” The Correlates of War Project, accessed January 30, 2015,
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related deaths in a single calendar-year.”6 In addition, if the government does not
participate as an actor in the internal conflict it cannot technically be considered a civil
war. In my study, I adhere to the definition developed by the Correlates of War project
and construct a new dataset that tests path dependence in intrastate conflicts based on the
observations and outcomes of civil wars from the COW Project’s database.

Methodology

The primary goal of my research is to identify the patterns in the onset and
termination dynamics of the civil wars. As stated earlier, the existing literature has
focused extensively on each stage of the intrastate conflict, but has not inquired into the
phenomenon in all its totality. Therefore, it is imperative to conduct a cross-sectional
evaluation of these tendencies or lack thereof regarding the civil wars that have been
recorded and systematized.
The analytical framework of this dissertation relies on the mixed methods
research paradigm. The initial inquiry into the correlation between the onset factors and
civil war settlement options are conducted through several empirical tests. The
subsequent elaboration of civil war dynamics introduces the exogenous and endogenous
tipping points to substantiate the narrow definition of path dependence. This step requires
empirical refinements of the original hypotheses by including the intervening variables
that control for temporal and sequential assumptions of path dependence. Finally, I
propose a series of case studies that examine the explanatory power of the empirical

6

Ibid, 249.

79
findings regarding path dependence in intrastate conflicts. In sum, the proposed research
design follows the logic of mixed methods.
While I designate three separate research approaches, I do not suggest that they
are sequential, such that I need to test the hypotheses of Research Design A to get to B
and, finally, to C. Instead, I consider all three frameworks to apply simultaneously to the
central point of inquiry about path dependence in intrastate conflicts. Therefore, the logic
of the mixed methods approach is to test a theory from different angles where each
research design has a specific role in analyzing the wider picture of civil war dynamics.
As Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom in Working Together: Collective Action, the Commons,
and Multiple Methods in Practice suggest, “case studies and small-N comparative
research designs offer advantages for concept and theory development as well as
evaluation of hypothesized causal sequences and mechanisms.”7 Since the core aspect of
this dissertation is to develop and test a theory about the path dependence dynamics in
intrastate conflict, methodological pluralism is required to investigate macro level
hypotheses and delve into nuances through micro-level case studies.
In order to determine the overarching patterns between the start and end of civil
wars and influence of endogenous and exogenous tipping points, two comprehensive
datasets, Onset-Termination of Intrastate Conflicts (OTIC) and Tipping Points in
Intrastate Conflicts (TPIC), are introduced here that incorporate data from the Correlates
of War (COW) project Dataset of Intra-State Wars v. 4.1 and the Dataset of National
Material Capabilities v. 4.0; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin’s dataset for the article
“Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”; the POLITY IV Project Dataset; Nathan Black’s
7
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contagion dataset from “When Have Violent Civil Conflicts Spread? Introducing a
Dataset of Substate Conflict Contagion”; the Diamond Dataset (DIADATA) by Elisabeth
Gilmore, Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch & Jan Ketil Rød; Third Party Peacekeeping
Missions, 1946-2012 (Version 3.0); and, the World Development Indicators dataset.8
The current OTIC database consists of 127 cases of civil war that encompass immediate
post-World War II period and span until the most recent episodes of an intrastate conflict
that were codified in Correlates of War project.
A series of multinomial logistic regressions are utilized to test the hypotheses
regarding the dynamics of the termination and the onset of civil wars. Specifically,
multinomial logistic regressions are applied to test the relationship between civil war
outcomes and onset factors for Research Design A. The analysis of the impact of tipping
factors in Research Design B involves the investigation of the temporal dimensions of
conflict. To analyze the impact of the internal and external factors that could lock in the
particular outcome of the conflict, I introduce a survival analysis framework. In
particular, I investigate the competing risks assumptions regarding the interaction
between multiple outcomes of civil wars and explanatory variables using the Cox
proportional hazards model and the Fine and Gray method for competing risks model.
8
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The analysis of the three cases outlined in the Research Design C requires a qualitative
approach with the focus on application and elaboration of path dependence in specific
instances of intrastate conflict.

Research Design A

Given the broad definition of path dependence, the outcome of the civil war,
whether it is the victory for government, compromise or victory of rebel forces, is
dependent upon the factors that are considered to be behind the onset of the intrastate
conflicts. The model that tests this argument encapsulates various types of the onset
determinants such as the presence of lootable resources (secondary diamonds); an oil
exporting economy; religious and ethnic fractionalization; possibilities of civil war
spreading to other countries (contagion); and, a dummy variable for the period during and
after the Cold War. The following hypotheses encapsulate the proposed interactions
between onset conditions and civil war outcomes.
Hypothesis #1. Civil wars in countries with the presence of the lootable resources
(secondary diamonds) are more likely to end up in the victory of rebels. Conflict or
bloody diamonds are commonly known factors in sparking armed confrontations in
various regions of the world. In an article “A Diamond Curse? Civil War and a Lootable
Resource,” Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore argued about the influence of secondary
diamonds on instigating ethnic intrastate conflict.9 Thus, it is imperative to examine if
diamonds continue to have an important role after the initiation of the hostilities.

9

Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Elisabeth Gilmore, “A Diamond Curse? Civil War and a Lootable
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Hypothesis #2. Civil wars that occurred in countries with an oil-exporting
economy are more likely to end up with victory by the government. There is a formidable
body of literature that connects oil with intrastate conflicts. In their seminal article,
Fearon and Laitin have observed the effect that oil has on the outbreak of civil war.10
Given these dynamics it is valid to assume that this lootable resource will also be pivotal
in shaping the outcomes of civil conflicts.
Hypothesis #3. Civil wars in countries that were affected by the conflict contagion
are more likely to end up with rebels’ victory. By and large, previous analysis of the
geography of conflict suggests that when a civil war erupts, neighboring states are likely
to be affected by the spillover of the hostilities. Moreover, a country does not need to be
located in the close proximity of an intrastate conflict to be affected by the armed
violence. In the modern age, indirect financial and military contribution to spark the
conflict can be provided by states and non-state groups located in different regions and
even continents. Specifically, these tendencies apply to ideological or religiously
motivated spillover of conflict. Here, I aim at evaluating whether or not these indirect
causal contributions influence resolutions of civil wars.
Hypothesis #4. Civil wars in countries that are characterized by religious
homogeneity are more likely to result in government’s victory. Alternatively, if civil wars
occur in countries that are characterized by religious heterogeneity, they are more likely
to result in rebel’s victory.
Hypothesis #5. Civil wars in countries that are characterized by ethnic
homogeneity are more likely to result in government’s victory. Alternatively, if civil wars

10
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occur in countries that are characterized by ethnic heterogeneity, they are more likely to
result in rebels’ victory. Ethnic and religious tensions are traditionally identified as the
culprits for internal violence. Yet, quantitative studies found little support for ethnoreligious causes of intrastate conflict onset.11 Case studies analysis, however, proved to
be more fruitful in understanding the dynamics of war in ethnically and religiously
diverse societies. My analysis aims at empirically testing the impact of these factors on
the ways civil wars are resolved. To clarify a theoretical design of this section, table 4
provides a summary of the main hypotheses, dependent, independent, and control
variables.

11

James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” The American Political
Science Review Vol. 97, no. 1 (Feb., 2003): 83-84.

84
Table 4. Research Design A.

Hypothesis #1
Civil wars in countries with the presence of
the lootable resources (secondary diamonds)
are more likely to end up in the victory of
rebels.
Hypothesis #2
Civil wars that occurred in countries with
the oil-exporting economy are more likely
to end up with the government victory.
Hypothesis #3
Civil wars in countries that were affected by
the conflict contagion are more likely to end
up with rebels’ victory.
Hypothesis #4
Civil wars in countries that are
characterized by religious homogeneity are
more likely to result in government’s
victory. Alternatively, if civil wars occur in
countries that are characterized by religious
heterogeneity, they are more likely to result
in rebel's victory.
Hypothesis #5
Civil wars in countries that are
characterized by ethnic homogeneity are
more likely to result in government’s
victory. Alternatively, if civil wars occur in
countries that are characterized by ethnic
heterogeneity, they are more likely to result
in rebel's victory.

DV

IV

CV

Civil War
Outcome

Secondary
Diamonds

Cold
War

Civil War
Outcome

Oil Exporting
Economy

Cold
War

Civil War
Outcome

Contagion

Cold
War

Civil War
Outcome

Religious
Fractionalization

Cold
War

Civil War
Outcome

Ethnic
Fractionalization

Cold
War
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Research Design B

Throughout the history of civil wars, the international community had
occasionally to intervene in order to prevent the continuation of violence. While the
official reasons behind the involvement of the United Nations peacekeepers such as
preventing humanitarian disaster or separation of warring sides is widely known and
openly stated, it is imperative to trace whether or not the intervention of the UN is
correlated with one of the three intrastate conflict outcomes. Aside from the involvement
of the UN that is oftentimes paralyzed by the power play of the permanent members at
the Security Council, insufficient resources or the will to intervene in civil wars, regional
intergovernmental organizations are becoming a decisive factor in shifting the odds of the
internal conflict. Since interventions by United Nations (H6) or the regional organizations
(H7) that require the mandate from the Security Council are geared toward mitigating the
conflict rather than assisting one of the interested parties, the pursuit of compromise
appears to be the most logical outcome.
Unlike the global and regional intergovernmental organizations, states or state-led
coalitions can interfere in the course of the civil war with or without the UN approval and
do not necessarily pursue a peaceful solution. I expect to observe a higher probability of
government victory given that the third party state supports government forces (H8). In
contrast, if the state intervention supports rebels, I expect the rebellion to succeed (H9).
The table below summarizes the abovementioned hypotheses.
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Table 5. Research Design B Exogenous Tipping Points.
Exogenous Tipping Point

Civil War outcome

UN intervention

Compromise

Regional IGO intervention

Compromise

State intervention for government

Government wins

State intervention for rebels

Rebels win

In Contentious Politics, Tilly and Tarrow make an intriguing observation about
the possible reasons behind the occurrence of lethal conflicts. Thus, the primary
determinant of the state’s ability to prevent the outbreak of violence rests in a character of
political regime that is reflected through the “capacity of its central government and its
degree of democracy.”12 According to the authors, fluctuations in this capacity can lead
to either regime split or transfer of power: “high-capacity states reduce the threat by
making it difficult for anyone to create rival concentrations of coercive means with their
territories,” while the “low-capacity states more often face precisely the threat that some
rival actor will build up a major concentration of coercive means and use it to topple the
existing rulers.”13 Specifically, in regards to civil wars, Tilly and Tarrow identified two
broader groups depending on the regime type: “relatively high-capacity regimes, however
democratic or undemocratic, containing significant zones that escape central control” and
“low-capacity undemocratic regimes.”14

12
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Traditionally, state capacity has been widely examined in the scholarly literature
through the prism of economic and administrative performance, economic intervention
and development.15 In recent years, the notion of state capacity has been widely applied
to the study of conflict and its dynamics.16 Although different determinant are used to
capture the effects of state capacity such as tax burden, economic interference, the ability
of a state to extract resources, in this study I focus on the size of government’s military
personnel as a proxy for a state capacity during the intrastate conflict.17 Specifically, I
created a variable based on the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset
that encompasses military capacity as a ratio of all military personnel to the total of
state’s population.
Thus, I hypothesize that the civil wars in which the state has high military
capacity are more likely to be conducive to the success of the government (H10).
Likewise, if the state maintains only a small military force, rebels are more likely to
succeed (H11). Alongside military capacity, I test the degree of democracy in the
outcome of a civil war. Given that the country has democratic institutions in place, I
hypothesize that the government and rebel forces are more likely to enter into a
compromise agreement (H12). I expect to observe the success of the government if the
state regime is authoritarian (H13). Furthermore, it is crucial to test the interactions
15
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between military capacity and regime type to capture their influence on the outcome of
intrastate conflict. Table 6 summarizes theses hypotheses.

Table 6. Research Design B Endogenous Tipping Points.
Endogenous Tipping Point

Civil War outcome

High military capacity

Government wins

Low military capacity

Rebels win

Democratic regime

Compromise

Autocratic regime

Government wins

Research Design C

The overarching trends between onset and termination of intrastate conflicts and
the impact of tipping factors that substantiate path dependence are empirically tested in
this study. In this section, rather than focusing on large-n and small-n testing, I intend to
develop a causal narrative about the impact of initial conditions on the outcome of civil
wars. I select three cases based on outcome criteria such as the civil war that ended with
the government victory; civil war that culminated in the success of rebellion; and a case
of a compromise outcome. The cases that I review in this dissertation are the First
Chechen War of 1994-1996; Africa’s World War (the Second Congo War) of 1998-2002;
and, the Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War (Eelam IV) of 2006-2009. Chechen and
Congolese intrastate conflicts are part of the OTIC dataset, while the Second Sri Lanka

89
Civil War is a recent war and analyzed in this study to test the applicability of the
quantitative tests to out-of-sample cases. In sum, the focus of the analysis is the impact of
exogenous and endogenous factors on the increasing returns and amplification of
switching costs in each of cases.

Operationalization of Variables

As a foundation for the Onset-Termination of Intrastate Conflict dataset, I utilize
a Correlates of War (COW) project Dataset of Intra-State Wars v.4.1 that I modified by
limiting the instances of civil wars chronologically to the period from 1945 to 2007. In
the period after World War II, bilateral and then multilateral system of international
relations have fundamentally shifted from the previous periods. Furthermore, I have
excluded four out of seven types of internal wars that Meredith Reid Sarkees has
identified in the Correlates of War project Dataset of Intra-State Wars: “the war was
transformed into another type of war; the war is ongoing as of 12/31/2007; stalemate;
and, conflict continues at below war level.”18
The primary reason for excluding the abovementioned outcomes is to provide
more robust inferences regarding the possibility of the path dependence in intrastate
conflicts. It is also worth noting that according to the Correlates of War project dataset
there can be four types of intrastate conflicts: civil wars for central control, civil wars

18
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over local issues, regional internal, and intercommunal.19 In the time frame that I use for
my dataset, the majority of intrastate wars are civil wars for central control or over local
issues with the exception of the First Nigeria Christian-Muslim war (1999-2000) and the
Second Lebanese war (1975-1976) that are codified as intercommunal.

Dependent Variable

The single dependent variable that I utilize in this study is the outcome of the
intrastate conflict is obtained from the Correlates of War (COW) project Dataset of IntraState Wars v.4.1. Three possible intrastate conflict outcomes are:
1 – Side A (Government) wins
2 – Side B (Rebels) wins
3 – Side A and Side B reach a compromise

Independent Variables

Lootable Resources (Primary and Secondary Diamonds)

The current literature on civil wars highlights the importance of lootable resources
such as precious stones, narcotics and other valuable, easily transportable goods in
sparking intrastate conflicts. For my dataset, I focused primarily on the industry of
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secondary diamonds mining. Since this type of diamond extraction does not require
heavy equipment to mine and the end product is easily transportable, it becomes a
lucrative source of enrichment and contention. To capture diamonds as the onset factor in
civil wars, I turn to the DIADATA that was developed by Elisabeth Gilmore, Päivi
Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch & Jan Ketil Rød and focused on recording the diamond
occurrence across the globe.20 According to the authors, the account of diamond
occurrences “was compiled through an intensive literature search of academic databases
and journals, national geological survey reports, and industry databases and reports.”21
DIADATA encompasses the record of both the year of discovery and the year
when the location was mined for primary and secondary diamonds. To juxtapose
adequately the presence of diamonds with the particular intrastate conflict, I had to clarify
the geographical presence of this factor. For example, I designate a war to be influenced
by lootable resources if diamonds were discovered during the occurrence of intrastate
conflict and within the region of conflict. In contrast, if in Russia diamonds were
discovered in 1946 but in the Ural Mountains, it had no impact on intrastate conflicts
between Bolsheviks and Ukrainian Partisans in 1945-1947 or Forest Brethren of Baltic
region in 1945-1951. Since there is no conclusive evidence of diamond production during
Paraguay war of 1947 and Seventh Colombian civil war (1948-1958) both instances are
codified 0.
1 –primary or secondary diamonds are present
0 – no diamonds
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Contagion

Occasionally, intrastate wars can be influenced by the spillover of the conflict
from the neighboring states or influenced by the external actors. The factor of contagion
has been extensively debated both in terms of definitions and quantitative ways to capture
this phenomenon.22 The critical aspect of codifying the contagion factor is whether or not
to consider possibilities of war spillover not only from immediate neighbors, but also
from geographically distant locations. I adhere to the latter assumption and thus
incorporate the contagion variable from Nathan Black’s Dataset of Substate Conflict
Contagion, 1946-2007.23 He defines contagion as the phenomenon that occurs when “a
substate conflict makes a causal contribution to the onset of a civil war in another
state.”24 Furthermore, Black outlines the distinction of his notion of contagion from the
one which focuses on the neighboring states: “my definition allows contagion to occur
between non-contiguous states; instead of only considering pairs of states which border
each other, I consider pairs of states in the same ‘neighborhood,’ where each
neighborhood is a region of geographically and historically similar states that influence
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(2013): 751-759.
23
Nathan Black, Dataset of Substate Conflict Contagion, 1946-2007, (2013), accessed January 30, 2015,
http://scholar.harvard.edu/nathanblack/node/114901
24
Nathan Black, “The Spread of Violent Civil Conflict: Rare, State-Driven, and Preventable,” (doctoral
thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012), 24, accessed January 30, 2015,
http://web.mit.edu/polisci/people/gradstudents/nathan-black.html

93
one another’s internal politics.”25 Finally, Black is explicit about the plausibility of war
contagion only if the instigating state adopts one of three actions:
Evangelization, the deliberate sponsorship of nascent rebel groups abroad by a
state that has experienced a violent regime change; Expulsion, the deliberate
transfer of combatants across borders by a state in conflict; and Meddling with
Overt Partiality, the deliberate interference in another state’s substate conflict that
subsequently leads to conflict in the interfering state.26
In his dataset, Black gives an extensive analysis of the possibility of contagion
within intrastate conflict dyads from 1946 to 2007. In my dataset, I adapt Black’s
codification of contagion through binary variables to the instances that I shortlisted from
the Correlates of War dataset (government wins, compromise or rebels win). The
following codification focuses on incidence of contagion:
1 – actual contagion observed
0 – no contagion

Non-lootable Resources (Oil Exports)

In contrast to scholarship that evaluates the impact of lootable resources on civil
war, identifying the non-lootable determinants of intrastate conflict goes a little further
than outlining the presence of primary or secondary diamond deposits in a given state.
Among the plethora of the non-lootable resources such as oil, gas, metals, and others, the
primary role as a factor in internal conflict dynamics is given to the access and
production of oil. In this study, I utilize the oil exports indicator that was developed and
codified by James Fearon and David Laitin for their article “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and

25
26

Ibid.
Ibid, 9.
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Civil War” as the onset variable for non-lootable resources. In their dataset, Fearon and
Laitin proposed a binary variable for oil exporting countries by identifying “countryyears in which fuel exports exceeded one-third of export revenues, using World Bank
data.”27 In the addendum to their original paper, the authors specified their technique for
outlining the variable:
We next created a binomial variable marking country years that had greater than
33% fuel exports. This dichotomous variable was then extended forward for each
country for the most recent years if these lacked data, and backwards for missing
years prior to 1960, on the assumption once countries come “on line” for oil
production they generally stay there (this assumption was checked to a significant
extent by going through the data and making country-specific inquires where we
had doubts or concerns).28
Since their dataset is limited chronologically to the year 1999, I have used the
same approach to outline the missing country-year observations from 1999 to 2007 (15
observations in total) by referring to fuel export indicators from the World Development
Indicators (WDI) dataset. The factor of fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise
exports was not available for Chad and Liberia. According to the WDI dataset, Chad’s
merchandise exports accounted for $3,080,945,195 in 2005.29 In the report “Chad's Oil
Troubles,” Carin Zissis provided the value of Chad’s oil exports in 2005 which was equal
to $400,000,000 in direct revenue.30 Thus, Chad in 2005 oil exports accounted for only
13% of its overall merchandise exports and it is codified in the dataset as 0. CIA World
Factbook 2002 does not indicate oil or other energy resources as export products of
27
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30
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http://www.cfr.org/chad/chads-oil-troubles/p10532.
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Liberia during the period of the Fourth Liberian War.31 Therefore, Liberia is codified as a
non-oil exporting country.
1 – an oil exporting country
0 – not an oil exporting country

Ethnic Fractionalization

To measure the ethnic factor as the determinant of the civil war onset, I borrow an
indicator for ethnic fractionalization that was developed by Fearon and Laitin in
“Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” The authors have compiled this index based on
the ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) methodology outlined in Atlas Narodov Mira
with data added from CIA World Factbook, Encyclopedia Britannica, and the Library of
Congress Country Studies.32 According to Fearon and Laitin, ethnic fractionalization can
be determined by measuring the “probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a
country are from different ethnolinguistic groups.”33
In my dataset, I extrapolate the ethnic fractionalization index into the binary
variable through codifying any country observation where the index is 0.15 or smaller as
ethnically homogenous societies (0) and a country observation where the index is larger
than 0.15 as ethnically heterogeneous societies (1).
0 – ethnically homogenous societies
1 – ethnically heterogeneous societies
31
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Religious Fractionalization

Differences in religious beliefs are commonly attributed to instigation of conflicts
including civil wars. Religious diversity in a given country can arguably be used to
measure the impact of religion on the onset of intrastate conflict. For this study, I use
Fearon and Laitin’s religious fractionalization index that they proposed in “Ethnicity,
Insurgency, and Civil War.” This index is modeled after the ethnolinguistic
fractionalization methodology by measuring the probably that any two persons share
different religious beliefs.34
In this study, I similarly extrapolate the religious fractionalization index into the
binary variable through codifying any country observation where the index is 0.15 or
smaller as religiously homogenous societies (0) and country observation where index is
larger than 0.15 as religiously heterogeneous societies (1).
0 – religiously homogenous societies
1 – religiously heterogeneous societies

Regime Type

The contemporary scholarship on intrastate conflicts introduces the factor of
regime type either as a primary explanatory variable or a control factor for the onset or
duration of civil war. In this study, I investigate the role of regime type in the path
dependence dynamics of a civil war by analyzing how it can be associated with a
particular conflict outcome. The most widely used source of data regarding regime type
34

Ibid, 79.

97
and the elements that determine whether the regime is democratic, anocratic or autocratic
is the POLITY IV Project.35 I utilize the Revised Combined Polity Score (POLITY2) that
codes countries on the scale from 10 (most democratic) to -10 (least democratic) and also
better adapted for time series analysis. Thus, I created three dummy variables for each
regime type:
10 to 6 – democracy
5 to -5 – anocracy
-6 to -10 – autocracy
Finally, for the research design that focuses on the duration of conflict by
analyzing the total duration rather than annual duration, I averaged out the Polity score by
calculating the mean of total years minus first and last years if the war lasted more than
three years and mean of two years if it lasted for only that period.

Military Capacity

The ability of a government to extract resources, control population or impose its
will using military resources has been extensively examined in the modern literature on
conflicts. In this study, I do not focus on the efficiency of bureaucracy or the ability to
extract taxes effectively, and instead consider the size of the government military forces
to be the most applicable proxy for state capacity during the war period. While a state
does really on bureaucracy and taxes to control its population, it seems reasonable to
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Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr and Keith Jaggers, “Political Regime Characteristics and
Transitions, 1800-2012. Dataset Users’ Manual,” POLITY™ IV PROJECT, accessed March 1, 2015,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2012.pdf

98
assume that these elements would be jeopardized during the armed conflict (especially
for the territory controlled by the rebels). At the same time, the functionality of the armed
forces in principle remains the same during peaceful and conflict periods.
To capture the military capacity of the government, I use the National Material
Capabilities dataset (v. 4.0) of the Correlates of War project. This dataset offers six
elements of state capabilities including the size of military personnel. I adjust this number
by calculating military capacity as a ratio of military size to the total population. For the
survival analysis that examines the total duration of civil war and not annual intervals, I
constructed the following formula to capture the average military capacity.
Average military personnel per 1,000 =
Due to the character of several civil wars, it is important to discuss missing values
and alternative sources to substitute missing data:


The Georgian War of 1991-1992 started on December 26, 1991 and ended in
March of 1992. Since the missing value for 1991 in NMC accounts only for five
days, it is reasonable to use the value for 1992 instead.



The Second Somalia War of 1991-1997: following initial confrontation between
governmental and rebels forces in 1991, the Somali National Army and other
security forces were disbanded.36 Thus, the missing values can be treated as no
military personnel and codified it as 0.



The Dniestrian Independence War of 1991-1992 started on December 26, 1991
and ended on July 2 of the following year. The missing value for 1991 can as well

36
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19.
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be downplayed due to the war occurring primarily in 1992. Thus, the value for
1992 is used.


During the Third Somalia War of 2006-2008, the government troops of Somalia
had approximately 10,000 active duty personnel according to a report by the
BBC.37



The NMC dataset does not provide information about the size of Armed Forces of
Liberia during the Second Liberia Civil War of 1992-1995 for the years 1994 and
1995. The World Development Indicators dataset shows that the Liberian army
size was 21,000 strong in 1995.38 For the year 1994, I combine the average of
armed forces size of the previous and subsequent years.



According to the World Development Indicators dataset, the armed forces
personnel in Liberia during the Third Liberia Civil War of 1996 accounted for
22,000 active duty soldiers.39

The United Nations Intervention

While technically not an intervention, peacekeeping missions of the United
Nations are undoubtedly an intervening factor in the course of intrastate conflicts.
Interventions on the behalf of the United Nations varied in essence, scope, and size.
Nevertheless, it is critical to understand whether or not this global security organization
can be a tipping point that establishes a path dependent solution to civil wars. Using the
37
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dataset on third party peacekeeping missions compiled by Mark J. Mullenbach, I matched
UN peacekeeping with the records of civil wars for the period from 1945 to 2007. 40 His
dataset includes not only the incidence of intervention but also the objectives of every
mission. Thus, it is worth noting that the majority of the intervention had been aimed at
observing a ceasefire or monitoring disarmament and disengagement of warring sides.

Intervention by Regional Intergovernmental Organizations

To capture the role of regional intergovernmental organizations I used the same
Mullenbach’s dataset “Third Party Peacekeeping Missions, 1946-2012 (Version 3.0).”41
Most of the missions that were led by regional IGOs were aimed at the military
observation of ceasefires. IGO intervention is a dummy variable.

Intervention by States in Support of Rebel Forces or the Government

The original Correlates of War dataset on intrastate conflict that I used to outline
three outcomes to civil wars also has information on the timing of third party intervention
by the state and the side they chose to support.42 Thus, I introduce the dummy variables
for state intervention on the behalf of the government and on the behalf of the rebel

40
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forces. I do not treat instances where the support was provided to both warring sides as a
separate variable.

Control Variable

With the onset of the Cold War and the ensuing bipolar system of international
relations there was hardly a place on the globe that was out of the interest for two
superpowers. Therefore, I include in this dataset the dummy variable for the Cold War to
control for the period before and after bipolar confrontation.
1 – intrastate conflict occurred during the Cold War
0 – intrastate conflict occurred after the Cold War

Missing variables

The Correlates of War dataset has missing values for some of the entries for days.
I substitute the missing values for days by the middle of the month – day15. One entry for
third party intervention in the Mozambique Civil War of 1982-1992 was missing values
for month and day. I consider the third party intervention to have started at the beginning
of the year – January 1st.
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Conclusion

The mixed methods research framework outlined in this chapter provides a
comprehensive evaluation of the theory of path dependence. By focusing on the broad
and narrow concept of path dependence, I outline hypotheses that test overarching trends
behind initial conditions and outcomes of civil wars as well as analyze the impact of
tipping points in shaping conflict dynamics. Furthermore, I introduce two datasets for
testing path dependent dynamics in civil wars and describe the logic behind the selection
of multinomial logistic regression analysis and event history (survival) models. In
subsequent chapters, I provide an empirical analysis of two notions of path dependence,
while also evaluating their explanatory power by applying the findings into several cases
of intrastate conflicts.
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CHAPTER 4
QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION OF THE ONSET CONDITIONS AND OUTCOMES
IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS

Introduction

The central point of inquiry in this chapter is to identify the relationship between
factors that could instigate intrastate conflicts and three possible civil war outcomes.
Adopting the broad notion of path dependence that postulates the influence of earlier
stages of the process onto the latter stages, I hypothesize about the influence of the initial
conditions on the civil war dynamics. I argue that if intrastate conflicts are initiated in the
presence of lucrative lootable resources or energy reserves such as oil, ethnic or religious
heterogeneity, or by the means of contagion from other conflict areas, a specific civil war
outcome, be it the victory of the government forces, compromise, or success of rebels, is
intrinsically connected with a distinct onset factor. Following a series of multinomial
logistic regression analyses, several onset factors such as oil exports, contagion and the
Cold War appeared to have an influence on the outcome of the civil war. Nevertheless, it
is equally important to acknowledge the factors that had no effect on the way intrastate
conflict ended such as secondary diamonds, ethnic and religious fractionalization since
the absence of the relationship can inform about civil war dynamics.
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Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis

While the majority of conflicts that occurred from the period following the end of
World War II ended up with the government’s victory and only less than a fifth witnessed
the success of the rebels as can be seen in Table 7, the results of the multinomial logistic
regression models illustrate that the compromise outcome is strongly related with certain
onset conditions. Table 8 provides the output of the regression models given three
different base outcomes. Table 9 provides the analysis of marginal effects for three
different intrastate conflict outcomes.

Table 7. Descriptive Statistics of the Onset Factors and Outcomes of Civil Wars Models.
Outcome

Freq.

Percent

Government Wins

71

55.91

Compromise

34

26.77

22

17.32

127

100.00

Rebels Win
Total

Cum.

55.91
82.68

100.00
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Table 8. Coefficients of the Onset Factors and Outcomes of Civil Wars Models.
Government Wins
base outcome

Rebels Win base
outcome

Compromise base
outcome

Rebels
Win

Comp.

Gov.
Wins

Comp.

Gov.
Wins

Rebels
Win

Secondary
diamonds

–0.42
(0.59)

–0.3
(0.63)

0.42
(0.59)

0.12
(0.72)

0.3
(0.63)

–0.12
(0.72)

Oil exports

–1.32*
(0.69)

–0.03
(0.62)

1.32*
(0.69)

1.29
(0.81)

0.03
(0.62)

–1.29
(0.81)

Contagion

0.50
(0.49)

1.08*
(0.55)

–0.5
(0.49)

0.57
(0.61)

–1.08*
(0.555)

–0.58
(0.608)

–0.04
(0.53)

0.62
(0.76)

0.04
(0.53)

0.66
(0.81)

–0.62
(0.761)

–0.66
(0.81)

–0.38
(0.73)

–1.33*
(0.77)

0.38
(0.73)

–0.96
(0.79)

1.33*
(0.772)

0.96
(0.79)

Cold War

–0.85*
(0.49)

–1.47***
(0.56)

0.85*
(0.49)

–0.61
(0.6)

1.47***
(0.56)

0.61
(0.6)

Constant

0.35
(0.82)

0.08
(0.92)

0.35
(0.82)

–0.27
(0.93)

–0.08
(0.92)

0.27
(0.94)

No. of
observations

127

127

127

127

127

127

Ethnic
fractionaliza
tion
Religious
Fractionaliz
ation

Statistical confidence levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors provided in parentheses
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Table 9. Marginal Effects of the Onset Factors and Outcomes of Civil Wars Models.
Marginal effects
Government Wins

Rebels Win

Compromise

Secondary
diamonds

0.09
(0.12)

–0.07
(0.11)

–0.02
(0.08)

Oil exports

0.2
(0.12)

–0.25**
(0.12)

0.05
(0.08)

Contagion

–0.17*
(0.1)

0.05
(0.09)

0.12*
(0.07)

Ethnic
fractionalization

–0.05
(0.12)

–0.03
(0.1)

0.08
(0.09)

Religious
Fractionalization

0.18
(0.15)

0.02
(0.13)

–0.16*
(0.09)

Cold War

0.26**
(0.1)

–0.01
(0.09)

–0.16**
(0.07)

No, of observations

127

127

127

Statistical confidence levels: *p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Oil, Contagion, and the Cold War

The underpinning assumption about the interrelation between the onset and
termination factors that I have outlined in the previous chapter has been partially
confirmed. Among the factors that are considered in the scholarly literature on intrastate
conflicts to be the determinants of the civil war onset, an oil exporting economic structure
and, to an extent, a factor of contagion are found to be related to a particular civil war
outcome. Moreover, the control factor of whether or not an intrastate conflict occurred
during or after the bipolar confrontation between superpowers has had a substantial
impact on the way the particular war has ended. In a sense, considering the path
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dependent process in intrastate conflicts through the prism of importance of previous
stages (onset factors in this case), it is reasonable to claim that certain onset conditions do
indeed influence to outcome of the conflict. Now that we have confirmed the presence of
path dependence, it is imperative to discuss the directionality and magnitude of the onset
factors that proved to be significant as well as to interpret the meaning of the factors that
have shown no relationship with the civil war outcomes.

Oil Exports

Energy resources and specifically oil have been usually associated with intrastate
conflicts. The notions of a resource curse and an oil curse have been widely popularized
in the media as the explanations for the lack of development or reasons for instigating
armed conflicts. These hypotheses have been tested by James Fearon and David Laitin
who in “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War” have concluded that “the ‘median country’
had a 10% chance of civil war over a decade, whereas the same country as an oil
exported would have an estimated 21% chance.”1 Similar assumptions were provided by
David Collier in “Natural Resources, Development and Conflict: Channels of Causation
and Policy Interventions” where he argued that “in many situations, natural resources will
be located in regions where some political groups – albeit often on the fringe – are
already claiming autonomy” and thus oil and other natural resources can provide
additional reasons for armed conflict outbreak.2

1

James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” The American Political
Science Review Vol. 97, no. 1 (Feb., 2003): 85.
2
David Collier, “Natural Resources, Development and Conflict: Channels of Causation and Policy
Interventions,” Oxford University and World Bank (2003): 4, accessed January 30, 2015, http://www-
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My analysis of the path dependence dynamics in intrastate conflicts showed
substantive and statistical significance for the factor of countries with oil exporting
economies. Thus, in comparison to the base outcome of the government’s victory, the
rebels win outcome will be less likely if the country in conflict has the oil exporting
economy. Conversely, if the base outcome is a success of rebels, the government victory
is more likely given that the country has more than a third of its exports revenues in oil
(H2). The analysis of marginal effects of three outcomes suggested that if the country has
an oil-exporting economy, the probability of the rebel victory decreases by 25 percentage
points.
Even though Fearon and Laitin have found the significant effect that oil exporting
economies have on the outbreak of the intrastate conflict, they nevertheless expressed
their concern about the tendency of states whose exports are heavily influenced by oil to
be associated with a weaker state apparatus. The argument revolved around an
assumption that “oil producers tend to have weaker state apparatuses than one would
expect given their level of income because the rulers have less need for a socially
intrusive and elaborate bureaucratic system to raise revenues – ‘a political Dutch
disease’.”3 At the same time, Fearon and Laitin discarded the proposition that oil is a
good indicator for financing the rebels and instead hinted at the other lootable resources.
Can these two propositions regarding the role of oil in the onset of conflict explain the
likelihood of government to succeed and rebellion to fail?

wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/04/27/000265513_200404271100
39/Rendered/PDF/28730.pdf
3
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” The American Political
Science Review Vol. 97, no. 1 (Feb., 2003): 81.
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Given the assumption of an oil exporting economy as a proxy for weak state
apparatus and factor in the higher likelihood of conflict outbreak, my analysis suggests an
intriguing finding about the higher probability of the government succeeding in a civil
war. The explanation can lie in a second aspect of the oil factor as a source for funding
the military activities. While not a readily available option for rebels, oil offers more
opportunities for the government that has the technology and infrastructure to utilize this
resource. It is also worth noting that marginal effects analysis negates the statistical
significance of oil in terms of government’s victory. At the same time, the substantive
and statistical significance of oil in terms of rebels’ prospects for success remains
consistent in both tests. The adverse effect of an oil exporting economy on the likelihood
of rebels’ victory outcome can be partially explained through the lens of funding sources.
In order to gain the benefits from oil resources, the rebel forces would need to control the
whole production process including the extraction, storage, transportation, and refinery.
Therefore, in the presence of an oil exporting economy, rebel forces would require
absolute victory to control the production cycle. A similar requirement applies to
government, yet the analysis suggests that central forces are more likely to be effective in
utilizing oil resources to fund their war efforts.
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Contagion

The issue of war contagion has been widely circulated in the media and has found
support among scholars who investigated this phenomenon. Halvard Buhaug and Kristian
Skrede Gleditsch in “Contagion or Confusion? Why Conflicts Cluster in Space” find
evidence for the neighborhood effect in the spillover of conflicts.4 Erika Frosberg in her
dissertation “Neighbors at Risk: A Quantitative Study of Civil War Contagion” provides
new evidence on the conflict contagion effect through focusing on sources and targets
while specifying the importance of various factors such as ethnic composition, length of
borders, mountains and others.5 Nathan Black further elaborated on the various contagion
factors and provided substantive evidence for the spillover effect.6
Scholarship on contagion in intrastate conflict provides sufficient evidence for the
presence and impact of this phenomenon. My analysis further suggests that contagion has
a disproportionate effect on the likelihood of the government chances of winning the
conflict and a compromise solution. Given the base outcome of the success of
government’s forces, an intrastate conflict is more likely to result in a compromise if it
was caused by contagion. Likewise, if the base outcome is a compromise, the government
is less likely to topple the rebellion and would likely to seek a peaceful resolution. These
findings are both statistically and substantively significant and support my hypothesis

4
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http://web.mit.edu/polisci/people/gradstudents/nathan-black.html

111
about the effect of contagion as a path dependent determinant of civil war. Marginal
effects analysis does not support my H3 that implied the success of rebels in a country
affected by war contagion. Instead, the results of the analysis suggest that the probability
of the government victory decreases by 17 percentage points while the chances of a
compromise outcome increase by 12 percentage points.
Several possible mechanisms can explain the effect of contagion on the dynamics
of the intrastate conflict. First, if the intrastate conflict was instigated by the another civil
war, the rebels forces from the sender state could provide not only indirect financial
support and supply of weapons, but also innovative practices and techniques such as the
use of social media during the Arab Spring. Second, the success of civil wars in the states
that caused the contagion may unite the factions that are fighting against the central
government and rally their resolve and strength. Finally, the effect of contagion provides
the incentives for other states to intervene in the conflict to curtail the possibility of civil
war in their own territory or to prevent the spread of armed conflict in the region. All
these factors undermine the ability of the government forces to succeed, but, at the same
time, they do not provide enough leverage for the rebels to achieve a decisive victory
either. The likelihood of the compromise outcome might stem from possibility of the
involvement of external forces to mitigate the spread of the war contagion. In the
subsequent chapters, I test the role of third party interventions as the exogenous tipping
points in determining path dependence dynamics of civil wars.

112
The Cold War

It is not a secret that the bipolar stalemate that followed after the Second World
War has dominated all areas of economic, political, and security relations between states.
Two superpowers, the United States of America and Soviet Union, virtually divided the
globe into spheres of interest. On one hand, there was a system of alliances and bilateral
security arrangements led by the US. On the other hand, the Warsaw Pact and other
communism-inclined states followed the lead of the USSR in world affairs. While these
two regions have enjoyed relatively limited armed conflict incidence after 1945, countries
that have found themselves in the so-called Third World appeared to be heavily affected
by the superpower confrontation. Both sides systematically provided assistance to rebels
or governments depending on their ideological postures through not merely expressing
moral support, but by offering financial, military, and technical resources.
Therefore, the results of including the control variable that captured the time
period before and after the Cold War proved to have strong substantive and statistical
significance. Given the base outcome of the government’s victory, success of the
rebellion or compromise outcome proved to be less likely during the Cold War. At the
same time, given the base outcome of rebels’ victory or compromise, the intrastate
conflict was more likely to result in the success of the government if the intrastate
conflict occurred before 1991. The test of marginal effects suggests that during the Cold
War the probability of the government’s success in intrastate conflict increased by 26
percentage points, while the compromise outcome decreased by 16 percentage points.
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During the period of the Cold War, two superpowers had a disproportionate
impact not only in international relations in general, but also on the dynamics of intrastate
conflicts in particular. The support for rebels or governments during civil wars was
determined through the lens of Realpolitik, rather than the notions of human rights and
responsibility to protect. The focus on the human security in third party interventions is a
relatively novel concept that was initiated through the United Nations peacekeeping
efforts only after the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations.
Paraphrasing the famous saying attributed to Franklin Roosevelt’s assessment of
Nicaraguan ruler Anastasio Somoza that even though Somoza was a ruthless dictator, he
was nevertheless our ruthless dictator, it becomes clear that the full-fledged support of the
loyal dictatorial regimes was an acceptable course of action against the possibility of
communist rebellions. This logic equally applies to the Soviet Union that defended
dictatorial regimes in North Korea, Cuba and other countries to safeguard their influence
across the globe. This unequivocal adherence to national interests rather than
humanitarian concerns has defined the success of government forces and failure of
peaceful settlements during the Cold War.

Diamonds, Ethnic and Religious Fractionalization

Secondary Diamonds

The impact of lootable resources on the outbreak of intrastate conflict has
supporters among the general audience where the topic of blood diamonds was
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popularized in the movie industry as well among scholars of civil war. Political scientists
at PRIO, Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Elisabeth Gilmore, reported in “A
Diamond Curse? Civil War and a Lootable Resource” the findings that support the claim
about the impact of secondary diamonds on the possibility of the specific type of civil
war onset (ethnic war).7 At the same, they found that primary diamonds had the adverse
effect on the possibility of the war outbreak. While their findings may hold true for the
intrastate conflict onset, secondary diamonds were found to have no statistical
significance across all three civil war outcomes. This finding is rather interesting in a
sense that even if the secondary diamonds are an easy source for financing the rebels’
cause as I have outlined in the H1, in reality the presence of this type of lootable
resources does not significantly affect a particular civil war outcome.
While secondary diamonds might present a substantial risk for intrastate conflict,
they are not likely to provide a decisive upper hand to either government or rebels, nor
are they conducive to the compromise solution. However, secondary diamonds as a proxy
for lootable resources does not capture other potential sources for funding rebellions. The
inclusion of data on narcotic substances and other alluvial gemstones could shed new
light on the role of lootable resources in the path dependence dynamics of intrastate
conflicts.

7

Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Elisabeth Gilmore, “A Diamond Curse? Civil War and a Lootable
Resource,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 49, no. 4 (Aug., 2005): 538-562.
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Ethnic and Religious Fractionalization

Following the multinomial logistic regression analysis, I also found little support
for the H4 which states that civil wars in the countries that are characterized by religious
homogeneity are more likely to result in government victory; and H5 which suggests that
if civil wars occur in the countries that are characterized by the ethnic heterogeneity, they
are more likely to result in rebels’ victory. In contrast to diamonds, onset factors of ethnic
and religious fractionalization were found by James Fearon and David Laitin in
“Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War” to have little substantive and statistical
significance.8 Similarly, the output of the regression analysis finds no support for ethnic
heterogeneity as the possible factor in determining path dependent dynamics in intrastate
conflicts. While the religious fractionalization factor had exhibited a slight indication of
statistical significance when taking the base outcome of a government victory and a
compromise, it proved to have no statistical significance when tested for the marginal
effects.
Ethnic and religious diversity are equally unlikely to instigate intrastate conflict or
to determine its outcome. The fact that the state has multiple ethnic groups and various
religious adherents or the society is characterized by ethnic and religious homogeneity,
does not provide sufficient evidence to consider these two factors as determinants of path
dependence in intrastate conflict. Echoing the findings of David Collier and Anke
Hoeffler regarding the prevalence of opportunity-motivated onset of civil wars over

8

James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” The American Political
Science Review Vol. 97, no. 1 (Feb., 2003): 83-84.
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greed-motivated models, it is valid to extrapolate this assumption towards the outcomes
of intrastate conflicts.

Conclusion

The inquiry into the path dependence in civil wars through the broad concept
provided evidence for the interaction between the initial conditions and the outcomes of
conflict. Unlike previous scholarship that has suggested the prevalence of the opportunity
factors over grievance variables in explaining the outbreak of conflict, current study does
not provide such a clear cut distinctions for the factors that shape the solutions to civil
wars. Instead, the palette of onset conditions appears to be eclectic as it highlights the
importance of oil exporting economy; contagion; religious fractionalization; and the Cold
War. The logic behind the diversity of the explanatory variables lies in the alteration of
calculations of the warring sides. Thus, while secondary diamonds can provide incentives
for the rebels to start a war, they do not guarantee successful outcome for them or the
government. Arguably, different mechanisms enter the strategic and tactical calculations
of the counterparts in the course of an intrastate conflict. These dynamics can be
examined through the narrow concept of path dependence that focuses on the role of
timing and sequence. Therefore, in the next chapter I outline endogenous and exogenous
tipping factors that shape the path of intrastate conflict.
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CHAPTER 5
QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION OF THE TIPPING POINTS IN INTRASTATE
CONFLICTS

Introduction

The analysis of intrastate conflicts through the lens of path dependence provides
sufficient evidence of the presence of interrelation between the onset conditions and the
outcome. Indeed, the results suggest that certain factors at the initial stages of conflict
impact the probability of the specific civil war outcome. While these findings support the
general argument of the dissertation, further investigation into the mechanisms that “lock
in” a unique path to the civil war outcome is required to understand the underlying
dynamics of path dependence.
In this chapter, I analyze intrastate conflicts through the prism of the increasing
returns framework that was elaborated by Paul Pierson in the article “Increasing Returns,
Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.”1 Specifically, I focus on the temporal
dimensions of conflict and the effect of tipping points on the probability of the specific
outcome and increasing the cost of switching to alternatives. I classify tipping points in
terms of the internal or endogenous characteristics of the state in which civil war
occurred and through external or exogenous shocks that influence the direction of a
conflict. Thus, I elaborate on Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow’s insights regarding the
role of state capacity in determining the outcome of the civil war to control for

1

Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political
Science Review Vol. 94, no. 2 (June, 2000): 251-267.

118
endogenous impact. To examine exogenous shocks, I rely on the well-established
scholarship regarding the role of third party interventions on the duration and outcome of
civil wars. I also test the impact of several onset factors that may influence the outcome
after the initiation of the conflict. These control variables are the presence of lootable and
non-lootable resources; ethnic fractionalization; and religious fractionalization.
Ultimately, I anticipate to observe how external and internal tipping points influence the
dynamics of intrastate conflicts and influence the likelihood as well as duration of a
particular outcome.

Narrow Definition of the Path Dependence

In “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” Paul Pierson
extends the economic understanding of path dependence and the notion of increasing
returns to the domain of political science. According to Pierson, political life analyzed
through the framework of increasing returns is characterized by multiple equilibria of the
outcomes; the role of small events that occur at the right time; a critical role of timing and
sequencing; and inertia or resistance to deviate from the path.2 I argue that these
characteristics can be equally applied to the study of intrastate conflicts, which in turn
would characterize it as a path dependent process.
The dependent variable that I utilize to test path dependence hypotheses in the
dissertation is the outcome of civil war. For this study, I limited the inquiry into the cases
where government victory, rebels’ success or compromise has been observed. The
Correlates of War dataset extends the possible outcomes to encompass stalemate, conflict
2

Ibid, 263.
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continuation at lower level, ongoing conflict or transformation into another type of war.
This variety of outcome supports the first characteristic of a path dependent process,
namely, multiple equilibria of possible conclusions. As my previous analysis suggested,
the power of relatively small events such as the factor of contagion can also be applied to
the dynamics of the intrastate conflict. The investigation of the temporal dimension of
these events through the models that I propose in this chapter would further support the
increasing returns argument. Similarly, the role of timing and sequencing in intrastate
conflict can be verified using the temporal models that trace the influence of tipping
points on the civil war outcome. Finally, observing strong statistical and substantive
evidence that the onset factors do in fact determine the outcome of the intrastate conflict
and consequently identifying similar results in temporal models would suggest that the
resistance to change argument can be applicable to the study of intrastate conflicts.
The first assumption of the narrow definition of path dependence, existence of
multiple equilibria, is consistent with three possible outcomes of an intrastate conflict, yet
the second factor that underlines the power of small events is more challenging to
conceptualize. The answer to what constitutes a ‘small event’ in an intrastate conflict
appears to be rather subjective. If for example one considers the intervention by the UN
peacekeepers to be a game changing event in the civil war, does the relative size of the
mission matter? Or can the presence of international peacekeeping contingent in itself be
deemed as a big event? While the discussion of the role of micro events is relevant in the
context of intrastate conflicts, I argue that satisfying the other three conditions of the
narrow definition of path dependence is sufficient to apply the abovementioned
theoretical framework to the study of civil wars.
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In this chapter, I specifically address the third and fourth characteristic of the
path dependence dynamics: the role of timing and resistance to change. By using survival
model analysis, I expect to examine not only the interrelation between endogenous and
exogenous tipping points, but also the influence of these factors on the duration of an
intrastate conflict. Thus, I test the impact of these factors by using parametric survival
models (Weibull distribution); Cox proportional hazards models; and, proportional
hazards models for the subdistribution of a competing risk proposed by Jason P. Fine and
Robert J. Gray. Also, before testing the temporal dimensions of an intrastate conflict, I
test the role of tipping factors and onset conditions through multinomial logistic
regression analysis.

Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis

Table 10 provides the results of the marginal effects of three outcomes of
intrastate conflicts. I outline here the coefficients of marginal effects rather than the
output with three different base outcomes since with the former approach it is easier to
interpret the directionality and magnitude of the explanatory variables. I test both
exogenous and endogenous tipping factors along with variables for secondary diamonds,
oil exporting economies, ethnic fractionalization, and religious fractionalization. I did not
include the contagion factor in the analysis since it becomes theoretically irrelevant after
the start of confrontation, unlike other onset factors that retain their impact across the
whole period of civil war.
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Table 10. Marginal Effects of the Narrow Concept of Path Dependence Models.
Marginal Effects
Variable
Government Success
Rebel Success
Compromise
0.31
-0.36*
0.05
Democracy
(0.2)
(0.21)
(0.11)
0.14
-0.08
-0.06
Autocracy
(0.1)
(0.09)
(0.07)
0.01
-0.005
-0.002
Military personnel
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
United Nations
-0.06
-0.1
0.16**
intervention
(0.14)
(0.12)
(0.07)
Regional IGO
-0.37**
0.19
0.19*
intervention
(0.17)
(0.14)
(0.1)
State intervention
0.12
-0.17
0.05
for government
(0.13)
(0.12)
(0.08)
State intervention
0.04
0.03
-0.07
for rebels
(0.16)
(0.13)
(0.1)
Secondary
0.11
-0.01
-0.1
diamonds
(0.13)
(0.11)
(0.08)
0.05
-0.2
0.15*
Oil exports
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.08)
Ethnic
-0.13
-0.01
0.14
fractionalization
(0.12)
(0.1)
(0.09)
Religious
0.24
-0.09
-0.15*
Fractionalization
(0.15)
(0.13)
(0.08)
Statistical confidence levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors are in
parentheses.

Both oil exports and religious fractionalization remain substantively and
statistically significant here and in the initial conditions model that I have tested in the
previous chapter. While religious fractionalization decreases the probability of a
compromise outcome by roughly 15 percentage points in both models, the factor of oil
exports in new model now indicates the increase in probability of a compromise outcome
and has no effect for a rebel victory. The analysis further suggests that in democratic
regimes the likelihood of the rebel victory decreases by 36 percentage points, while
autocratic regimes or size of the armed forces do not appear to be related with any of
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three outcomes. UN peacekeeping forces, as I have hypothesized, are more conducive to
the compromise outcome. Thus, presence of the “blue berets” increases the likelihood of
the compromise by 16 percentage points. The peacekeeping missions by regional
intergovernmental organizations are also increasing the likelihood of the peaceful
settlement, yet they also decrease by 37 percentage points the possibility of the
government’s victory. In contrast to the missions lead by intergovernmental
organizations, state interventions that supported government or rebels did not have an
effect on the particular outcome of an intrastate conflict.

Parametric Survival Model (Weibull)

The contemporary scholarship on intrastate conflicts offers several approaches to
the analysis of the temporal dimensions of civil wars. Depending on the knowledge about
underlying distribution, baseline hazard or survival time, scholars have adopted different
models to test for the civil war duration. Oftentimes, to test for the robustness of the
analysis, the scholarship incorporates both parametric and semi-parametric models.3 In
this chapter, I apply two most frequently used models, the Weibull parametric survival
model and the Cox semi-parametric survival model. In the table 11 and 12, I report
hazard coefficients and hazard ratios using Weibull parametric survival model. The
duration in this model is measured in days.

3

Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Dan Reiter and Christopher Zorn, “Nonproportional Hazards and Event
History Analysis in International Relations,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 47, no. 1 (Feb., 2003):
33-53; Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates and Päivi Lujala, “Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of
Civil Conflict,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 53, no. 4, (August, 2009): 544-569.
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Table 11. Coefficients of the Parametric Survival Model (Weibull).
Weibull Coefficients
Variable
Government Success
Rebel Success
Compromise
0.53
-1.26
0.13
Democracy
(0.46)
(1.15)
(0.89)
0.25
-0.32
0.07
Autocracy
(0.25)
(0.4)
(0.51)
0.003*
-0.01
0.002
Military
personnel
(0.001)
(0.02)
(0.01)
-0.38
-0.56
0.59
United Nations
intervention
(0.42)
(0.52)
(0.47)
-0.45
0.73
3.4***
Regional IGO
intervention
(0.52)
(0.57)
(1.25)
-0.3
-1.02*
-0.93
State intervention
for government
(0.35)
(0.53)
(0.72)
0.12
0.19
-1.19
State intervention
for rebels
(0.4)
(0.51)
(0.79)
-0.06
-0.13
-0.84
Secondary
diamonds
(0.26)
(0.46)
(0.58)
0.35
-0.57
1.41**
Oil exports
(0.28)
(0.67)
(0.7)
-0.47
-0.1
1.25
Ethnic
fractionalization
(0.3)
(0.46)
(0.94)
0.45
-0.13
-1.01*
Religious
Fractionalization
(0.41)
(0.58)
(0.53)
_cons
-6.17***
-4.26***
-15.87***
(0.71)
(0.92)
(3.72)
ln_p _cons
-0.22**
-0.58***
0.61***
(0.1)
(0.15)
(0.21)
Statistical confidence levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses.
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Table 12. Hazard Ratios of the Parametric Survival Model (Weibull).
Weibull Hazard Ratios
Government
Variable
Rebel Success
Compromise
Success
1.7
0.28
1.14
Democracy
(0.79)
(0.33)
(1.02)
1.29
0.73
1.08
Autocracy
(0.33)
(0.29)
(0.55)
1*
0.99
1
Military personnel
(0.001)
(0.02)
(0.01)
0.68
0.57
1.81
United Nations
intervention
(0.29)
(0.3)
(0.86)
0.64
2.07
30.02***
Regional IGO
intervention
(0.33)
(1.18)
(37.61)
0.74
0.36*
0.4
State intervention
for government
(0.26)
(0.19)
(0.28)
1.12
1.21
0.3
State intervention
for rebels
(0.44)
(0.61)
(0.24)
0.94
0.88
0.43
Secondary
diamonds
(0.25)
(0.41)
(0.25)
1.42
0.56
4.12**
Oil exports
(0.4)
(0.38)
(2.86)
0.63
0.91
3.49
Ethnic
fractionalization
(0.19)
(0.42)
(3.27)
1.58
0.88
0.36*
Religious
Fractionalization
(0.65)
(0.51)
(0.19)
_cons
0.002
0.01
0
(0.001)
(0.01)
(0)
ln_p _cons
0.8
0.56
1.85
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.38)
Statistical confidence levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Bottom values are robust
standard
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Endogenous Tipping Points

Among three endogenous tipping factors, only the size of the governmental forces
appeared to be statistically significant for the Government success model. Thus, the size
of the military personnel increases the hazard rate and decreases the duration of the
intrastate conflict. At the same time, the analysis of the hazard ratio suggests that the
increase in the hazard rate is insignificant.

Exogenous Tipping Points

According to the model, interventions by regional intergovernmental
organizations are decreasing the expected duration in the compromise outcome, while in
government success and rebel success models it had no effect. The hazard ratio for a
regional intergovernmental organization implies a substantial increase in the hazard rate.
Furthermore, the analysis suggests that when individual states are intervening to support
the government, the expected duration of conflict actually increases in the rebel success
model. Thus, foreign state intervention on the side of government decreases the hazard
rate by 64%.

Onset (Control) Factors

Consistent with the multinomial analysis, the factors of oil exporting economies
and religious fractionalization are statistically significant in survival models. Thus, non-
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lootable resource of oil decreases the expected duration of conflict (increasing the hazard
rate by 312%), while religious diversity increases expected duration (decreasing hazard
rate by 64%) in the compromise model.

Cox Competing Risks Proportional Hazards Model

Recent scholarship on the duration and outcome of civil wars utilizes the Cox
semi-parametric model for analyzing competing risks.4 While this model has advantages
over parametric models since it does not rely on the distributional assumptions and does
require information about the baseline hazard for estimating hazard ratio, the data under
the analysis must meet two requirements to satisfy the application of the Cox model. The
first assumption is the non-informative censoring, which stipulates that the missing
observations occurred at random (opposite to informative censoring were missing
observations are not at random).5 The second assumption is the proportionality of hazard
functions over time.6 The dataset on intrastate conflicts that I am using for the analysis
does not have missing values, thus satisfying the first assumption. To evaluate the
proportional hazards assumption, I tested all three outcomes of intrastate conflicts. For
the rebel success model, the factor of democracy violated the proportional hazards
assumptions. Following the technique proposed by Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn,

4

Dylan Balch-Lindsay and Andrew J. Enterline, “Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration,
1820-1992,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 44, no. 4 (Dec., 2000): 615-642; Dylan Balch-Lindsay,
Andrew J. Enterline and Kyle A. Joyce, “Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process,” Journal of
Peace Research Vol. 45, no. 3 (May, 2008): 345-363; Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Dan Reiter and
Christopher Zorn, “Nonproportional Hazards and Event History Analysis in International Relations,” The
Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 47, no. 1 (Feb., 2003): 33-53.
5
Judith D. Singer and John B. Willet, Applied Longitudinal Data Analysis: Modeling Change and Event
Occurrence, (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 318.
6
Ibid, 516.
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I have interacted democracy with the natural logarithm of time and introduced a new
variable into the rebel success model.7
I used the Efron method for handling ties in all three models. Following the
approach outlined by Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce, I have estimated civil war
days as the unit of analysis.8 There are 127 cases of intrastate conflicts from 1945 to 2007
and total of 536 spells (observations). Similarly to the previous parametric survival
model, I am testing the effect of endogenous (democracy, autocracy, and military
personnel) and exogenous (UN, IGO, and state interventions) tipping factors that are
time-varying covariates and onset factors (secondary diamonds, oil exporting economies,
ethnic and religious fractionalizations) that are time-invariant covariates. In the tables 13
and 14, I report coefficients and hazard ratios of Cox proportional hazards model
respectively.

7

Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Dan Reiter and Christopher Zorn, “Nonproportional Hazards and Event
History Analysis in International Relations,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 47, no. 1 (Feb., 2003):
44.
8
Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew J. Enterline and Kyle A. Joyce, “Third-Party Intervention and the Civil
War Process,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 45, no. 3 (May, 2008): 354.
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Table 13. Coefficients of the Cox Survival Model.
Cox Proportional (Coefficients)
Government
Rebel
Rebel29
Compromise
Variable
-0.08
-1.81
7.72***
0.29
Democracy
(0.48)
(1.13)
(2.17)
(0.77)
-1.86***
Democracy*(ln(ti
(0.4)
me))
0.44*
-0.35
-0.34
-0.8
Autocracy
(0.26)
(0.45)
(0.46)
(0.73)
0.01
-0.01
-0.01
0.04
Military personnel
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
-0.1
-0.25
-0.26
1.8***
United Nations
intervention
(0.55)
(0.7)
(0.71)
(0.68)
-0.16
1.14*
1.18*
2.78***
Regional IGO
intervention
(0.83)
(0.68)
(0.68)
(0.86)
-0.16
-1.79**
-1.82**
-1.36
State intervention
for government
(0.34)
(0.86)
(0.86)
(0.86)
-0.86
0.78
0.77
-46.42
State intervention
for rebels
(0.92)
(0.53)
(0.53)
(0)
-0.01
-0.27
-0.31
-1.2
Secondary
diamonds
(0.3)
(0.48)
(0.5)
(0.8)
0.71**
-0.44
-0.52
1.88**
Oil exports
(0.28)
(0.63)
(0.68)
(0.79)
-0.86***
-0.32
-0.3
-0.32
Ethnic
fractionalization
(0.32)
(0.47)
(0.45)
(0.59)
0.65
-0.33
-0.36
-1.42**
Religious
Fractionalization
(0.53)
(0.58)
(0.58)
(0.57)
Statistical confidence levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses.

9

Rebel2 model provides hazard ratios of the Cox competing risks model after testing for the violation of
the proportional hazard assumption. The factor of democracy violated the proportional hazard assumption
and, thus, I multiplied it by the natural logarithm of time.
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Table 14. Hazard Ratios of the Cox Survival Model.
Cox Proportional (Hazard Ratios)
Government
Rebel
Rebel2
Compromise
Variable
0.92
0.16
2254.74***
1.33
Democracy
(0.45)
(0.18)
(4903.83)
(1.03)
0.16***
Democracy*(ln(ti
(0.06)
me))
1.55*
0.71
0.71
0.45
Autocracy
(0.41)
(0.32)
(0.33)
(0.33)
1.01
0.99
0.99
1.04
Military personnel
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
0.9
0.78
0.77
6.02***
United Nations
intervention
(0.5)
(0.54)
(0.54)
(4.09)
0.85
3.12*
3.24*
16.12***
Regional IGO
intervention
(0.71)
(2.12)
(2.22)
(13.89)
0.85
0.17**
0.16**
0.26
State intervention
for government
(0.29)
(0.14)
(0.14)
(0.22)
0.42
2.18
2.17
0
State intervention
for rebels
(0.39)
(1.16)
(1.15)
(0)
0.99
0.77
0.74
0.3
Secondary
diamonds
(0.3)
(0.37)
(0.37)
(0.24)
2.04**
0.64
0.59
6.55**
Oil exports
(0.57)
(0.41)
(0.4)
(5.15)
0.42***
0.72
0.74
0.73
Ethnic
fractionalization
(0.13)
(0.34)
(0.34)
(0.43)
1.91
0.72
0.7
0.24**
Religious
Fractionalization
(1.01)
(0.41)
(0.41)
(0.14)
Statistical confidence levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses.
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Endogenous Tipping Points

Following the Cox proportional hazards model analysis, the factor of the military
personnel has lost its effect on the government success and is no longer statistically
significant. At the same time, a new approach has suggested that in the government
success model autocratic states are more likely to decrease the expected duration of
conflict (Figure 2). Thus, autocratic regimes increase the hazard rate by 55% in the
conflict that end up with the government’s victory. Democracy is statistically significant
in the rebel success and indicates that democracy decreases the duration of conflict
(Figure 3).

Figure 2. The Role of Autocracy in a Government Success Model.
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Figure 3. The Role of Democracy in a Rebels’ Success Model.

Exogenous Tipping Points

As I hypothesized earlier, the United Nations peacekeeping interventions are
statistically significant in the compromise outcome model. UN peacekeepers decrease the
time to compromise outcome and increase a hazard rate by 502% (Figure 4). Similar
effect is observed for the interventions by regional intergovernmental organizations.
However, this type of intervention decreases not only the expected duration of
compromise outcome (Figure 5), but also expected duration of rebel victory (Figure 6).
Finally, as one can see in the Figure 7, state intervention supporting the government
prolongs the expected duration in the rebel success model (hazard rate decrease by 84%).
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Figure 4. UN Intervention in a Compromise Model.

Figure 5. Intervention by Regional IGOs in a Compromise Model.
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Figure 6. Intervention by Regional IGOs in a Rebels’ Success Model.

Figure 7. State Intervention for Government in a Rebels’ Success Model.
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Onset (Control Factors)

In addition to oil exporting economies and religious fractionalization that were
significant in the parametric model, ethnic fractionalization was found significant and
negatively related in the government success model. Thus, ethnically heterogeneous
societies increase the expected duration of conflicts that ended in the success of
government (Figure 8). In contrast, if the country is an oil producing economy, the
duration of civil war will decrease given the success of the government (Figure 9). In the
compromise outcome model, non-lootable resource of oil was found to decrease the
duration of conflict (Figure 10), while religious fractionalization on the opposite
increased the time of civil war (Figure 11).

Figure 8. The Role of Ethnic Fractionalization in a Government’s Success Model.
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Figure 9. The Role of an Oil Exporting Economy in a Government’s Success Model.

Figure 10. The Role of an Oil Exporting Economy in a Compromise Model.
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Figure 11. The Role of Religious Fractionalization in a Compromise Model.

Competing Risks Analysis Using Fine and Gray Model

Traditional approaches to the analysis of the competing risks have utilized the
Cox model for the cause-specific hazard functions. By assuming the non-informativeness
and using identical predictors across the different outcomes, it is possible to conduct
parallel tests and then compare the results.10 Yet, according to Montfort, Fennema, and
Ghidey: “in the presence of competing failure events that impede the event of interest, a
standard analysis using Cox regression is able to produce incidence-rate curves that either
(1) are appropriate only for a hypothetical universe where competing events do not occur

10

Judith D. Singer and John B. Willet, Applied Longitudinal Data Analysis: Modeling Change and Event
Occurrence, (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 592.
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or (2) are appropriate for the data at hand, yet the effects of covariates on these curves are
not easily quantified.”11 Therefore, to account for the presence of competing risks, I
utilize the semiparametric proportional hazards model for the subdistribution developed
by Jason P. Fine and Robert J. Gray that uses the partial likelihood principle and
weighting techniques.12
The underlying assumption in this study is that the outcomes of the civil war such
as the government victory, success of the rebels or compromise are influencing each
other. In a sense, the increase in the risk of a particular outcome should decrease the risks
for the occurrence of other outcomes. Thus, under the condition that the competing risks
for three outcomes are not independent from each other, it is more appropriate to estimate
the cumulative incidence.13 In the Figure 12, it is clearly seen that the likelihood of the
government success outcome is significantly higher after approximately 1,000 days of an
intrastate conflict. At the same time, the probability of rebel success and a compromise
outcome are similar throughout the whole period.

11

Kees van Montfort, Peter Fennema, and Wendimagegn Ghidey, “Competing Risks and Survival
Analysis,” in Developments in Statistical Evaluation of Clinical Trials, ed. Kees van Montfort, H.L. Oud
Johan, Wendimagegn Ghidey, (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2014), 91.
12
Jason P. Fine and Robert J. Gray, “A Proportional Hazards Model for the Subdistribution of a Competing
Risk,” Journal of the American Statistical Association Vol. 94, no. 446 (June, 1999): 496-509.
13
Vincenzo Coviello and May Boggess, “Cumulative Incidence Estimation in the Presence of Competing
Risks,” The Stata Journal Vol. 4, no. 2 (2004): 103.
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Figure 12. Cumulative Incidence (CI) Functions for Civil War Outcomes.

In the tables 15 and table 16, I report the coefficients and sub-hazard ratios
respectively of the Fine and Gray competing risks model. While the earlier examined
parametric survival model and cause specific survival model are critical steps in
understanding the path dependence dynamics in civil wars, they are also useful for
comparative purposes in regards to the Fine and Gray model.
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Table 15. Coefficients of the Fine and Gray Competing Risks Model.
Coefficients
Government
Rebel
Compromise
Variable
0.18
-1.68
1.71**
Democracy
(0.49)
(1.14)
(0.69)
0.52*
-0.35
-1.13
Autocracy
(0.27)
(0.47)
(0.86)
0.01
-0.02
0.03
Military personnel
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.03)
-0.54
-0.47
2.12***
United Nations
intervention
(0.58)
(0.77)
(0.64)
-1.03
0.89
1.95**
Regional IGO
intervention
(0.81)
(0.72)
(0.77)
0.3
-1.58*
0.04
State intervention
for government
(0.31)
(0.87)
(0.74)
-0.7
0.95*
-16.4***
State intervention
for rebels
(0.74)
(0.57)
(0.8)
0.32
-0.18
-0.6
Secondary
diamonds
(0.3)
(0.48)
(0.59)
0.33
-0.77
1.16*
Oil exports
(0.29)
(0.62)
(0.67)
-0.35
0.03
0.56
Ethnic
fractionalization
(0.34)
(0.46)
(0.72)
0.83
-0.38
-1.94***
Religious
Fractionalization
(0.52)
(0.6)
(0.63)
Statistical confidence levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses.
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Table 16. Sub-Hazard Ratios of the Fine and Gray Competing Risks Model.
Sub-Hazard Ratios
Government
Rebel
Compromise
Variable
1.2
0.19
5.54**
Democracy
(0.58)
(0.21)
(3.83)
1.67*
0.7
0.32
Autocracy
(0.45)
(0.33)
(0.28)
1.01
0.98
1.03
Military personnel
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.03)
0.58
0.62
8.35***
United Nations
intervention
(0.34)
(0.48)
(5.31)
0.36
2.42
7.06**
Regional IGO
intervention
(0.29)
(1.74)
(5.42)
1.34
0.2*
1.04
State intervention
for government
(0.41)
(0.18)
(0.77)
0.5
2.58*
1E-07***
State intervention
for rebels
(0.37)
(1.46)
(1E-07)
1.37
0.84
0.55
Secondary
diamonds
(0.42)
(0.4)
(0.32)
1.39
0.46
3.18*
Oil exports
(0.4)
(0.29)
(2.14)
0.7
1.03
1.75
Ethnic
fractionalization
(0.24)
(0.48)
(1.26)
2.28
0.69
0.14***
Religious
Fractionalization
(1.2)
(0.41)
(0.09)
Statistical confidence levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses.

Endogenous Tipping Points

The analysis of the government success model through the Fine and Gray
competing risk test indicates that the impact of autocratic regimes on the expected
duration of an intrastate conflict. Thus, civil wars in states with authoritarian
governments tend to be shorter, increasing the sub-hazard ratio by 67 percentage points.
It can be seen in Figure 13 that after 2,000 days of war the autocratic regime factor
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increases by 20 percentage points the probability of government success. The factor of
democracy appeared to be statistically significant in the compromise outcome model. In
intrastate conflicts that ended up in a peaceful settlement, the democratic regime variable
tended to decrease the expected duration of war. Furthermore, democracy dramatically
increases the likelihood of the compromise from the early days of an intrastate conflict
(Figure 14).

Figure 13. CI Function for Autocracy Factor in a Government’s Success Model.
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Figure 14. CI Function for Democracy Factor in a Compromise Model.

Exogenous Tipping Points

Both the intervention by the United Nations and regional intergovernmental
organizations are statistically significant and positively related in the compromise
outcome model. The presence of the UN peacekeepers and forces under the command of
the regional IGOs has an equally substantial effect on lessening the duration of the wars
that ended in a compromise. Both types of intervention increase the probability of a
compromise by 10 percentage points after 3000 days of fighting (Figures 15 and 16).
State interventions that support the government tended to prolong the duration of the
conflict in the rebel success model and also reduce the probability of the rebellion’s
success (Figure 17). In contrast, when states intervened on the behalf on the rebels, these
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civil wars appeared to be shorter and the chances of rebellion to succeed increased by 20
percentage points after 1000 days of conflict (Figure 18). However, such interventions
tended to prolong intrastate conflicts that ended with the compromise outcome, even
though the decrease in the hazard rate was rather small.

Figure 15. CI Function for UN Intervention Factor in a Compromise Model.
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Figure 16. CI Function for IGOs Intervention Factor in a Compromise Model.

Figure 17. CI Function for Government-biased Interventions in a Rebel’s Success Model.
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Figure 18. CI Function for Rebel-biased Interventions in a Rebel’s Success Model.

Figure 19. CI Function for Rebel-biased Interventions in a Compromise Model.
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Onset (Control) Factors

While lootable resources (secondary diamonds) have not been statistically
significant in all survival models, the factor of an oil exporting economy appears to be
relevant throughout the entire study. Fine and Gray competing risks analysis indicates
that oil is statistically significant in the compromise outcome model and indicates the
shorter duration of civil war when this non-lootable resource is present. Furthermore, oil
increases the cumulative incidence of a compromise outcome (Figure 20). Finally, the
test revealed that it takes longer for the compromise outcome to be achieved in the
societies with high religious diversity. The probability of the compromise outcome is 7
percentage points lower if the society is religiously heterogeneous (Figure 21).

Figure 20. CI Function for an Oil Exporting Economies in a Compromise Model.
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Figure 21. CI Function for Religious Fractionalization Factor in a Compromise Model.
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Current Findings and the Existing Literature on the Outcomes of Intrastate
Conflicts

The results of four different tests including multinomial logistic regression
analysis and three types of survival analysis provide sufficient support for the assumption
about the application of a narrow definition of path dependence to the study of intrastate
conflicts (Tables 17 and 18). Overall, the findings are predominantly consistent across all
models both in terms of statistical significance of the factors and their explanatory power.
Although all four tests are equally valuable to validate the robustness of the
results, Fine and Gray competing risks model is used here as the primary test since this
method satisfies the narrow definition of the path dependence. Thus, focusing on the type
of an intrastate conflict termination through the prism of competing risks to satisfy the
multitude of outcomes assumption; codifying each intervention by third parties as a new
event that could end war to satisfy the sequence and timing assumption; and, finally,
observing statistically significant factors to satisfy the inertia assumption make both the
dataset and methodology a valid framework for the testing of a narrow definition of path
dependence.
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Table 17. Event History (Survival) Analysis of Intrastate Conflict Outcomes.
Government
Weib

Cox

F&G

Weib

Rebel
Cox2
Cox
14

1.7

0.92

1.2

0.28

0.16

(0.79)

(0.45)

(0.58)

(0.33)

(0.18)

1.29

1.55*

1.67*

0.73

0.71

(0.33)

(0.41)

(0.45)

(0.29)

1*

1.01

1.01

(0.001)

(0.01)

0.68

Compromise
F&G

Weib

Cox

F&G

0.19

1.14

1.33

5.54*
*

(0.21)

(1.02)

(1.03)

(3.83)

0.71

0.7

1.08

0.45

0.32

(0.32)

(0.33)

(0.33)

(0.55)

(0.33)

(0.28)

0.99

0.99

0.99

0.98

1

1.04

1.03

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.03)

(0.03)

0.9

0.58

0.57

0.78

0.77

0.62

1.81

6.02**
*

8.35*
**

(0.29)

(0.5)

(0.34)

(0.3)

(0.54)

(0.54)

(0.48)

(0.86)

(4.09)

(5.31)

0.64

0.85

0.36

2.07

3.12*

3.24*

2.42

16.12*
**

7.06*
*

(0.33)

(0.71)

(0.29)

(1.18)

(2.12)

(2.22)

(1.74)

30.02
***
(37.6
1)

(13.89)

(5.42)

0.74

0.85

1.34

0.36*

0.17*
*

0.16*
*

0.2*

0.4

0.26

1.04

(0.26)

(0.29)

(0.41)

(0.19)

(0.14)

(0.14)

(0.18)

(0.28)

(0.22)

(0.77)

1.12

0.42

0.5

1.21

2.18

2.17

2.58*

0.3

0

(0.44)

(0.39)

(0.37)

(0.61)

(1.16)

(1.15)

(1.46)

(0.24)

(0)

0.94

0.99

1.37

0.88

0.77

0.74

0.84

0.43

0.3

0.55

(0.25)

(0.3)

(0.42)

(0.41)

(0.37)

(0.37)

(0.4)

(0.25)

(0.24)

(0.32)

6.55**

3.18*

(5.15)

(2.14)

Democracy

2254.
74***
(4903.
83)

Autocracy

Military
personnel
United
Nations
intervention
Regional
IGO
intervention
State
intervention
for
government
State
intervention
for rebels
Secondary
diamonds
Oil exports

2.04*
*
(0.57)
0.42*
**

1.39

0.56

0.64

0.59

0.46

(0.4)

(0.38)

(0.41)

(0.4)

(0.29)

4.12*
*
(2.86)

0.7

0.91

0.72

0.74

1.03

3.49

0.73

1.75

(0.19)

(0.13)

(0.24)

(0.42)

(0.34)

(0.34)

(0.48)

(3.27)

(0.43)

(1.26)

1.58

1.91

2.28

0.88

0.72

0.7

0.69

0.36*

0.24**

0.14*
**

(0.65)

(1.01)

(1.2)

(0.51)

(0.41)

(0.41)

(0.41)

(0.19)

(0.14)

(0.09)

1.42
(0.4)

Ethnic
fractionaliza
tion
Religious
Fractionaliz
ation

1E07***
(1E07)

0.63

0.16*
**
(0.06)
Statistical confidence levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Democracy
*ln(time)

14

Hazard ratios of the Cox competing risks model after testing for the violation of the proportional hazard
assumption. Since the factor of democracy violated the assumption, I multiplied it by the natural logarithm
of time.
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Table 18. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis of Intrastate Conflict Outcomes.

Variable
Democracy
Autocracy
Military
personnel
United Nations
intervention
Regional IGO
intervention
State
intervention for
government
State
intervention for
rebels
Secondary
diamonds

Government
Initial
Tipping
Conditio
Points
ns
0.31
(0.2)
0.14
(0.1)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.06
(0.14)
-0.37**
(0.17)
0.12

Marginal Effects
Rebels
Initial
Tipping
Conditio
Points
ns
-0.36*
(0.21)
-0.08
(0.09)
-0.005
(0.01)
-0.1
(0.12)
0.19
(0.14)
-0.17

Compromise
Initial
Tipping
Conditio
Points
ns
0.05
(0.11)
-0.06
(0.07)
-0.002
(0.01)
0.16**
(0.07)
0.19*
(0.1)
0.05

(0.13)

(0.12)

(0.08)

0.04

0.03

-0.07

(0.16)

(0.13)

(0.1)

0.09
0.11
-0.07
-0.01
-0.02
-0.1
(0.12)
(0.13)
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.08)
(0.08)
0.2
0.05
-0.25**
-0.2
0.05
0.15*
Oil exports
(0.12)
(0.13)
(0.12)
(0.13)
(0.08)
(0.08)
Ethnic
-0.05
-0.13
-0.03
-0.01
0.08
0.14
fractionalization
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.09)
(0.09)
Religious
0.18
0.24
0.02
-0.09
-0.16*
-0.15*
Fractionalization
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.09)
(0.08)
-0.17*
0.05
0.12*
Contagion
(0.1)
(0.09)
(0.07)
0.26**
-0.01
-0.16**
Cold War
(0.1)
(0.09)
(0/07)
Statistical confidence levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
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The analysis of endogenous and exogenous tipping points as well as control
factors provided not only support for the path dependence in intrastate conflicts, but also
hinted at mechanisms at play that could shed the light on the reasons behind a particular
civil war outcome. Both the Cox proportional hazards model and the Fine and Gray
competing risks model provided strong evidence for the role of the United Nations and
regional intergovernmental organizations in decreasing the duration of the civil war that
resulted in the compromise. Similarly, the multinomial regression model and survival
analysis approach indicated that both the UN and regional IGOs are likely to increase the
probability of a peaceful settlement solution (H6 and H7). These results suggest the
strong evidence that peacekeeping missions do indeed minimize the conflict duration and
lead to a compromise outcome. Furthermore, Virginia Page Fortna in “Does
Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after
Civil War” finds evidence that once the civil war is over, peacekeeping forces help
maintain peace for longer periods.15
Yet, one has to be cautious about this particular finding for two reasons. First, the
United Nations has a record of sending its troops to the locations where there is a peace
to keep. In other words, this international organization is likely to send troops to solve
intrastate conflicts where the prospects of the compromise are readily attainable. Second,
the primary objectives of the UN peacekeepers and forces from such IGOs as the African
Union, ECOWAS, League of Arab States, European Union, and Commonwealth of
Independent States are to observe ceasefire or monitor disarmament and disengagement
of warring sides. Therefore, such mission statements indicate that the UN and IGOs

15

Virginia Page Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of
Peace after Civil War,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 48, no. 2 (Jun., 2004): 286.
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appear to be facilitators of the ascending compromise outcome rather than instigators.
Yet again, it is possible that these international bodies first broker a compromise outcome
through diplomatic means and then provide peacekeepers. In such scenario, the role of
the UN and regional IGOs as the lock in mechanisms for the compromise path
dependence can be valid.
Competing risks tests have found no support for my hypothesis about the effect of
the state intervention for the government forces on the likelihood of the government
success outcome or changes in its duration (H8). While not affecting the government
victory outcome, state intervention for the government forces prolonged intrastate
conflicts where rebels eventually succeeded. In contrast, when a third party state provided
military support for the rebels, the time till the rebel forces would succeed tend to
decrease (H9). This is an important finding given the voluminous scholarly debate
regarding the impact of state interventions on the outcome of civil wars. Thus, Stephen E.
Gent in “Going in When it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil
Conflicts” using Patrick M. Regan dataset that sets the bar for the civil wars at 200
fatalities and applying Cox proportional hazards model, has found similar results in
regards to rebel-biased interventions and the probability that rebels will win.16 However,
his analysis further suggested that the rebel-biased interventions are also associated with
the negotiated settlements outcome and that government-biased interventions have no
effect on the way the civil war will end.17
In the article “Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process” Dylan BalchLindsay, Andrew J. Enterline, and Kyle A. Joyce have conducted a similar study that
16

Stephen E. Gent, “Going in When it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil Conflicts,”
International Studies Quarterly Vol. 52 (2008): 722.
17
Ibid, 724-725.
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focused on the type of third party intervention and its influence on the civil war
outcome.18 They have used an earlier version of the Correlates of War dataset with the
1000 battle related deaths threshold for the intrastate conflicts for the period from 1816
till 1997, while my study focused on the period after the Second World War until 2007.
Similarly to Stephen E. Gent, the authors applied the Cox proportional hazards model to
test hypotheses about civil war outcomes. Their finding about the statistically significant
and positive impact of rebel-biased interventions on the likelihood of the rebel victory is
consistent with Stephen E. Gent’s results and my conclusions. Yet, in their study rebelbiased interventions were found to be negatively associated with the government victory
and positively with the compromise, while government-biased interventions were found
to shorten the duration of the compromise and the government success outcomes. The
variability in the conclusions between the studies can be caused by several factors. The
first factor is the difference in the datasets between the thresholds in civil wars fatalities.
The second element is the difference in the time periods under investigation. The third
factor is the variability of explanatory factors across studies. Finally, the difference in the
results can be explained by fact that the previous studies have utilized Cox proportional
hazards models assuming the independence of the outcome risks, while I applied Fine
and Gray model that incorporates the dependent risks assumption.19 This approach is an
important contribution of my study to the scholarship on intrastate conflicts.
The role of regime type and military capacity in the determining the civil war
outcome has been an equally heated debate in the scholarship on intrastate conflicts. In
crafting the hypotheses regarding the impact of endogenous tipping points on locking in a
18

Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew J. Enterline and Kyle A. Joyce, “Third-Party Intervention and the Civil
War Process,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 45, no. 3 (May, 2008): 345-363
19
Ibid, 355.

154
particular conflict outcome, I mostly referred to the assumptions put forth by Charles
Tilly and Sidney Tarrow in Contentious Politics.20 By extending their observations
regarding the ability of a state to prevent the outbreak of the rebellion through the prism
of the regime type and capacity into the likelihood of a particular intrastate conflict
outcome, I suggested that high military strength of the government armed forces should
be related to the government victory outcome. However, throughout all four tests,
military capacity has not been associated with the government success, rebel victory or
compromise outcome. A 2004 study by Karl R. DeRouen, Jr. and David Sobek
employing a data from Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis on civil wars from 1944
till 1997 has found strong support for the role of armed forces across all civil war
outcomes.21 The contrast in findings can be partially explained by the Research Design
And testing methods, yet it is critical to further investigate the factor of military capacity.
While military capacity might not be a critical tipping point in determining the
path of the civil war, regime type has appeared to affect the intrastate conflict outcome.
Thus, as hypothesized democratic regimes tend be associated with the compromise
outcome (H12). Furthermore, democracies tend to decrease the duration of the conflict
that ends in the negotiated settlement. While hypothetically democratic societies are
characterized by the mechanisms to addresses grievances to prevent conflicts, they are
not immune from civil wars. However, the presence of democratic institutions implies
credible mechanisms for establishing a dialogue between the government and rebels and
provides space to address grievances for both sides. Autocratic regimes, on the other
hand, lack such mechanisms, but also can afford to ignore public opinion that usually
20

Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007).
Karl R. DeRouen, Jr. and David Sobek, “The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” Journal of
Peace Research Vol. 41 no. 3 (2004): 312.
21
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prefers peaceful settlement to prolonged bloody war. My analysis further supports this
assumption as autocratic states are largely associated with the government success
outcome and the decrease in its duration (H13). The majority of the civil war literature
that aims at explaining the outcome of conflict treats regime type as a secondary
explanatory variable or simply a control factor that should be included in the tests.
Furthermore, the democracy variable is given preference to anocratic or autocratic
regimes in these studies.22 My analysis, however, incorporates both regime types and
offers inferences about their impact on the civil war outcomes and duration. While
Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow have suggested that undemocratic regimes are more
prone to instigate a civil war, my study suggests that they are also more likely to topple
the rebellion.

Conclusion

The analysis of the narrow concept of path dependence through the framework of
three event history models revealed statistically and substantively significant tipping
points that have the capacity to shape the outcomes of a civil war. The factor of
government’s military strength appears to have no effect on the way intrastate conflicts
are resolved. At the same time, the regime type of democracy was found to be conducive

22

Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew J. Enterline and Kyle A. Joyce, “Third-Party Intervention and the Civil
War Process,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 45, no. 3 (May, 2008): 345-363; Stephen E. Gent, “Going in
When it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil Conflicts,” International Studies Quarterly
Vol. 52 (2008): 713-735; Karl R. DeRouen, Jr. and David Sobek, “The Dynamics of Civil War Duration
and Outcome,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 41 no. 3 (2004): 303-320; Virginia Page Fortna, “Does
Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War,”
International Studies Quarterly Vol. 48, no. 2 (Jun., 2004): 269-292.
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to a compromise resolution, while government’s victory was more likely in autocratic
states. Interventions by UN and IGOs decreased the time of a civil war and ultimately led
to a negotiated settlement. Rebel-biased interventions increased the chance of the
rebellion’s success, whereas state-based interventions increased the duration of a civil
war. In the subsequent chapter, I apply the results of broad and narrow models of path
dependence to three cases of civil wars to investigate causal mechanisms that shape the
course of the conflict.
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CHAPTER 6
CASE STUDIES

Introduction

The investigation into the broad and narrow notions of path dependence has
supported the hypotheses about the influence of the initial conditions as well as temporal
and sequence factors on the outcomes of intrastate conflicts. Viewing civil wars as an
overarching process rather than the sum of different stages offers a novel perspective on
the dynamics of the conflict and mechanisms that have the potential to lock in a particular
settlement option. This chapter outlines the stories of three civil wars, incorporates the
findings from onset factors and tipping points models, and proposes causal mechanisms
that explain the particular outcome of an intrastate conflict.
While there is no commonly agreed approach in social sciences as to what
constitutes a case study, I adhere to the supposition put forth by Poteete, Janssen, and
Ostrom in Working Together: Collective Action, the Commons, and Multiple Methods in
Practice that views the case study through the prism of the unit of analysis since it “offers
an empirical interpretation of the theoretical subject of study.”1 Indeed, a focus on a
specific civil war through outlining the development of conflict in general and crucial
milestones in particular, provides a compelling test for the models and addresses possible
limitations of the study.

1

Amy R. Poteete, Marco A. Janssen, and Elinor Ostrom, Working Together: Collective Action, the
Commons, and the Multiple Methods in Practice (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
2010), 33.
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The case selection for this chapter was based on the way the intrastate conflict
ended as well as the presence of endogenous and exogenous tipping points. Thus, three
cases that are analyzed in this study are the First Chechen War of 1994-1996 that resulted
in the victory of rebels; Africa’s World War (Second Congo War) of 1998-2002 in which
a compromise between warring sides was achieved; and, the Second Sri Lanka Tamil
Civil War (Eelam IV) of 2006-2009 where the government toppled the rebel forces. The
last case was not included in the original dataset and is introduced here to test the
applicability of my findings for out-of-sample civil wars. Each case study involves a brief
account of the war, discussion of the initial conditions, evaluation of the tipping factors’
impact, and analysis of the causal mechanisms that led to a particular civil war outcome.
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The First Chechen War of 1994-1996

Table 19. Overview of the First Chechen War.
Outcome

Rebels’ Victory

Regime Type

Anocracy

Military personnel per
1,000
United Nations
intervention
Regional IGO
intervention
State intervention for
government
State intervention for
rebels

9.46
No
No
No
No

Secondary diamonds

No

Oil exports

Yes

Contagion

Yes

Ethnic fractionalization

Heterogeneous

Religious
Fractionalization

Heterogeneous

Overview of an Intrastate Conflict

The roots of the First Chechen War can be traced back to the history of the
policies conducted by the communist regime toward the local populace. Yet, a direct
impetus for the independence of Chechnya lies in the chaos and vacuum of power that
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resulted after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many autonomous republics within the
Russian Federation felt that the appropriate moment had come for the proclamation of
national rights and liberties in the light of the weakening grasp of Moscow. Indeed, many
autonomous entities sought to proclaim independence in the early nineties. However,
after the first president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, succeeded in establishing control over
the turbulent political system, many autonomous republics searched for a new agreement
with the central authority.
As of 1994, Moscow managed to negotiate federal treaties with the majority of
the autonomous republics, including powerful and independence-seeking Tatarstan.2 And
if in the case of Tatarstan, agreement was achieved by relatively peaceful methods,
relations with the Republic of Chechnya included the use of force in 1991 and 1992,
which after a severe repulse from the Chechen government of Dudayev forced Russian
troops to conduct a covert operation in the fall of 1994.3 John P. Hardt and his colleagues
provided insight into the reasons for the Chechen crisis and argued that “Dudayev has
made numerous extreme, hostile statements against Russia, and some suggest that Yeltsin
bears a personal animus against Dudayev.”4 Therefore, animosity between Russian and
Chechen leaders multiplied by decentralization tendencies after the collapse of the Soviet
Union appeared to be significant factors that predetermined the First Chechen War. As of
the year 1994, the situation in Chechnya escalated significantly and under these
circumstances Boris Yeltsin opted for decisive actions.
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Initial attempts of the federal government to solve the conflict through engaging
the Chechen opposition to seize the Chechen capital, Grozny, on November 26, 1994
failed. The assistance of the Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service in this operation
did not alter the outcomes of the attack. To put things in perspective, in their account of
the Chechen conflict, Trenin, Malashenko, and Lieven compare the November 1994
attack on Grozny to the Bay of Pigs invasion.5 Unable to localize conflict to only
Chechen authorities, Yeltsin decided to engage in a full-scale campaign that would
include regular troops. After massive air strikes, ground forces started a march toward
Grozny in December of 1994.6 The war lasted for almost two years and resulted in the
signing of the Khasav-Yurt agreement in August, 1996. In fact, this treaty stipulated the
de facto defeat of Moscow in the First Chechen War. Analyzing the reasons for Russian
failure to establish control over Chechnya, one could be startled by the situation when a
former “superpower” loses a war to a significantly weaker opponent. The first factor that
led to Moscow’s defeat was the disastrous situation at the strategic and tactical levels of
Russian military decision-making. Other factors were political intrigues within the
Russian government and a worsening economic situation. However, despite all these
drawbacks federal troops succeeded in confronting Chechen insurgents in conventional
battles and controlling the majority of Chechen territory. So what forced Moscow to give
concessions to Chechen separatists and sign an unfavorable agreement?
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Initial Conditions

The disintegrative tendencies in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union
continued to haunt newly independent republics, including the Russian Federation. In the
Caucasus, several frozen conflicts erupted in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the
early 1990s and sent ripples across the region. Decentralization tendencies in Chechnya
were undoubtedly encouraged by similar outbreaks in the neighboring republics. Yet, the
factor of contagion appeared to be inconsistent with the findings of the quantitative
models of initial conditions as Chechen rebels succeeded in confronting the federal forces
and securing victory. As I have argued in chapter 5, the spillover of the civil war brings
innovative tactics into the battlefield. While the rebels were not able to withstand Russian
forces in conventional warfare since federal forces have significant advantage in airpower
and artillery, they succeeded in using asymmetric tactics involving a guerrilla
counteroffensive and terrorist attacks. The findings of the model suggested that
government is less likely to succeed in civil wars caused by contagion, while, at the same
time, compromise outcome becomes more likely. In a sense, success of the Chechen
rebels can be interpreted as de facto defeat of the federal forces, but also as a negotiated
settlement as de jure Chechnya still remained part of Russia after Moscow Peace Treaty
of 1997.
An oil-exporting economy as the onset factor has been associated with the
decreasing chances of the rebels to succeed in the intrastate conflict. Yet, in the case of
First Chechen War the role of oil appeared to be more complex. In the initial model of
path dependence that focused on the initial conditions, I codified the impact of oil
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through identifying countries where this non-lootable resource accounts for the third of
the merchandise exports. While Chechnya has historically contained both oil deposits and
refining capabilities, the fraction of Chechen oil in overall Russian production was
relatively low.7 Thus, war in Chechnya has not influenced the capabilities of the Russian
government to deploy forces or support military activities. This caveat must be taken into
account when interpreting the results of the large-n studies of intrastate conflict,
especially if the dataset contains observations for large countries like Russia.
I have argued in previous chapters that rebel forces are unlikely to benefit from
the oil as this resource is not easily extractable, transportable and thus does not provide
immediate financial benefits. Yet, Anna Politkovskaya, a Russian journalist and human
rights activist who was assassinated allegedly due to her professional work, provided
insight into the role of oil during the conflict in Chechnya. In her book A Dirty War: A
Russian Reporter in Chechnya, Politikovskaya argued that oil wells served as a payment
for the supporters of the Chechen rebel leaders.8 Moreover, given the unpopularity of the
war in Russia, pervasive corruption, and dominance of criminal warlords, lucrative
business emerged in Chechnya that involved the criminal elements from Russia and
Chechen bandits trading in the spoils of war, including oil.9 Therefore, looking at the
micro level of civil war in Chechnya, the oil factor might have increased the chances of
the rebels’ victory.
Finally, the factor of religion during the First Chechen War played a role both in
the terms of Russian and Chechen confrontation as well as the dynamics within the
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rebellion. The competing risks analysis suggested that in religiously diverse societies,
warring sides take a longer time to reach a compromise. In the case of Chechnya,
overwhelmingly Muslim rebel forces opposed religiously diverse but increasingly
Orthodox Christian federal forces. Within the separatist movement, two approaches
defined the actions of the rebels: a moderate wing that has led by Chechen President
Dudayev and a radical wing led by military commander Basayev who adhered to the
Wahhabist traditions. Whereas religiously driven rhetoric was used by the Chechen
troops to rally support against federal forces and impeded the compromise decision,
infighting within the separatist movement appeared to be a greater issue both in terms of
the likelihood of the conflict outcome as well as the outbreak of the Second Chechen War
in 1999.

Tipping Points

The First Chechen War was an isolated intrastate conflict in a sense that there was
no foreign military intervention or international peacekeeping mission. The international
community remained largely an observer in this civil war. Russia as the successor of the
Soviet Union retained one of the largest military forces and nuclear arsenal making a
third party intervention a risky endeavor. Finally, as the permanent member of the United
Nations Security Council, Russia had the opportunity to veto any decision of the body
and insisted on considering the Chechen conflict an internal affair.
Although Russia made significant transformations in its political system after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, it has been defined as neither autocracy nor democracy in
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the POLITY IV dataset. The analysis of the civil war outcomes through the prism of
competing risks suggested that authoritarian regimes favor government success outcome,
while democratic societies prefer compromise. Russia during the period of the First
Chechen War was arguably a combination of the democratic transformations alongside
growing authoritarian powers of President Yeltsin, especially in the aftermath of Russian
Constitutional crisis of 1993. In sum, exogenous and to a lesser extent endogenous
factors had minimal effect on the course of civil war in Chechnya.

Mechanisms

Traditional interpretations of the success of the rebels during the First Chechen
War point at political and economic instability within Russia as well as poor Russian
military decision-making and planning. Yet, if one considers the framework of path
dependence in its narrow sense, it becomes increasingly useful to consider the impact of
small events as well as the role of timing and sequence during the intrastate conflict. In
case of the First Chechen War, the power of small events can be analyzed through prism
of terrorist tactics by Chechen separatists. Moscow appeared to be unprepared for
asymmetrical warfare that on the other hand had a significant impact not only on the
government, but also on Russian society as a whole. Two major terrorist attacks by
Chechen separatists appeared to be crucial determinants of Moscow’s defeat in the First
Chechen War.
The most striking act of terrorism that the Russian government experienced
during the First Chechen War was the raid on a hospital in Budennovsk on June 14, 1995.
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During this attack hundreds of hospital personnel and patients were taken hostage.
Interestingly, the attack occurred at the end of spring of 1995 when Russian troops
achieved significant success over Chechen separatists and forced them to retreat to
mountainous regions.10 Two suppositions explain the change of separatists’ tactics. Some
conspiracy theorists trace connections between the terrorist leader, Basayev, and the
Russian government arguing that certain officials were interested in the continuation of
the war.11 Other sources claim that the attack on Budennovsk was a coincidence triggered
by accident.12 Another perspective on this incident is offered by Dianne Leigh Sumner
who cites the leader of terrorists during the Budennovsk attack, Shamil Basayev: “They
say that Budennovsk was terror. And the fact that the Russian Air Force is bombing our
villages every day – that is not terror? ... [Budennovsk] was a response reaction. We were
compelled to resort to extreme means in order simply to survive. I am not a bandit …
Russia is breaking all the international laws and the United Nations does nothing.”13 In
sum, various evidence suggest that the attack was well planned and unexpected which
also explains its effectiveness.
The Budennovsk massacre lasted six days. On June 14, 1995 approximately one
hundred rebels led by Basayev entered the city where they met other rebels that were
spread around Budennovsk. The targets of Basayev troops were a hospital, maternity
clinic, bank, communication center, town hall, and the local internal affairs department,
which they failed to seize.14 The element of surprise and swiftness of the attack shocked
10
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Russian authorities even more so since the city was located outside of the conflict zone
and virtually meant the spillover of war outside of Chechnya. As federal forces
surrounded the city, Basayev demanded “amnesty for all Chechen fighters and free
elections for Chechnya.”15 Already killing 91 people in the initial attack on the city,
rebels proceeded with the execution of hostages after several unsuccessful siege attempts
by Russian forces. Basayev was holding almost 1,500 hostages including pregnant
women.16 These factors forced Moscow to make concessions to terrorists and accept their
demands for a cease-fire and “direct negotiations between Russia and Chechen President
Dudayev.”17
The stalemate period appeared to be very short for establishing a bilateral
agreement and the active fighting was restored. Once again Chechen separatists failed to
withstand federal troops in conventional warfare. Under such circumstances, the rebels
made a decision to utilize similar terrorist tactics. This time the target of the rebels
became the hospital in town Kizlyar of the neighboring republic Dagestan.18 On January
9, 1996, 256 Chechen separatists lead by Salman Raduyev entered Kizlyar and captured
the hospital with around 2,000 people. On their way, separatists destroyed an airfield and
killed 25 civilians. This time the rebels decided not to stay on the premises, but to move
back to Chechnya using hostages as a “live shield”.19 However, federal troops were also
ready for decisive actions and blocked the road near village Pervomayskoye where
Chechen rebels were supposed to pass. Near the village, they captured another 100
15
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civilians and 37 soldiers and took cover in the neighboring building. Five days of
negotiations did not bring any changes since this time Russian authorities refused to
negotiate with the rebels and planned a siege. The ensuing three days of fighting could
have resulted in a complete Russian victory, but Chechen separatists received
reinforcement and partially succeeded to retreat (their leader Salman Raduyev also
escaped).20 Leaving 150 terrorists and 40 hostages killed, this operation could be
evaluated as neither a success nor a failure for Russian forces, while the objectives of the
terrorists also were not achieved.
Once again the decision-making process toward the Chechen attacks ironically
became a hostage of a political process. Yeltsin’s appointment of the FSB head
responsible for hostage conflict resolution, Barsukov, can be evaluated as a critical
mistake since Barsukov spent his entire career at the Kremlin and had only vague
experience in dealing with terrorist attacks.21 This fact along with the government’s
failed attempts to raise public approval led to a significant drop of president’s approval
rating as “millions of television viewers saw him telling clumsy lies and looking as if he
were absolutely out of touch with reality.”22 In contrast with Budennovsk, federal troops
had not considered the possibility of negotiations and launched a full-scale siege paying
less attention to the hostage casualties. The results of the operation were devastating: a
high toll of hostage casualties and the escape of Chechen separatists, multiplied by the
public dissatisfaction with the war, became the final nails in the coffin of the First
Chechen War.
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These unfavorable outcomes for Moscow were the result of the lack of
preparation of the federal forces for new Chechen tactics. However, a bigger cause
behind the defeat of the federal forces was Russian political decision-making. Lilia
Shevtsova argued in Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Reality: “the actions by the
Chechens…rocked all of Russia and temporarily paralyzed its leadership.”23 Moreover, in
this particular period a greater confrontation remained at the high political level. Being on
a foreign trip, the Russian president gave an order to utilize military force against rebels
who attacked the hospital.24 When the siege ended with a debacle, Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin entered the scene by succeeding in negotiations with the rebels to release
the hostages. The acceptance of Basayev’s demands meant a huge strike against Russian
military prestige. At the same time, the Communist-led opposition in Duma tried to adopt
an impeachment resolution against Yeltsin. Despite the fact that the attempt was
unsuccessful, the President’s positions were weakened by the resignation of key ministers
in power departments.25
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Africa’s World War (the Second Congo War) of 1998-2002

Table 20. Overview of Africa’s World War.
Outcome

Compromise

Regime Type

Anocracy

Military personnel per
1,000
United Nations
intervention
Regional IGO
intervention
State intervention for
government
State intervention for
rebels

1.25
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Secondary diamonds

Yes

Oil exports

No

Contagion

Yes

Ethnic fractionalization

Heterogeneous

Religious
Fractionalization

Heterogeneous

Overview of an Intrastate Conflict

The presence of conflict seems to be endemic to the region of equatorial Africa.
With the advent of the era of colonization, it has experienced one of the most devastating
violent outbreaks. Throughout almost five hundred years of the European occupation and
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about sixty years of independence, violent conflicts became part of the history.
Humanitarian disasters, wars for resources, and political struggles are mundane headlines
of the news from this part of the African continent. Part of the problem lies, obviously, in
the historical development of the region during colonial times and, specifically, the way
these territories were divided, administered, and eventually tied to the metropolis. While
various factors contribute to the onset and dynamics of the modern conflict in equatorial
Africa, the underlying problem is the colonial legacy.
The most vivid and tragic example is the present day Democratic Republic of
Congo. Since its independence in 1960, the vicious cycle of violence, corruption, and
secessionism has paralyzed the state and condemned the society to suffering the
consequences of constant fear and socioeconomic deprivations. The last two decades
brought unparalleled destruction as the country faced civil wars, massive human rights
violation, and de facto humanitarian catastrophe. Several factors are crucial to the
dynamics of the conflict within the DRC: ethnic violence, the presence of hostile
neighboring countries, natural resources, weakness of central government, and
secessionist movements. At the same time, the involvement of the United Nations,
African Union, and participation of the world’s major powers reflect not only the fact that
third parties are instrumental in solving this conflict, but also that civil war in Congo
could not be contained within its national borders.
The countries that comprise the Great Lakes Region of Africa have historically
been intertwined in terms of population, culture, and economic relations. Despite the
plethora of domestic grievances, the end to President Mobutu’s rule came from external
calamity. One of the most tragic catastrophes in the recent history, the genocide in
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Rwanda of 1994 has impacted the fragile balance in the DRC that was then called Zaire
as almost 1.2 million Hutu refugees relocated to the Kivu, a region that is populated by
Tutsis.26 Two years later, the Mobutu opposition, Alliance des Forces Democratiques
pour la Liberation de Congo, led by Laurent-Desire Kabila and supported by Rwanda and
Uganda, initiated a rebellion that resulted in removal of the decades long dictatorship and
renaming the country to the Democratic Republic of Congo. Yet, Patricia Daley points
out that the newly established leader not only failed at curbing systemic problems, which
he inherited from the Mobutu regime, but also utilized state resources to strengthen the
military and buy back the support of allies.27 These drawbacks in addition to the
involvement of neighboring countries in the conflict inadvertently led to the outbreak of
the second civil war in Democratic Republic of Congo.
In ironic twist of events, the rebellion against Kabila started in the same region of
Kivu with the support from his former ‘friends’ where “the Rassemblement Congolais
pour la Democratie (RCD-Goma) is supported by Rwanda, while the Mouvement pour la
Liberation du Congo (MLC) and the RCD-Bunia, a break-away of the RCD-Goma, are
sponsored by Uganda.”28 At the same time, Kabila was promised military assistance from
Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, which effectively elevated the scale of the conflict to
the regional level. Support on each side came not due to friendly intentions, but as a
strategic calculation which involved ethnic and economic dimensions. Elites on each side
were eager to utilize insecurity to achieve their parochial interests at the expense of
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peace. Filip Reyntjens underlines the paradox of the conflict environment in the
Democratic Republic of Congo: “local, national and regional state and non-state actors
indeed act rationally, engaged as they are in cost-benefit analyses, whose outcome often
shows that war, instability and state decay are more attractive than peace, stability and
state reconstruction.”29
The anti-Kabila rebellion further destabilized the Democratic Republic Congo,
while the scope of parties involved and a deteriorating humanitarian situation attracted
greater attention from international community. Rwandan troops march toward Kinshasa
in 1998 with the aim of the quick toppling of Kabila, but were thwarted by the
involvement of the DRC allies Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. With neither side able
to achieve decisive victory, the DRC was de facto divided between three warring
counterparts: the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (the Rwandan supported
rebel group) controlled the east; Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo with the
backing from Uganda dominated northern parts; and Kabila forces securing the rest of the
country.30 In light of the stalemate, all sides agreed to the peace dialogue that culminated
with signing the Lusaka Accord in 1999. The military component of the agreement
outlined “a cease-fire, the deployment of a UN force, the neutralization of ‘negative
forces’ (including Rwandan and Burundian rebel groups) and the withdrawal of foreign
armies,” while the political provision focused on the “the organization of an ‘interCongolese dialogue’ aimed at agreeing on the terms of a transition to a democratic form
of government, and the re-establishment of the authority of the state throughout the entire
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national territory.”31 The fragile ceasefire was constantly under the threat of relapse as
every side regularly accused the other of violations. The United Nations Security Council
was equally concerned about the domestic application of the accord specifically in
regards to the exploitation of natural resources by external actors.32
The assassination of Laurent-Desire Kabila in 2001 and the succession of his son,
Joseph, as the leader of a state symbolized a new stage in the history of the DRC. While
gradual steps were taken to ameliorate the conflict, withdraw foreign presence, and
institute provisional government, the country again faced a crisis as the results of the
2006 Presidential elections, which Kabila won, were not accepted by the opposition
candidates.33 A new rebellion erupted in the ill-fated province of Kivu and other regions
of the DRC. For the past seven years the national army, FARDC, has consistently
attempted to address the rising tides of secessionism and instability. The involvement of
the United Nations in the conflict since 1999 as the Mission in the Democratic Republic
of Congo or MONUC and following the new stage in operation as the Stabilization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or MONUSCO appeared to be
instrumental in addressing one of the most violent and complex intrastate conflicts in the
Great Lakes region of Africa.
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Initial Conditions

Several factors that I have analyzed in the model of initial conditions have been
present at the onset of the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. First and
foremost, the spillover of the conflict from nearby intrastate wars that ravaged the states
surrounding the DRC made direct causal contributions. Thus, refugees that were escaping
genocide, rebels that failed in their countries, and foreign armed forces that brought to
power President Kabila all contributed to the onset of civil war in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. The factor of contagion in the Africa’s World War is consistent with
the model of path dependence in intrastate conflicts that focused on the impact of initial
conditions on the outcome. Thus, spillover of civil war in the DRC has a cascading effect
that resulted in the third party intervention. Interestingly, various neighboring states
provided first indirect and in the later stages direct military support both to the
government forces and insurgent groups. The stalemate between different factions in the
war prompted brokerage and subsequent involvement of regional and international
organizations culminating in a compromise settlement. Arguably, the onset factor of
contagion is associated with the compromise outcome because it prompts interventions
from the UN and regional IGOs to curb the spread of violence, which was the case for
Africa’s World War.
While the Democratic Republic of Congo has vast fuel resources including oil, its
primary export commodities include copper, cobalt and other non-ferrous minerals.34 At
the same time, the presence of lootable resources in the conflict areas has been identified
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by the United Nations Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as the source of
financing rebel activities as well as criminal elements that were interested in perpetuating
the conflict.35 The Panel’s Report has highlighted the complexity of the civil war and
post-conflict reconstruction in the DRC as not only rebel groups, but also states that
intervened and supported them militarily in the conflict had a stake in the resources-rich
neighbor. According to the Report, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and Uganda anticipating the
involvement of the United Nations peacekeeping missions altered their approach to
controlling the DRC resources by withdrawing armed forces, but leaving criminal
elements to sustain illegal extraction and, as a result, the propensity for conflict
reoccurrence.36 While my quantitative models of path dependence found no connection
between diamonds and intrastate conflict outcome, the case of Africa’s World War
implies the connection between lootable resources and third party intervention by states.
Furthermore, focusing exclusively on diamonds and oil may limit the explanatory
potential of the models as in the case of the DRC such lootable resources as tantalum,
gold, and coltan were instrumental in causing and sustaining conflict.
The civil war in Democratic Republic of Congo was largely driven by ethnic
violence rather than religious differences. Thus, spillover of the conflict between Hutus
and Tutsis in neighboring Rwanda into the DRC led to the continuation of the interethnic
conflict that then involved local tribes that were dissatisfied with the influx of
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immigrants.37 As the conflict ravaged the country, old ethnic rivalries reemerged and
were exacerbated by the vacuum of power after the withdrawal of warring sides
according to the ceasefire agreement. The stark example of such ethnic confrontation was
the Ituri conflict in the eastern province of the DRC that “erupted in the wake of Ugandan
Army withdrawal in compliance with peace agreements and international pressure.”38
Since the existing scholarship on civil war in the DRC does not provide any insights into
the role of religion in affecting conflict dynamics, it is problematic to extrapolate further
the factor of religious diversity as a determinant in path dependent process.

Tipping Points

After the end of the Cold War, the long lasting authoritative grip of the President
Mobutu that ruled the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire at that time) slowly
diminished. Since 1990 the POLITY IV Project has identified the DRC as anocratic. The
regime type that is neither democratic nor autocratic has lasted in the Democratic
Republic of Congo after Mobutu’s death in 1997 and surpassed the period of the second
civil war itself. Since the civil war erupted only a little more than year after the First War
in Congo, President Kabila had not only a limited time to implement democratic changes
that were desired by Congolese people, but even less incentive to do so given the
increasing fear of the presence of foreign troops.39 Thus, stuck in a regime limbo Kabila
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did not have avenues to use democratic institutions to establish credible commitments
with the warring sides or autocratic instruments to topple unpopular moods within the
country. Furthermore, he relied militarily on Rwandan and Ugandan strength to topple
the previous government of Mobutu and thus failed to establish effective national armed
forces. While the regime type and military capacity are useful dimensions for examining
an intrastate conflict in the DRC, it is the exogenous tipping points that played a decisive
role in the initiating the war, sustaining the violence, and eventually locking in the
particular civil war outcome.
Indeed, the name of an intrastate conflict, African World War, implies the
involvement of the regional parties that had their security, financial, and political interests
in influencing the dynamics of the conflict. The analysis through the lens of path
dependence dynamics is rather complex in this particular case since third party
interventions supported both government and rebels troops as well as involved
peacekeeping missions from the United Nations and regional IGOs. Yet, the key factor in
solving the puzzle is focusing on the sequence and timing factors, or in other words in
what order did the interventions occur. The significance of timing and sequence has been
stressed by Paul Pierson in this analysis of the narrower notion of path dependence and
confirmed by my models of the intrastate conflict.
The results of the competing risks models indicated that rebel-biased interventions
tend to result in the rebels’ victory. As the Rwandan and Ugandan governments became
dissatisfied with the newly established Kabila’s regime, they backed up the
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) rebel group and instigated the
conflict. The swiftness and scale of the attack almost granted rebels a victory, but the
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involvement of government-biased intervention from Angola and Zimbabwe prevented
Kabila’s demise. 40 In the presence of support for government and rebel troops, combined
with the diversification of rebel groups and their motives, the possibility of decisive
military victory of either side appeared to be highly unlikely. The ensuing Lusaka
Accord of 1999 that established a ceasefire was regularly violated by warring sides and
the assassination of President Kabila in 2001 imbued conflict with reinvigorated fervor.
Yet, it was the involvement of the United Nations peacekeepers that played the pivotal
role in the emergence of the compromise outcome in the African World War. In the next
section, I outline the evolution of UN missions and mechanisms that locked in the
compromise solution.

Mechanisms

The United Nations has been involved in the peace operations in Congo since the
early years of its independence from Belgium. As the transition period was marked with
violence, Belgian forces moved troops to Congo to restore order, which were not
welcomed by the Congolese government that in turn asked the United Nations to provide
protection from foreign aggression.41 The United Nations Operation in the Congo
(Opération des Nations Unies au Congo or ONUC) was established in July 1960 and at
its apex consisted of 20,000 personnel that were “originally mandated to provide the
Congolese Government with the military and technical assistance it required following
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the collapse of many essential services and the military intervention by Belgian troops”
and later had to expand their mandate due to the complex conflict situation.42 The
secessionist trends within Congo became a prominent topic on the agenda of ONUC that
initially been tasked with protection from external forces. The situation has deteriorated
even further after the tragic events on September 17, 1961 when the airplane that carried
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld crashed in the region of the nowadays Zambia en
route to the meeting to discuss the future of the secessionist Katanga province.43 In 1964,
following the prevention of secessionist movements and external aggression, the ONUC
finished its operation in Congo, but structural problems that arose during their four-year
mandate not only threatened the future of peacekeeping, but also jeopardized the
feasibility of the United Nations in general.44
The role of the United Nations was equally crucial for mediating the Second
Congo War following the instability spawned by the removal of the three-decade-long
regime of Mobutu and rise to power of Laurent-Desire Kabila. After the signing of the
Lusaka Accord in 1999 that culminated the internal conflict exacerbated by the
participation of neighboring countries, the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 1279 and established an Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (MONUC). Two weeks prior to the inception of the MONUC operation, on
November 16, 1999, the Organization of the African Unity dispatched a Joint Monitoring
Commission to observe the fulfillment of the Lusaka Accord.45
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Initially, MONUC was tasked with traditional peacekeeping functions, ceasefire
monitoring, but not surprisingly had to update the initial mandate due to the complex
situation in the field. Observers of this intrastate conflict highlighted the need for a more
robust approach to peacekeeping given the complexity of the situation that would require
introduction of the Chapter VII peacekeeping.46 According to article 42 of the UN
Charter, in cases where peaceful settlement of conflicts is not attainable the UN can
authorize enforcement mechanisms “by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security.”47 Indeed, following the 2002
agreement between warring sides to form a transitional government, MONUC was
authorized to disarm the rebel groups but still lacked the enforcement mechanisms.48 Not
only the mandate but also the undersized peacekeeping mission prevented MONUC from
swiftly responding to the increasing levels of violence in the eastern provinces of the
DRC. Under the deteriorating peace conditions, the UN Security Council adopted the
resolution 1484 (2003) which authorized deployment of European Union troops under the
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.49 French-led Operation Artemis was the first instance of
the independent European Union crisis management mission and was successful in
providing security in the Bunia region, weakening militia groups, delivering humanitarian

46

Paul S. Orogun, “Crisis of Government, Ethnic Schisms, Civil War, and Regional Destabilization of the
Democratic Republic of Congo,” World Affairs Vol. 165, no.1 (Summer, 2002): 40.
47
“Charter of the United Nations,” The United Nations, accessed March 23, 2015,
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml
48
Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, The United Nations in the 21st Century, 4th ed.,
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012), 124.
49
Kees Homan, “Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” in Faster and More United?
The Debate About Europe’s Crisis Response Capacity, eds. Andrea Ricci and Eero Kytömaa (Luxembourg:
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2006), 152.

182
aid, and ultimately saving time for establishing a more reinforced UN peacekeeping
presence in the area.50
While officially the African World War ended on December 16, 2002 with
government and rebel groups singing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement to form
transitional government, local conflicts in Kivu, Ituri, and Katanga provinces continued
despite the presence of international peacekeepers. In this light, it is critical to emphasize
both the role of the United Nations as the mediator of the compromise outcome for the
civil war and also as an active enforcer of the peace process during the post-compromise
period.

Lessons Learned

In the light of the findings regarding the role of international involvement in
shaping the compromise outcome in civil wars, it is imperative to investigate further path
dependent dynamics in the DRC. Thus, in this section I will focus on the evolution of
MONUC into MONUSCO and elaborate on how actions of the UN intervention brigade
helped secure the compromise outcome through active enforcement measures.
The need for a “robust force” in the secessionist regions of Democratic Republic
of Congo forced the UN Security Council to expand the mandate of MONUC with
Security Council Resolution 1565 (2004) that authorized the increase of personnel by
roughly 6,000 peacekeepers with the tasks of protection of civilians, discouraging
violence, providing security to the UN personnel, ceasefire observation, and
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disarmament.51 As of 2010, the MONUC was 20,000 peacekeepers strong and expanded
its mandate to assisting with electoral process, training the Congolese national army
(FARDC) and gradually preparing for the transition that would reflect the realities of the
modern situation in the DRC.52
The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was established in May 28, 2010 on the basis of
MONUC to reflect the ‘new stage’ in the history of the Democratic Republic of Congo.53
In reality, however, MONUSCO was not different from its predecessor since its mandate
emphasized similar provisions: “to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate
relating, among other things, to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and
human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the
Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.”54 Moreover,
the composition of the peace operation, “a maximum of 19,815 military personnel, 760
military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 personnel of formed police units,”
remained similar to MONUC, even though suggestions have been made about reducing
the number of peacekeepers.55 With the approved budget of almost $1.5 billion for 20132014, MONUSCO remains by and large the largest external guarantee of security in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. Yet, addressing the structural roots of intrastate conflict
is a slow process and would require participation of various non-state actors that must
operate in a secure environment. The recurring attacks from rebel groups backed by
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neighboring countries jeopardize peacebuilding attempts. While the United Nations peace
operations traditionally relied on protecting rather than enforcing, it was imperative in the
case of the DRC to reformulate current postulates in order to address efficiently the
transnationally supported rebel groups.
The idea behind a more muscular vision of the United Nations is not new.
According to Article 45 of the UN Charter, “to enable the United Nations to take urgent
military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force
contingents for combined international enforcement action.”56 The UN Military Staff
Committee that was charged with coordinating military actions of the UN was paralyzed
by the Cold War stalemate and to this day remains largely dysfunctional. As an
alternative, the United Nations authorized the creation of the peacekeeping forces that
have evolved from merely ceasefire observers to the complex instrument aimed at
preventing conflict, mediating reconciliation, and addressing the roots of conflict.
However, peacekeepers have generally lacked the enforcement component and this
limitation was effectively utilized against them in various intrastate conflicts.
In Congo, the situation has been drastically different both during the first
involvement of the UN (ONUC) as well as during the recent peace operations (MONUC
and MONUSCO). The creation of the UN Force Intervention Brigade in the spring of
2013 with the aim of neutralizing armed groups in the DRC was viewed as a
paradigmatic shift not only for peace operation in Congo, but also for peacekeeping in
general. While certainly a more offensive mandate was a required measure in the light of
deteriorating conflict environment in the eastern provinces, UN considerations about
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using stronger actions are not novel in this particular case, but in fact the topic of
enforcement measures have been on the agenda since the UN’s first involvement during
the early years of Congo’s independence. Thus, the United Nations Operation in the
Congo (ONUC) that was established in July 1960 and consisted of 20,000 peacekeepers
became a victim of the Cold War rhetoric and de facto “became an enforcement army for
the central government, which the UN Secretariat created with Western support.”57 The
refusal of the USSR and France to pay the fees and resistance of other troop contributors
to UN control led to a major split within this organization. That not only cast a shadow on
the role of peacekeepers in offensive operations, but also undermined the UN’s
involvement in the whole region of Great Lakes of Africa.58
The seminal Brahimi Report on the future of peacekeeping criticized the current
peace operations that oftentimes lack personnel or sufficient authority to respond
efficiently to the modern crises. The call for a “robust force” has been reflected in the
changing mandate of MONUC that was initially tasked with ceasefire observance, but
later incorporated disarmament, electoral assistance, and security of civilians and UN
staff. Durch and his colleagues in The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace
Operations posit that “the first operational test of these new principles and force
requirements awaited the Security Council’s July 2003 expansion of MONUC’s mandate
to ‘use all necessary means’ in the DR Congo’s northeastern district of Ituri, where
extreme inter-ethnic violence had erupted in the wake of Ugandan Army withdrawal in
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compliance with peace agreements and international pressure.”59 Following the adoption
of Resolution 1565 (2004), the UN Security Council authorized the expansion of the
MONUC staff and strengthening the enforcement provisions of the mandate.
However, in comparison to the previous cases the UN Force Intervention Brigade
had one important distinction. It was the first time in peacekeeping history that the
mandate permitted direct offensive operations against rebel forces. The initiative to create
the intervention brigade came following high-level talks between all the Great Lake
region countries, United Nations, African Union, and other African regional
organizations that culminated in signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation
Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region on February, 24th
2013.60 The next month the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2098 (2013) in
which it condemned the activities of rebel groups such as “the M23, the FDLR, the ADF,
the APCLS, the LRA, the National Force of Liberation (FNL), the various Mayi Mayi
groups and all other armed groups and their continuing violence and abuses of human
rights, including summary executions, sexual and gender based violence and large scale
recruitment and use of children.”61 Article 9 of this resolution authorizes the creation of
an intervention brigade which would be directly subordinate to the MONUSCO
commander and be responsible for “neutralizing armed groups as set out in paragraph 12
(b) below and the objective of contributing to reducing the threat posed by armed groups
to state authority and civilian security in the eastern DRC and to make space for
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stabilization activities.”62 Reference to paragraph 12(b) outlined the possibility of
working jointly with or independently from FARDC (Congolese army) and the obligation
to follow international law when engaging with combatants.
The actions of the Intervention Brigade that was initially viewed by international
NGOs as rather another problem than a real solution to the crisis in Congo has proven its
effectiveness in a joint operation with Congolese army that pushed rebel group
Movement of March 23 (M23) outside of Congo and virtually led to its collapse. The
3,000-strong brigade that consisted of Tanzanian, Malawi, and South African troops
under the UN command after successfully combating M23 has pledged to combat other
rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo.63 While clearly a game changer, the
UN Intervention Brigade’s future largely depends on its success in addressing remaining
rebel groups. The government of Democratic Republic of Congo and FARDC are still not
able to provide political and security guarantees for the whole nation without the external
support from international organizations such as the UN. Even though the situation that
the UN found itself in the 1960s is unlikely to occur, both the Congolese government and
foreign forces have to be rather cautious about the Intervention brigade’s tactics and its
interaction with local population.
The involvement of the United Nations peacekeeping mission and Organization of
African Unity’s observation commission has been pivotal in establishing a fertile ground
for the dialogue between the warring sides in the light of the military deadlock. At the
same time, international and regional organizations lacked enforcement mechanisms to
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prevent the outbreak of violence following the ceasefire of 1999. Gradually, the scope
and size of the mission increased, thus contributing to the compromise between rebel
groups and government forces in 2002. If not for the UN that sustained fragile peace after
the peace agreement, the intrastate conflict in the DRC probably would have continued at
the national level rather than been isolated to local provinces. Transformation of the
MONUSCO and actions of the UN intervention brigade proved to be crucial in securing
peace through active enforcement measures.
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The Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War of 2006-2009

Table 21. Overview of the Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War.
Outcome

Government wins

Regime Type

Democracy

Military personnel per
1000
United Nations
intervention
Regional IGO
intervention
State intervention for
government
State intervention for
rebels

8.00
No
No
No
No

Secondary diamonds

No

Oil exports

No

Contagion

No

Ethnic fractionalization

Heterogeneous

Religious
Fractionalization

Heterogeneous

Overview of an intrastate conflict

There are different approaches toward outlining the temporal dimensions of the
Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War. One approach argues for treating the entire period of
confrontation in Sri Lanka as a continuous process, in which the Second Sri Lanka Tamil
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Civil War that is also called Eelam War IV is the last stage of the war that lasted almost
26 years.64 In fact, this makes civil war in Sri Lanka one of the longest periods of
intrastate violence since the end of the Second World War. In this study, I adhere to the
classification developed by Correlates of War project that treats the period of conflict
from 1983 to 2002 as the first Sri Lanka Tamil War and conflict that started in 2006 as
the ongoing Second Sri Lanka War.65 The Correlates of War Dataset v.4.1 was published
before the end of the Second Sri Lanka Tamil War. The intrastate conflict has effectively
culminated with the victory of the government forces over the remnants of Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on May 18, 2009.66
Undoubtedly, the Second Sri Lanka Tamil War has its roots in the previous
periods of the intrastate conflict as the same factors that sparked violence two decades
before led to the outbreak of conflict in 2006. After gaining independence in 1948 from
the British government, Sri Lanka found itself facing the classical post-colonial dilemma
of managing the redistribution of the power between ethnic groups. Tamils that are the
minority ethnic group in Sri Lanka enjoyed dominant status during the colonial period,
but after the independence Sinhalese who represent the biggest ethnic group have stated
their claim on power. Initially non-violent Tamil protests gradually transformed into
violent separatist movements and brought to the stage militarized groups such as the
LTTE in the 1970s.67 Full-fledged intrastate conflict that officially erupted in 1983 has
been characterized by periods of intense violence and ceasefires as well as third party
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intervention by India in the late 1980s.68 After two decades of fighting, government and
rebel forces agreed to enter a peace process that was supported by the mediation efforts
of the international community.69
Despite the high hopes from all sides of conflict for the peace process and joint
efforts to address the consequences of the 2004 tsunami disaster, mutual distrust, internal
struggle within the rebel movement and ascension to power of the nationalist Sinhalese
parties eventually jeopardized reconciliation efforts.70 In 2006, government forces
launched an offensive operation against LTTE formally starting the Eelam War IV.71
Gradual advancement of the Sri Lankan troops in the eastern and northern regions of the
country in 2007 culminated in the spring of 2009 when the Tamil Tigers acknowledged
that the military resistance has no prospects for success.72

Initial Conditions

In the case of civil war in Sri Lanka, adopting the terminology popularized by
Collier and Hoeffler, grievance inducing factors such as ethnic cleavages and religious
differences have a better explanatory power regarding the onset of conflict than control
over natural resources. Sri Lanka is not an oil exporting economy and does not possess
lootable resources that can be a potential source for conflict. At the same time, a long
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history of ethnic violence that is complicated by the religious mosaic of Sri Lankan
society has been identified as the culprit of instability in the country. Traditional
interpretations of the civil war in Sri Lanka picture an inherent feud rooted in the colonial
past between Buddhist Sinhalese and Hindu Tamils. Yet, another faction of Muslim
Tamils joined the conflict dynamics in the eastern provinces.73 In a sense, ethnic and
religious factors are by and large aligned when it comes to differentiating government
troops and rebels. Indeed, ethno-religious differences in Sri Lanka are consistent with my
analysis of the broader definition of path dependence that focuses on the initial
conditions. Religiously diverse societies are less likely to find a compromise solution to
their intrastate conflicts. While some argue that the first civil war in Sri Lanka ended in a
compromise, it is valid to argue that an end of hostilities in 2002 was a mere prelude
before the final act of the civil war. This also explains why other sources do not divide
Sri Lankan civil war into two separate instances of intrastate conflicts, but rather treat it
as a continuous process.
Another interesting perspective on the conflict dynamics was proposed by
Benedikt Korf in the article “Greed and Grievance in Sri Lanka” in which he argued that
ethnic and religious differences determine the line between territories that each warring
side claims to control for political and economic benefits.74 In turn, these “gains made by
conflict entrepreneurs and war winners feed grievances caused by perceived
discrimination, exclusion, and inequality among ethnic groups.”75 The mutually
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reinforcing greed and grievance dynamics provide enough momentum for the prolonged
sustenance of an intrastate violence.

Tipping Points

The international response to the crisis in Sri Lanka has been limited to the
declarations and statements by the United Nations, European Union, United States and
other major players to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. At the onset of the conflict,
third parties were hesitant to support openly the Sri Lanka government, but as the
outcome of the war seemed clear Iran, China, and India pledged military, economic, and
political support for the ruling regime.76 Toward the end of the war, the UN Human
Rights Council witnessed a heated confrontation between the Western powers who
proposed a resolution that will label actions by Sri Lankan armed forces and LTTE alike
as war crimes, while a counter-resolution supported by India, Russia as well as other
members from Asia, Africa, and Latin America argued for the non-interference
principle.77
In the light of the increasing power of the Responsibility to Protect and human
security principles, the involvement of the third parties was nevertheless highly unlikely
not only because of the impasse at the UN level, but increasingly because of the swiftness
of government’s military offensive on the rebel positions. In the case of Second Sri
Lanka Tamil Civil War, external forces had minimal effect on the outcome of an
intrastate conflict, yet in terms of post-conflict process Sri Lanka remains largely under
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the heavy pressure from the Western powers for its negative record of violating human
rights during the conflict.
According to the POLITY IV dataset, during the period of second civil war Sri
Lanka was a democratic state. Indeed, Sri Lanka is considered to be one of the oldest
democracies in South Asia.78 Yet, during the Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War
observers have argued that the President Mahinda Rajapaksa has used the fear of the
LTTE to maintain a firm grip over the government.79 After the conflict ended, the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay expressed her concerns with
deepening of the authoritarian direction in Sri Lanka as the new legislation provided the
president with more power over the judiciary branch.80 Despite Rajapaksa’s popularity
after winning a three decade conflict, he lost the 2015 Presidential elections and the
newly elected government vowed to curb authoritarian legislation and guide Sri Lanka
toward a more democratic society.81
Although technically Sri Lanka was a democracy during the civil war,
authoritarian elements – which according to my analysis in the previous chapters are
pivotal for increasing the chances of the government’s success – were present during
President Rajapaksa’s rule. In this light, it is valid to argue that the Sri Lankan
government had used an image of LTTE as an enemy to garner more control over
political checks and balances and to ignore pressures from domestic and international
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communities. In the case of Sri Lanka, an internal tipping point of regime type was an
indirect cause of the government’s success. The primary determinant of the intrastate
conflict outcome was the continuous military offensive on the rebel forces with no
intentions for a compromise solution. It is imperative to examine the role of military
actions as the mechanism of path dependence in intrastate conflict given that the
quantitative analysis found little support for this factor.

Mechanisms

Aside from reliance on military power to solve the intrastate conflict, the factor of
the previous war outcome and the factor of the “War on Terror” appear to be the main
elements of the path dependence dynamics during the Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War.
Jayadeva Uyangoda points out the resilience of the government military forces that not
only gradually captured territories under the LLTE control, but also did not hesitate to
target civilian areas where rebels were hiding.82 It is also important to note that despite
the decrease of the size of the armed forces during the war, the rise of military
expenditures and military performance resulted in “a qualitative change in the capabilities
(enhanced force multiplier) of the Sri Lankan forces, as the Sri Lankan Armed forces
destroyed, killed or captured most of the LTTE forces.”83 While across all instances of
intrastate conflicts since the Second World War the size of the armed forces was not
related with a particular civil war outcome, in the case of Sri Lanka, decisive actions of
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government forces even in the face of a humanitarian disaster have predetermined its
victory in the conflict.
The Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War was a recurrence of the protracted conflict
and as I argued earlier can be considered as a last episode of the conflict that lasted for
almost thirty years. The war that started in 1983 and ended in the compromise in 2002
was characterized by periods of ceasefire and active combat. The volatility of the
settlement attempts made both sides distrustful, which coupled with the lack of
mechanisms to sustain commitments, led to the resurgence of conflict. The government
and the LTTE consistently violated the 2002 truce and as the full-fledged war erupted in
2006, military victory appeared to be the preferable war outcome.
Finally, the global response to the terrorist attack on a World Trade Center in
New York on September 11, 2001 was the critical shift that minimized the chances of the
negotiated settlement and led to the government’s victory. The US-led “War on Terror”
has not only changed the geopolitical map in the Middle East, but also affected large
number of separatists groups around the globe. The addition of the LTTE to the US State
Department terrorist list put it among such notorious groups as Al Qaeda, Hizballah, and
Shining Path, which dramatically altered its image in the world community. 84 Diaz and
Murshed further suggest that the new discourse on the war between Sri Lankan armed
forces and the LTTE has labeled the government’s struggle as “a virtuous campaign,
where the violence of war could be justified as a moral obligation against terror.”85
Labeled as the terrorist group, the LTTE lost an important source of funding from Tamil
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Diaspora as the international community started targeting their sympathizers and
sponsors.86 Therefore, a change of attitudes from the international community toward the
LTTE, justification of the military actions, and loss of financial support justify the
argument about the path dependence of the government success outcome in the Second
Sri Lanka Tamil War.

Conclusion

Three case studies reviewed in this chapter addressed the variation of factors, both
at the early stages of conflict and in the later phases, that shaped different outcomes of
civil wars. One immediate observation following the comparative analysis of intrastate
conflict is the caution with the reliance on the large-n statistical results. It is evident in the
qualitative overview of three conflicts that statistically and substantively relevant
indicators of path dependence are useful as the first place to look for explanation of
causal mechanisms, yet the reality proves that relationship behind the civil war dynamics
is rather complex.
In the case of First Chechen War, causal mechanisms behind the onset factor of
oil appeared to be complicated by the existence of illegal trade between rebel forces and
criminal elements from the Russian Federation. Moreover, the outcome of intrastate
conflict can be interpreted both as the success of rebels and also a compromise since de
jure Chechnya remained part of Russia. The decisive role in determining the outcome of
an intrastate conflict can be attributed to asymmetric warfare of Chechen rebels such as
terrorist attacks that paralyzed Russian political establishment. In this regard, it is
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possible to trace parallels with the First Sri Lanka Tamil War that also ended in a
compromise after the LTTE started using asymmetric tactics.
Furthermore, both the Second Chechen War and the Second Sri Lanka Tamil
Civil War ended in a decisive victory of the government as it was able to cut international
support for the rebels, label them as terrorist organization after the US-led “War on
Terror,” and, ultimately, conduct ruthless military operations that bordered on violations
of the human rights. In contrast, the Second Congo War is the example of how
international involvement by the modern UN peacekeepers that have the mandate for
active military engagement can establish the mechanisms for a stable peace. In all three
cases, initial conditions, tipping points, or small events shaped the path dependent
dynamics that are responsible for the variation in intrastate conflict outcomes.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

Introduction

Intrastate conflicts are complex and multifaceted phenomena. Existing analytical
approaches tend to deconstruct intrastate conflicts into phases and evaluate each stage
separately. While such a method generated valuable inferences about the nature of civil
war, it ultimately lacks the overarching understanding about how the stages of war
interact with each other. This dissertation overcomes this limitation by integrating the
theory of path dependence into the intrastate conflict discourse through outlining the
patterns where a particular outcome of a civil war is conditioned by the initial character
of a conflict, internal features of a state, and intervening factors. Indeed, viewing an
intrastate conflict as a dynamic, continuous process that is shaped by internal and external
forces allows the construction of the set of testable hypotheses about path dependence in
intrastate conflicts. The theory of path dependence proved to be an innovative framework
for analyzing intrastate conflicts.
The research design of the dissertation that is shaped after the mixed methods
approach provides the comprehensive evaluation of path dependence conjectures while
controlling for the drawbacks of the large-n analysis and focusing on individual cases.
The results of quantitative tests provide considerable evidence for both the broad
conception of path dependence that emphasizes the role of the initial conditions in
framing the outcomes of the process as well as the narrow conception that highlights the
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critical role of exogenous and endogenous tipping points. Case studies analysis has
supported the validity of the quantitative findings, yet also hinted at the potential
limitations of the large-n approach. Instead, focusing on individual cases of civil wars
provided an insight into the causal mechanisms that shape the outcome of the conflict. In
the next sections, I provide a synthesis of the empirical findings, discuss theoretical and
policy implications, and discuss potential limitations of the current study.

Empirical Findings

A quantitative inquiry into the broad concept of path dependence has provided
sufficient evidence to support several hypotheses that tested the impact of the initial
conditions on the outcomes of civil wars. The logic behind the design of this particular
methodological framework was partially informed by the motive-opportunity paradigm
of conflict onset. Thus, I have identified secondary diamonds and an oil-exporting
economy as the opportunity structures, while religious and ethnic diversity of the society
as the motive (grievance) agencies. The factor of contagion does not fit within this
classification, yet remains a decisive determinant of the civil war initiation. Finally, the
control variable for the Cold War is introduced in the dataset to capture the impact of the
bipolar system of international relations.
To account for the impact of the initial conditions on the outcomes of a civil war,
I have conducted a series of multinomial logistic regressions. The findings of these tests
have provided substantial evidence for the interrelation between the onset and
termination phases of the conflict. Unlike previous studies that focused on the greed and
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grievance paradigm in which opportunity determinants were found to be closer related to
the onset of civil war than motive-based factors, my inquiry into path dependence
dynamics has found little evidence for this clear-cut distinction. On the contrary, when it
comes to explaining the outcome of the civil war, the opportunity factor of oil; the motive
factor of religious fractionalization; the factor of contagion; and, the Cold War era have
been found statistically and substantively significant. The eclecticism of the relevant
onset factors can be explained by the fact that there are different calculations and
expectations about the war before and after the initiation of hostilities.
Thus, in the recent scholarship on conflict onset, secondary diamonds that are
easily extractable and tradable were found to be related with the start of the civil war as
they can serve a lucrative source for financing the rebel cause. My analysis found no
support for the role of secondary diamonds in determining the outcome of the intrastate
conflict. Indeed, while the decision to rebel can be explained by the presence of lootable
resources, secondary diamonds do not provide sufficient dividends for the success of
rebels’ cause nor do they prolong or shorten the duration of the conflict itself. The factor
of oil, however, has been consistently relevant in increasing the chances of war onset and
in shaping the path to its termination. Thus, if a third of the country’s export revenue is
from oil, the chances that the rebels succeed go down by a quarter. It is also interesting
that previous studies have found that oil-exporting economies are more likely to
experience a civil war, although as my analysis suggests the chance of rebels’ victory are
very slim.
The spillover of the conflict from troubled neighboring states appears to be
undermining the chances of the government to topple the rebellion. I have argued that the
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reasons behind government’s defeat might lie in the spread of innovative practices and
techniques as well as in rallying the resolve and strength of the rebels after witnessing the
success of similar uprisings in the neighboring areas. However, the results of the
multinomial logistic regression analysis indicated that the civil wars caused by contagion
are also likely to end in a compromise. The logic here is that war spillover incentivizes
other states and international organizations to intervene in the conflict to prevent the
outbreak of a civil war in their own states or the region in general. Further investigation
into impact of the third party interventions confirmed my assumptions.
Finally, an investigation into the impact of the international environment in which
civil wars occurred provided strong evidence for the influence of the Cold War dynamics
on the outcome of intrastate conflicts. During the period of bipolar system of
international relations, proxy wars that were waged by US or Soviet Union or intrastate
conflicts where superpowers were indirectly involved had less of a chance to end in a
compromise and were more likely to be won by government forces. With the collapse of
the USSR, the evolution of the UN peacekeeping, the ascent of the globalization era and
the human security paradigm, the dynamics of the intrastate conflict have been altered. It
is imperative to further investigate the nature of the contemporary international system
and its impact on the dynamics of civil wars.
The empirical inquiry into the narrow concept of path dependence supported the
hypotheses about the impact of endogenous and exogenous tipping points on reinforcing
the chances of a particular outcome of a civil war. This research design is aimed at
investigating the temporal dimensions of conflict, the sequence of events, and
explanatory factors that “lock in” a unique path to the civil war outcome. Through
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applying various event history (survival) models that were utilized in the previous
scholarship and introducing a novel approach that accounts for the dependence of
competing risks between three intrastate conflict outcomes, I have examined the
consistency of results across the methods. Table 13 summarizes the findings of the Fine
and Gray model that I have utilized to test the narrow concept of path dependence in
intrastate conflicts. In sum, it outlines whether or not a particular tipping point or control
factor reinforced a hypothesized outcome and what its effect was on the duration of that
particular outcome.

Table 22. The Results of Event History (Survival) Models.
Hypothesized
outcome

Confirmed

Effect on
duration

Compromise
Compromise

Yes
Yes

Decrease
Decrease

Government
Rebels

No
Yes

None
Decrease

Government
Rebels
Compromise
Government

No
No
Yes
Yes

None
None
Decrease
Decrease

Rebels
Government
Rebels
Rebels

No
No
No
No

None
None
None
None

Exogenous Tipping Points
UN intervention
Regional intergovernmental
organizations intervention
State intervention for government
State intervention for rebels
Endogenous Tipping Points
High military capacity
Low military capacity
Democratic regime
Autocratic regime
Control Factors
Secondary diamonds
Oil exporting economy
Ethnic heterogeneity
Religious heterogeneity
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The empirical investigation of intrastate conflicts through the lens of the narrow
concept provided not only strong support for the theory of path dependence in civil wars,
but also informed about causal mechanisms behind a particular civil war outcome. As
hypothesized, both the interventions by the United Nations and regional
intergovernmental organizations increased the chances of the compromise solution and
decreased the duration of conflict. While this finding implies the efficiency of
international peacekeepers, in reality, the UN and regional IGOs’ interventions are
conditioned upon their mandate that presupposes ceasefire observance and monitoring of
disarmament as well as the presence of the environment that is already conducive to
peace. Thus, these organizations intervene only when the prospects of a compromise are
high. Although this hypothesis calls for the discussion of selections effects, it is also
worth of noting that each peacekeeping operation is preceded by extensive diplomatic
efforts to ameliorate the conflict, which can be distinguished as the early stage of the
third party intervention. Mechanisms and instruments of the international involvement in
intrastate conflicts are complex, yet it is clear that their participation increases the
probability of a negotiated solution. The endogeneity problem that is evident with these
types of interventions requires a detailed investigation in future research. Subsequent
studies should include a distinction between peacekeeping missions that have an observer
status and those that require an active enforcement as in the case of the intervention
brigade in the DRC.
Unlike international and regional intergovernmental organizations, interventions
by individual states are geared toward the support of one of the warring sides. Thus,
rebel-biased state interventions tend to maximize the chances of the rebellion’s success,
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while minimizing the overall duration of conflict. Contrary to my assumption, statebiased interventions in fact did not increase the chances of government forces
succeeding, yet they prolonged confrontations that resulted in a rebels’ victory. These
findings differ from the previous scholarship on intrastate conflict outcomes, which can
be attributed to the difference in codifying civil wars, methodological frameworks, and
historical periods under review. Ultimately, the results of this dissertation have to be
interpreted in terms of this particular research design and inferences drawn here are
pertinent to the most recent dataset available.
The event history analysis found no support for the degrees of state military
capacity, codified in term of the armed personnel as a fraction of total population, in
determining the outcome of the civil war. It appears that neither maintaining a sizable
army guarantees the success of the government, nor the presence of limited military
contingent presupposes the victory of rebels. In contrast to state capacity, regime type has
been closely associated with a particular civil war outcome. In autocratic states,
government forces have a higher chance of success and the civil war tends to be shorter.
The logic behind the prevalence of the government’s victory stems partially from the
repressive capabilities of the autocratic state that is aimed at rallying public support and
catalyzing resources. In contrast, in democratic societies the government is affected by
public opinion that prefers peace to a prolonged warfare. In the presence of democratic
institutions, warring sides can utilize credible mechanisms for establishing a dialogue to
address grievances. The results of the event history models supported this expectation by
indicating that a democratic regime decreases the duration of the intrastate conflict and
eventually leads to the compromise outcome.
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None of the hypotheses about the initial conditions of the intrastate conflict that I
have adapted to the analysis of the narrow concept of the path dependence were
confirmed. I aimed at observing the effect of several onset factors that had the capacity to
retain their impact on the outcome of civil wars such the presence of secondary
diamonds; an oil-exporting economy; ethnic fractionalization; and religious
fractionalization. While I have not found the support for the hypothesized interactions,
the onset (control) factors have, in fact, influenced the odds of certain civil war solutions.
Intrastate conflicts in oil-exporting economies and religiously diverse societies tend to
end in a compromise. Substantively, however, the effect of these explanatory variables
was only relatively significant. Given the plethora of statistical findings, it was
imperative to develop the causal narratives of the path dependence mechanisms by
analyzing how initial conditions and tipping points influenced the outcomes in a specific
case of a civil war.
To account for the variation in the conflict outcomes, three cases of civil war
reviewed in this dissertation are the First Chechen War of 1994-1996; Africa’s World
War of 1998-2002; and the Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War of 2006-2009. The first
two wars are part of the OTIC and TPIC datasets that I have used to test empirically the
path dependence in civil wars. The intrastate conflict in Sri Lanka is the out-of-sample
case that I have selected to test the predictive power of the empirical findings. Ultimately,
case studies analysis allowed moving beyond the framework of initial conditions and
tipping points and investigating the power of small events and their sequence.
The crisis in Chechnya in the early 1990s occurred against the backdrop of the
decentralization tendencies that were caused by the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
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Weakness of the federal political apparatus, the failed military campaign, and the
unpopularity of war ultimately forced Moscow into negotiations, which de facto meant
the victory of Chechen separatist. Conflicts in the nearby republics, the presence of oil,
and religious fractionalization have been contributing to the onset of the civil war. Yet,
the in-depth analysis of the empirical findings through the lens of the Chechen case
suggested the relationship between onset conditions and conflict outcomes to be more
complex than anticipated earlier. While none of the significant variables were able to
predict the outcome of the conflict, a closer look at the dynamics of war revealed that oil,
for example, was not used to finance rebels directly, but served more as a payment for
loyalty of different warlords for the rebel causes. It also was a part of the illegal resource
trade that involved both Chechen rebels and Russian criminals. Spillover of war tends to
result in compromise, and technically after the Moscow Peace Treaty of 1997, the
Chechen crisis ended in a negotiated settlement as de jure Chechnya still remained part of
Russia.
Endogenous tipping points had a minimal effect on shaping the path of the war
given the fact that Russia was neither a democratic nor fully autocratic state. Since the
Russian Federation retained a seat on the UN Security Council and possessed a vast
nuclear arsenal, neither peacekeeping mission nor foreign interventions were viable
options in the First Chechen War. From the path dependence standpoint, the pivotal
determinant of the civil war outcome appeared to be the asymmetric warfare that
Chechen rebels utilized after they failed to confront Russian federal forces in a
conventional way. Two major terrorist attacks by Chechen separatists, the Budennovsk
and Pervomayskoe hostage crises, shifted the scales of war in favor of the rebels. These
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attacks were poorly handled by Russian forces and sent political ripples across the
Kremlin. The power of small events such as the acts of terrorism has had a considerable
role in shaping the outcome of the First Chechen War.
Unlike the intrastate conflict in the Northern Caucasus, the dynamics of the
Second War in Congo or “Africa’s World War” were shaped by the regional and
international interventions. Moreover, the region of the Great Lakes has been
characterized by the persistence of intrastate and interstate warfare for decades. Rooted in
the colonial past, the history of the Democratic Republic of Congo has been written by
violent conflicts, autocrats, and natural resources. Africa’s World War can be considered
a continuation of the previous hostilities that revolved around the demise of the President
Mobutu’s authoritarian regimes. Only two years after Zaire was renamed the Democratic
Republic of Congo, revolutionary forces that brought Laurent-Desire Kabila to power
attempted another power shift. Rebel forces supported by Rwanda and Uganda who were
dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the new country came close to their goal, only to
witness how other regional powers such as Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia provided
military assistance to President Kabila that led to the stalemate between warring sides.
The path dependence dynamics in this intrastate conflict have been shaped by
both initial conditions and tipping factors. Thus, the spillover of conflict from
neighboring states was an important determinant for the uprising in the eastern provinces
of the DRC. The empirical findings from the test of the broad concept of path dependence
are consistent with outcomes of this war as a factor of contagion was associated with the
compromise outcome. Yet, as I have argued earlier, the causal mechanism behind the
contagion-compromise link lies in the probability of third party intervention such as UN,
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which was the case in the Africa’s World War. A similar connection can be traced to the
conflict over the lootable resources that are abundant in the DRC. While secondary
diamonds were not found to be statistically or substantively significant in determining the
outcome of the conflict, in this particular case they have been closely associated with the
decision of regional powers to intervene and even retain their influence. A report by UN
experts confirmed the connection between the persistence of conflict, lootable resources,
and neighboring states’ decision to intervene.
The pivotal dimension in determining the path of the conflict outcome in the
Democratic Republic of Congo was the involvement of foreign states, regional
intergovernmental organizations, and ultimately the United Nations. Since the event
history analysis highlighted the connection between civil war outcomes and third party
interventions, it was imperative to investigate the sequence of their involvement and
causal mechanisms in play. According to empirical findings, rebel-biased state
interventions tend to result in the rebellions’ success. Indeed, the existing evidence
suggests that President Kabila’s forces were in full retreat and if not for the foreign
military support, would have quickly lost the war. Therefore, in Africa’s World War the
stalemate resulted from the involvement of the third parties on both sides of conflict. The
compromise was possible, however, only with the involvement of the United Nations that
possessed instruments for establishing the ground for negotiations and mechanisms to
upheld commitments between the warring sides. Moreover, after the compromise was
successfully brokered, the Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo or MONUC gradually evolved into a proactive force that had the capacity not only
to guarantee security, but also act militarily against the remaining rebel groups.
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Finally, the analysis of the out-of-sample case of the Second Sri Lanka Tamil
Civil War has revealed the importance of the regime type and state capacity in
determining the path of the government’s victory. An intrastate conflict in Sri Lanka was
one of the most prolonged periods of internal armed violence in the twentieth century.
The Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War is often considered as a last phase of the conflict
that lasted almost three decades. I use the classification that distinguishes two wars since
the negotiated settlement that was reached between Sri Lankan government and Tamil
rebels in 2002 was rather promising in solving the conflict, while the war that lasted
between 2006 and 2009 represented a qualitatively new level of confrontation.
Sri Lanka is neither an oil-exporting country nor it is rich in secondary diamonds,
yet the conflict dynamics were driven by the ethno-religious cleavages between Buddhist
Sinhalese and Hindu Tamils. Greed and grievance symbiosis in the case of Sri Lankan
civil war is responsible for the persistence of conflict in this republic. Yet, this analytical
framework cannot explain the outcome of the second civil war. The key element of the
government’s success in toppling LTTE lies in the combination of resilient political
regime, the military capacity of a state, and the absence of international involvement.
While Sri Lanka is the oldest democracy in South East Asia, during the period of civil
war, the incumbent government was characterized by the firm grip on power
mechanisms, which many observers have classified as having authoritarian elements.
Indeed, the administration of the President Rajapaksa utilized an image of LTTE as an
enemy to gain control over the political system and to ignore pressures from domestic
and international communities.
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The experience from years of conflict has discouraged the government from
attempting to use military means to subdue LTTE to enter into negotiations. The
international community that has consistently pressured the Sri Lankan government to
follow this course of action has also lost its credibility after peace talks broke down in
2006. In this light, decisive military actions against rebel forces appeared to be the only
logical conclusion. Unlike previous decades of conflict, the government gained an upper
hand over the LTTE not only militarily, but also through labeling them as a terrorist
organization and, thus, cutting international channels for financial and military support.
In sum, understanding the path dependent dynamics in the case of Sri Lanka requires a
closer look at the factors that were not included in the statistical inquiry as well as
elaboration of elements that had an indirect influence, such as military tactics or the
absence of international support.
All three cases of intrastate conflict have revealed the complexity of the war that
oftentimes cannot be captured by the large-n studies. Nevertheless, the mixed methods
approach allowed a comprehensive examination of civil wars at the micro and macro
levels, while revealing the underlying causal mechanisms and overarching trends. For
example, investigation of the civil war in Chechnya and Sri Lanka through the prism of
path dependence has revealed critical similarities between the two instances. Thus, in
both cases, the first episode of conflict ended in a compromise decision (de jure in
Chechnya) as the rebel forces utilized asymmetric warfare tactics such as hostage-taking
and suicide attacks. In both scenarios, despite the government’s military superiority,
terrorist tactics sent ripples across political and economic systems forcing warring sides
to enter into negotiations. During the second phase of conflict, both governments
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answered with resilient military attacks that bordered on human rights violations against
the asymmetric tactics of the rebels. Furthermore, both governments labeled the rebel
groups as terrorist organizations after the United States announced its global War on
Terror. In both cases, the rebel cause was compromised by the change in international
perception, which in turn led to dissipation of financial support from abroad. The absence
of international involvement, as in the case of the Africa’s World War, has also
determined the success of the government. To conclude, the research design that follows
the logic of mixed methods provides mutually reinforcing analytical tools to evaluate a
complex phenomenon like an intrastate conflict while controlling for different levels of
analysis.

Theoretical and Methodological Implications

The contemporary scholarship on intrastate conflicts relies on well-developed
theoretical and methodological discourse to analyze the complex nature of civil wars. The
study of intrastate conflicts is arguably moving in the direction of becoming a discipline
in itself not only because this type of conflict dominates over other forms of violence, but
increasingly because of the analytical and practical resources devoted to this topic by
various entities ranging from the United Nations and states to major think tanks and
individual scholars. Under these circumstances, it is imperative to connect the existing
piecemeal inquiries into the nature of civil wars and develop an overarching theory of an
intrastate conflict. The theory of path dependence, which in a broader sense argues that
previous stages of conflict influence the subsequent phases and as a narrower concept
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focuses on factors that lock in a unique outcome of war, is a potential candidate for
analyzing intrastate conflict as a continuous process.
Aside from outlining a unifying theoretical framework, the theory of path
dependence provides methodological instruments to devise testable hypotheses. In this
dissertation, I have operationalized the broad and narrow concepts of path dependence
through outlining the factors that lead to the onset of civil wars and tipping factors that
shape the outcome of the civil war respectively. To test the relationship between the
initial conditions of and solutions to civil wars, I have applied multinomial logistic
regression analysis. While evaluating the coefficients for government victory, rebels’
success, and compromise with three different base outcomes was useful to observe the
pairwise dynamics, I found the analysis of marginal effects to be better suited for
interpreting the magnitude of the explanatory variables.
An empirical evaluation of the narrow definition of path dependence requires a
different approach since this research design focused on the temporal dimensions. The
existing scholarship on civil war dynamics and outcomes applied event history (survival)
models as a method to investigate the duration of the conflict. In this regard, the
transition from the approaches that focused on parametric models to articles that used
Cox competing risks model implies the continuing search for more appropriate tools to
capture the dynamics of civil wars. In this dissertation, I have introduced a model
developed by Jason P. Fine and Robert J. Gray that accounted for the interdependence of
civil war outcomes. The application of the proportional hazards model for the
subdistribution of a competing risk provided estimators for the cumulative incidence for
the explanatory variables in a particular conflict outcome while holding other outcomes
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as competing risks. I have conducted a comparative analysis of the Weibull parametric,
Cox competing risks and Fine and Gray models to investigate the robustness of estimates
across the methods. The results suggest that while the statistical significance of
explanatory variables does not differ considerably, hazard and sub-hazard ratios vary
across the models. Thus, the interpretation of the magnitude for a particular variable
appears to be related to the methodological tool that the researcher is using. Given the
fact that the Fine and Gray model is better suited for analyzing the competing risks of
civil war outcomes, it is valid to give this model a preferred position for the interpretation
of the explanatory variables’ magnitude.
Finally, case study analysis proved to be instrumental in outlining causal
mechanisms behind the relevant as well as overlooked determinants of the path
dependence dynamics in civil wars. Only in combination with inquiries into individual
cases of civil war it is possible to develop the narratives for the empirically significant
factors. While methodological pluralism is critical to advance the knowledge of civil
wars, it is equally imperative to acknowledge differences in the analysis while making
policy prescriptions and predictions.

Policy Implications

This dissertation identified patterns of path dependence in intrastate conflicts,
which can be directly implemented in devising tactical responses to the existing internal
crises as well as drafting strategic policy prescriptions for generating a particular civil
war outcome. It is beyond doubt that the pervasiveness of intrastate conflicts in global
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conflict dynamics requires a solid systematic response not only from great powers and
international organizations, but also from state leaders as well as commanders of rebel
forces in the countries ravaged by civil wars. As of 2015 there are more than a dozen
major intrastate conflicts on four continents where the count of fatalities passed a
thousand deaths threshold. Civil wars in Yemen, Eastern Ukraine, Syria and Iraq,
Somalia, and Nigeria among others are unique in their own right, yet share similarities in
regards to the initial conditions and tipping points that can shape their outcome.
Given the history of the United States’ involvement in the intrastate conflicts
during and after the end of the Cold War, it becomes clear that recent actions by the
world’s only superpower lack not only strategic but increasingly tactical consistency. The
Obama Administration’s poor record of handling recent outbursts of internal violence
from the Middle East to Eastern Europe can be partially attributed to the lack of grand
strategy. However, it is valid to assume that the existing approaches to dealing with
insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan has created the atmosphere of hesitance in dealing
with intrastate crises that is reminiscent of the US withdrawal from the international
scene after the 1993 Mogadishu debacle.
The findings of this dissertation highlight the role of the United Nations and
regional intergovernmental organizations peacekeeping missions in generating
compromise outcomes. In the light of the US uncertainty about its posture in global
security governance, it appears imperative for UN to assert its status and enhance the
capacity of its peacekeeping forces as was demonstrated through the creation of the
intervention brigade during the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Obviously,
the UN Security Council remains the hostage of the power play and ill-fated reform
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attempts will hardly allow this international body to become a dominant force in solving
intrastate conflicts across the globe. The prospects of the regional IGOs taking the vacant
spot of the UN appear to be equally bleak considering the crisis of identity of NATO;
political and financial instability within the EU; and the lack of cohesion among the
members of the African Union. In this light, governments and rebels in civil wars of the
twenty-first century appear to be the smiths of their own destiny. Understanding the
initial conditions of the war, capitalizing on the internal features of the state, and
managing the involvement of the third parties give either side an advantage in shaping the
path of an intrastate conflict.
Investigation into the future of civil wars is another dimension of this study.
Recent academic inquiries into the dynamics of civil war have been actively explored by
the US policy-making community. For example, the CIA sponsored the Political
Instability Task Force, a joint group of political scientists, to investigate the quantitative
dimensions of states’ vulnerability to lethal violence. The findings of major think tanks
and academic projects such as the Peace Research Institute Oslo and the Correlates of
War project have been actively used in understanding intrastate conflicts and formulating
policy approaches. Therefore, the current dissertation contributes in a similar fashion to
the tacit symbiosis between the academic and policy discourses on intrastate conflicts.
The analytical and methodological framework devised in this study can be used to
generate solutions for the ongoing and potential outbreaks of the intrastate violence.
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Recommendations for Future Research

As I have argued earlier, the introduction of the path dependence theory into the
study of intrastate conflicts generates a new analytical debate about the continuity of and
change in civil wars. While this dissertation rests on the well-established civil war
discourse, integration of the path dependence paradigm requires further discussion about
applicability of its central assumptions to the study of war. It is imperative to further
develop a theory behind causal mechanisms of initial conditions, intervening variables,
and the power of small events. Given that the central theoretical tenets of path
dependence are extrapolated mainly from the economic literature, it is equally important
to analyze the dynamics which are unique to the study of intrastate conflicts.
From the methodological standpoint, future inquiries have to account for the
wider spectrum of civil wars that are not limited to the period from the Second World
War to 2007. Another potential avenue for improvement lies in utilizing a different
classification of civil wars that lowers the death threshold per year from 1,000 to 25 such
as in the dataset developed by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Future studies can also
benefit from expanding the state capacity factor to include bureaucratic and
administrative components. While the current research design focused on the democratic
and autocratic regime types, it is also critical to investigate the role of anocratic regimes.
Further inquiries into the broad concept of path dependence will benefit from expanding
the explanatory factors beyond those that are tested in this dissertation.
Finally, the ultimate test for the findings of this study lies in devising policy
relevant suggestions. The case studies chapter of this dissertation provides a tentative
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framework that combines the evaluation of the statistical results with outlining causal
narratives of a unique civil war path. Subsequent policy analysis can utilize this
framework, while also capitalizing on the features and practical applications of the path
dependence mechanisms.

Limitations of the Study

To investigate the patterns of path dependence in civil wars, this study has utilized
a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. Given the nature of the empirical
approach, this dissertation relied on generating the dataset based on secondary sources.
As a direct consequence, the findings of this study are contingent upon the validity of the
data gathering techniques of other scholars. Even though conflict dynamics in the past
seventy years were characterized by the prevalence of civil wars, the total number of
observations is relatively small for detecting strong correlations between explanatory
variables and civil war outcomes. Thus, the results of several models of path dependence
may have been skewed as the test sample has not contained a sufficient number of civil
wars with required parameters.
By and large, present and previous inquiries into intrastate conflict have been
limited by the availability of data and relevance of proxy variables. For example, the
current study did not find a sufficient link between military capacity and the civil war
outcome. Part of the reason may be the choice of proxy variable that could be better
represented by either military spending or the quality of armed forces. Similar drawbacks
can be attributed to the indices of ethnic and religious fractionalization. In this
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dissertation, these variables have not been associated with the particular solution to a civil
war, even though the conflict narratives were fueled by ethnic or religious grievances.
The central conundrum, however, is to interpret the absence of statistical or substantive
significance as the indicator of the actual dynamics of civil war or to search for the
measure that would appear to be relevant.
Finally, despite certain theoretical and methodological limitations, the findings of
this dissertation remain credible. With the mantra that correlation is not causation in
mind, the mixed methods approach mitigates the drawbacks of quantitative and
qualitative methods by capitalizing on their symbiotic interaction. Empirical results that
were provided by the large-n analysis have been examined in a specific civil war
environment, while mechanisms that have been uncovered in the case studies will be
added to the future quantitative inquiries into the nature of an intrastate conflict.

Conclusion

The onset of the intrastate conflict, its development, and termination do not exist
separately in the vacuum. The contemporary literature on civil wars created artificial
stages of conflict that appear to be independent from each other. This dissertation
introduced a theory of path dependence that provides analytical and methodological
instruments to analyze an intrastate conflict as a continuous process. The primary
contribution of the new discourse on civil wars lies in connecting initial conditions,
internal features of a state, and intervening factors in shaping the path of the conflict and
its outcome.
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The mixed methods approach introduced in this dissertation offers a constructive
analysis of path dependent dynamics through the prism of multinomial logistic
regression, an event history model, and a series of case studies. The evaluation of the
broad concept of path dependence that focuses on initial conditions in shaping the
outcomes emphasized the relevance of conflict spillover, non-lootable resources, and
character of the international system. The analysis of the narrow concept, which describes
the factors that “lock in” a particular civil war outcome, pointed at the role of the UN and
regional intergovernmental organizations in accelerating the compromise; highlighted the
dynamics behind democratic and autocratic regimes; and, found no support for the
relationship between the size of the armed forces and conflict outcome. Finally, case
studies of three civil wars, which ended in different ways, revealed unique intrinsic
causal mechanisms behind each outcome.
Path dependence theory is a useful tool for understanding civil war as a process
where preceding stages and tipping points can determine the outcome of conflict. The
analysis of conflict dynamics in Chechnya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sri
Lanka revealed the complex nature of war and significance of timing and sequence of
interventions as well as power of small events. Research design outlined in this study has
the potential to generate new insights into the future of ongoing intrastate conflicts in
Ukraine, Syria, Yemen and other war-torn states.
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APPENDIX
LIST OF INTRASTATE CONFLICTS FROM 1945 TO 2007 ACCORDING TO THE
CORRELATES OF WAR PROJECT INTRA-STATE WAR DATA (V 4.1)

Polish Ukrainians

1945-1947

Iraq-Shammar

1959-1959

Forest Brethren

1945-1951

First DRC (Zaire)

1960-1963

Ukrainian Partisans

1945-1947

First Laotian

1960-1962

Chinese Civil War, Phase 2 1946-1950

North Yemen

1962-1969

Taiwan Revolt

1947-1947

Algerian Revolutionaries

1962-1963

Paraguay

1947-1947

Second DRC (Jeunesse)

1963-1965

First Burmese

1948-1951

First Ogaden

1963-1964

Seventh Colombian

1948-1958

First Rwanda

1963-1964

Yemeni Imamate

1948-1948

First South Sudan

1963-1972

Costa Rica

1948-1948

Third DRC Rebellion

1964-1965

South Moluccas

1950-1950

Zanzibar Arab-African

1964-1964

Hukbalahap Rebellion

1950-1954

Second Iraqi Kurds

1965-1966

Bolivia

1952-1952

First Chad Rebellion

1966-1971

Indonesia Darul Islam

1953-1953

First Guatemala

1966-1968

Argentine Military

1955-1955

First Uganda

1966-1966

Tibetan Khamba Rebellion

1956-1959

Cultural Revolution Phase 2 1967-1968

Indonesian Leftists

1956-1962

Biafra

1967-1970

First Lebanese

1958-1958

Third Iraqi Kurds

1969-1970

Cuban Revolution

1958-1959

Second Guatemala

1970-1971
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Naxalite Rebellion

1970-1971

Anti-Khomeini Coalition

1979-1984

Black September

1970-1970

Mozambique

1979-1992

First Sri Lanka-JVP

1971-1971

El Salvador

1979-1992

Khmer Rouge

1971-1975

Nigeria-Muslim

1980-1981

First Burundi

1972-1972

Second Chad (Habre Revolt) 1980-1984

First Philippine-Moro

1972-1981

Second Uganda

1980-1986

Rhodesia

1972-1979

Hama

1981-1982

Dhofar Rebellion Phase 2

1973-1975

Shining Path

1982-1992

Baluchi Separatists

1973-1977

Tigrean and Eritrean

1982-1991

Chilean Coup of 1973

1973-1973

Fourth Burmese

1983-1988

Fourth Iraqi Kurds

1974-1975

Matabeleland

1983-1987

Argentine Leftists

1975-1977

Fourth Lebanese Civil

1983-1984

Eritrean War

1975-1978

First Sri Lanka Tamil

1983-2002

Second Lebanese

1975-1976

Second South Sudan

1983-1991

East Timorese War Phase 3 1976-1979

Fifth Iraqi Kurds

1985-1988

Third Laotian

1976-1979

Holy Spirit Movement

1986-1987

Angolan Control

1976-1991

South Yemen

1986-1986

Fourth DRC (Shaba)

1978-1978

Second Sri Lanka-JVP

1987-1989

Second Ogaden Phase 3

1978-1980

Fifth Burmese

1988-1988

Third Guatemala

1978-1984

First Somalia

1988-1991

Saur Revolution

1978-1978

First Aceh

1989-1991

Overthrow of the Shah

1978-1979

Third Chad (Deby Coup)

1989-1990

Sandinista Rebellion

1978-1979

Fifth Lebanese

1989-1990
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Romania

1989-1989

First Congo (Brazzaville)

1997-1997

First Cambodian Civil War

1989-1991

Third Angolan

1998-2002

Shiite and Kurdish

1991-1991

Second Congo (Brazzaville) 1998-1999

First Sierra Leone

1991-1996

Guinea-Bissau Military

1998-1999

Georgia

1991-1992

Second Sierra Leone

1998-1999

Croatian Independence

1991-1992

Africa's World War

1998-2002

Dniestrian Independence

1991-1992

First Nigeria

1999-2000

Second Somalia

1991-1997

Oromo Liberation

1999-1999

Bosnian-Serb Rebellion

1992-1994

Second Chechen

1999-2003

Algerian Islamic Front

1992-1999

Second Aceh

1999-2002

Angolan War of the Cities

1992-1994

Second Philippine-Moro

2000-2001

Second Liberia

1992-1995

Fourth Rwanda

2001-2001

Tajikistan

1992-1997

Third Burundi

2001-2003

Second Cambodia Civil

1993-1997

Cote d'Ivoire Military

2002-2004

Abkhazia Revolt

1993-1994

Fourth Liberian

2002-2003

South Yemeni Secessionist

1994-1994

Third Aceh

2003-2003

First Chechnya

1994-1996

Second Nepal Maoists

2003-2006

Second Rwanda

1994-1994

First Yemeni Cleric

2004-2005

Croatia-Krajina War

1995-1995

Waziristan

2004-2006

Fifth DRC

1996-1997

Fifth Chad

2005-2006

Third Liberia

1996-1996

Third Somalia

2006-2008

Third Rwanda

1997-1998
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